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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis is comprised of six chapters in the following order: 
Chapter I 	Introduction 
Chapter II A Historical Overview of Analytic Philosophy 
Chapter III Picture Theory of Language 
Chapter IV Game Theory of Language 
Chapter V Wittgenstein's Impact on Epistemology 
Chapter VI Critical Evaluafion  
The first chapter itrodn'ction'_brings, out that western philosophy has 
registered a radical paradigii shi-ft ,' n - ,twentiethcentury. The post-Kantian re-
examinations of philosophy have fructified into various methodological 
approaches to philosophy. These approaches pushed substantial ontological, 
cosmological, teleological, axiological and even epistemological questions to 
background and underlined the need for an exploration of the very nature, role 
and function of philosophy itself. Such a methodological approach to 
philosophy was triggered off by great strides in scientific research and 
technological development. The outstanding results achieved in science 
focused the attention of philosophers to the circumlocutory character of 
philosophical discourse. Consequently, wide-ranging methodological studies of 
philosophical problems were carried out from various angles of interpretation 
or within various paradigms of understanding. 
Thus, an existentialist approach to philosophy brought out that 
traditional philosophers have wrongly metamorphosed existential problems 
into speculative disagreements. While philosophy ought to have been engaged 
in illuminating of our individual existence or awakening of our innermost 
authentic responses, it was quagmired into perennially irresolvable abstract 
disagreements about truth, knowledge, meaning, value, reality etc. On the other 
hand, the sociological approach to philosophy also rejected the superscientific 
conception of philosophy. The sociological approach to philosophy does not 
treat a philosopher as a wholly deconditioned agent but a person functioning 
within his deep cultural and ethnocentric prejudices. According to this 
approach, a philosophical world-view cannot be susceptible to logico-
mathematical demonstration or empirical verification; for our philosophical 
responses are deeply conditioned by our cultural presuppositions. Karl Marx 
went to the extent of deeming philosophy as an ideological tool in the political 
and economic conflict between capitalist haves and proletarian have-nots. The 
analytical approach to philosophy pioneered by Betrand Russell, G.E. Moore 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein underlined that an indepth investigation of the 
linguistic origin, genesis and development of philosophical formulations can be 
greatly helpful in the resolution of philosophical problems. It deemed an 
analysis of philosophical language in a comparative methodological framework 
to be highly important in achieving clarity of `philosophical disagreement'. The 
foremost analytical philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, unambiguously 
promulgated the dissolutionistic conception. of philosophy underlining that 
philosophical problems are impervious to resolution but can be dissolved 
through appropriate linguistic analysis. 
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The present dissertation work, in the main, seeks to study the impact of 
Wittgenstein's logical and linguistic theories of what is called his early and 
later phases on his epistemological views. These views he put forward in his 
last works such as On Certainty and Last Writings on Philosophy and 
Psychology etc. This followed a pattern since his mentors in philosophy, 
particularly G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell had had similar course of 
philosophical development. As is well-known, philosophy in the first two 
decades of twentieth century Britain was dominated by the neo-Hegelian ideas 
that were out of tune with the scientific temper of times and these two 
philosophers represented a kind of revolt against their peers who practiced that 
older mode of philosophizing. Wittgenstein himself was informally associated 
with the positivistic ideas of Vienna circle in Austria/Germany but had had his 
philosophical grooming in British universities under the tutelage of Moore and 
Russell. 
The second chapter `Historical Overview of Analytic Philosophy' 
advances an overview of analytic philosophy with special reference to Moore 
and Russell. Moore almost pioneered the method of linguistic analysis in 
resolving the old disputes on the reality or unreality of the physical world. The 
presence of the physical objects could be affirmed or denied not by indulging 
into metaphysical speculation. All that one has to do was to analyse the 
propositions about them and verify their subjects by the seeing, hearing, 
touching, feeling etc. It was through the act of analysis that the world of 
common-sense could be affirmed and the theory of idealism could be reputed. 
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Like Moore, Russell's sympathies were also with a realistic view of the 
world but he theorized his ideas through a procedure of logical analysis. His 
early interests were in the domain of mathematical philosophy that however led 
to his two famous theories namely, theory of types and theory of descriptions 
and finally to his theory of logical atomism that was also the starting print of 
Wittgenstein's own philosophizing in his first phase. In the case of Russell, 
however, the idea of `descriptions' as complex propositions generated the idea 
of logical `samples' that were to be designated as `names' and were also to be 
perceived directly i.e. through `knowledge by acquaintance' which was 
contrasted by `knowledge by description' of complex entities and facts. 
Through years Russell ruminated over the questions of knowledge and reality 
formulating a number of theories. Both Moore and Russell popularized the 
terminology of sense-data and Wittgenstein, too, has had a lot to say on this 
following the line of his predecessors. 
After presenting a historical sketch of the logical and linguistic 
approaches of Russell and Moore, especially as they generated some new 
epistemological reflections, an exposition of Wittgenstein's own philosophical 
theory presented in his book Tretatus Logico-Philosophicus is attempted in the 
third chapter `Picture Theory of Language'. It is seen that, unlike Russell 
and Moore, Wittgenstein's concern was not so much to develop a philosophy 
of Realism, or even to refute idealism or any other philosophical theory for that 
matter. His association with the philosophers of Vienna circle had inculcated in 
him the ambition to develop a scientific or positivistic view of the world. 
4 
Philosophy had to be subservient to science and not the other way round as has 
historically been the case. Scientific world-view was seen to be opposite of 
metaphysical views where some extra-material entities were seen to be more 
real than the entities of physical world. Metaphysics has thus to be done away 
with. While the logical positivist had, in their imagination, accomplished this 
object by having their famous `verification theory of meaning' Wittgenstein 
arrived at his deconstructive conclusions through a further developing of 
Russell's theory of logical atomism. 
Propositions could be either analytic (tautological/contradictory) or 
synthetic. Analytic proposition were (universally) true or false on the basis of 
their very logical structure and did not need any reference to external facts for 
their verification or falsification. The synthetic statements, on the other hand, 
were true/false on the consideration of their reference to an external fact or a 
state-of-affairs. A true proposition was true when its subject and predicate 
terms corresponded to objects out there in external world and stated some 
relation as present between the objects. A proposition, in other words, had to be 
a faithful picture of a state-of-affair in the outside world in order to be called 
true. By applying rigorously this criterion of correspondence and picturisation, 
the metaphysical propositions were automatically eliminated from the domain 
of logically meaningful propositions. The terms line `God' or `merciful' did not 
correspond to any observable objects and hence a proposition like `God is 
merciful' could not be caIIed a meaningful proposition at all. 
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These views of his own, however, were contested by Wittgenstein in his 
second major work Philosophical Investigations. The fourth chapter of this 
thesis, `Game Theory of Language' accordingly, is concerned with this phase 
of his philosophy. Mainly, Wittgenstein's emphasis here shifts from logic to 
language. It is the language, not so much the logic, that plays a crucial part in 
man's understanding of his world. Language, indeed could be said to have a 
life of its own. The solution of philosophical difficulties could be found 
through the understanding of the working of language i.e. a correct analysis of 
linguistic representations of the factualities of world. Most of our commerce 
with world as represented in our communicative devices and strategies does not 
follow the logical pattern. Linguistic devices are diverse and complex of which 
logical presentations are only a part. Language is a larger idea while the logic 
has only its restrive use. 
What is needed then is to understand these diverse and complex uses of 
language. In other words, we have to understand how we play the game of 
language. Basically, Wittgenstein stressed, language is embedded in our life 
world and our playing the language-game is meaningful when the rules of the 
game are strictly followed. When the rules are breached, the language `goes on 
a holiday'; it becomes dysfunctional. Most of the confusions and controversies 
in philosophy have arisen because the philosophers have not played the 
language-game in accordance with the correct rules. The muddles of 
metaphysics can also be avoided by identifying the breaking of rules of the 
philosophers who build metaphysical systems. 
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The fifth chapter titled `Wittgenstein's Impact on Epistemology' 
explores the implications of his theory of language or theory of knowledge. 
The issues pertaining to knowledge or justified true beliefs etc., can have their 
own complex logic. There can be various criteria of knowledge or various 
conditions of knowledge. There can be various theories of knowledge as well 
as various theories of truth. Philosophers can engage in numberless 
disagreements with regard to knowledge, truth and justification. They can 
negotiate various conditions of knowledge, truth and justification and even 
stipulate various conditions thereof. However, they cannot afford to be 
oblivious to the basic methodological distinctions or sophistications with 
regard to the logical terrain of language. They cannot afford to be ignorant with 
regard to the logical topography of language. For if they cannot command a 
clear view of the logical terrain of language, they can perennialIy get 
circumlocuted in the labyrinthine tangles of Ianguage and may never be 
negotiating the orbit of propositional truth or untruth in view of their blissful 
ignorance of basic methodological distinctions within the multicomplex terrain 
of language. Being aware of the logic of language may not be the sufficient 
condition of knowledge but it is a necessary condition of knowledge. The 
philosopher must know how language is actually operating across the 
spectrum. He must be aware of the descriptive and non-descriptive operations 
carried out by a given language. He must grasp the multifunctional, 
multidirectional and multicontextual character of language. 
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Only then can a philosopher grasp that all that glitters at the 
propositional plane need not be golden at the epistemic plane. Language carries 
out an infinite number of operations. In this onward march of linguistic 
infinitum, there are propositions that are referentially true and contextually 
meaningful. However, the primary business of language is not to go on 
engaging in truth-operations or knowledge-operations. Language as such is not 
addressed to exploring truth or arriving at sure and certain knowledge. 
Scientific researchers can aspire to discovering correspondent truth or 
mathematicians and historians can aspire to exploring coherent truth and 
thereby expand the frontiers of knowledge. However, the fundamental mood or 
. 
	
	 direction of any given language is pragmatic. We employ language with a view 
to doing something. We carry out myriad operations through language and in 
all such operations, words and sentences are perfectly meaningfully employed. 
We never question the doing character of language; the functional or 
operational mode of language. However, the questions pertaining to truth and 
knowledge, are, broadly speaking, irrelevant to the fundamentally doing 
character of language. As it happens, language is, primarily oriented to 
pragmatic operations or commercial transactions and only figuratively or 
metaphorically extrapolated to questions pertaining to truth and knowledge. 
We have this irresistible quest for truth, for understanding, for 
realization. However, as Wittgenstein underlined, there is no pure or unalloyed 
truth, understanding or realization. Human understanding is co-extensive with 
language. There is no non-linguistic understanding. Our understanding can 
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have pictorial components. Besides early Wittgenstein's picture theory of 
language or meaning even later Wittgenstein talked of our being trapped into 
mental or conceptual pictures. However, for later Wittgenstein, our 
understanding is primarily interpretative or hermeneutical and, more 
importantly, there is no translinguistic understanding which can yield 
absolutely clear truth or unqualified knowledge. 
The sixth chapter attempts a `Critical Evaluation' of some of the main 
concepts and theories of Wittgenstein. It is seen that the epistemological quest 
for objective knowledge, in view of the above considerations, is impossible of 
realization. A philosopher who is itching for a final, objective, transcendental, 
universal, and eternal metaphysical account of reality or final account of true 
knowledge is to be treated as suffering from conceptual illusions and linguistic 
confusions. He is to be treated as a patient and relieved of his confusions and 
misconceptions, through requisite and appropriate methodological field-
illumination. Bringing out the multiple functions, purposes and uses of 
language is the most appropriate method of liberating the philosopher from his 
puzzlement. This conception of philosophy advanced by Wittgenstein can have 
its' own merits and demerits. However, we need to bring out the limitations of 
Wittgenstein's approach as well. 
Wittgenstein while bringing out the linguistic genesis of philosophical 
problems fails to appreciate their sociological or situational context. 
Philosophical problems do not originate merely from linguistic sources, they 
are sociologically or situationally inspired as well. The emergence and 
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development of human behavior of various dimensions and orientations is a 
function of various crises that we encounter in our societies. Wittgenstein also 
completely ignores the existential axiogenetic or value-genetic character of 
philosophy. 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER - I 
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophy has had a chequered career from being classically defined as 
`Love of Wisdom' or `Mother of all Sciences' to being deemed as a method of 
`clarification of Propositions' in twentieth century. The Classical, Medieval 
and even Modem expectations from Philosophy were large and wide. It was 
deemed to be an exploration of universal and eternal truth transcending all 
cultures, languages, historical twists and turns and civilizational paradigms. 
Plato defined philosophy as an exploration of the eternal and immutable 
Beauty, Justice and Truth. For Descartes philosophy is the study of the perfect 
knowledge of all things that man can know; it seeks to provide a secure 
foundation for all knowledge. For Spinoza, the ultimate end of philosophy is 
nothing but appropriation of truth. Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Hegel and many 
more expounded that philosophy aims at giving us a true account of things or 
of reality. 
However, contemporary western philosophy has registered a radical 
paradigm-shift. The post-Kantian re-examinations of philosophy have fructified 
into various methodological approaches to philosophy. These approaches 
pushed substantial, ontological, cosmological, teleological, axiological and 
even epistemological questions to background and underlined the need for an 
exploration of the very nature, role and function of philosophy itself. Such a 
methodological approach to philosophy was triggered off by great strides in 
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scientific research and technological development. The outstanding results 
achieved in science focused the attention of philosophers to the circumlocutory 
character of philosophical discourse. Consequently, wide-ranging 
methodological studies of philosophical problems were carried out from 
various angles of interpretation or paradigms of understanding. 
Thus, an existentialist approach to philosophy brought out that 
traditional philosophers have wrongly metamorphosed existential problems 
into speculative disagreements. While philosophy ought to have been engaged 
in illuminating of our individual existence or awakening of our innermost 
authentic responses, it was quagmired into perennially irresolvable abstract 
disagreements about truth, knowledge, meaning, value, reality etc. On the other 
hand, the sociological approach to philosophy also rejected the superscientific 
conception of philosophy. The sociological approach to philosophy does not 
treat a philosopher as a wholly deconditioned agent but a person functioning 
within his deep cultural and ethnocentric prejudices. According to this 
approach, a philosophical world-view cannot be susceptible to logico-
mathematical demonstration or empirical verification; for our philosophical 
responses are deeply conditioned by our cultural presuppositions. Karl Marx 
went to the extent of deeming philosophy as an ideological tool in the political 
and economic conflict between capitalist haves and proletarian have-nots. The 
analytical approach to philosophy pioneered by Betrand Russell, G.E. Moore 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein underlined that an indepth investigation of the 
linguistic origin, genesis and development of philosophical formulations can be 
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greatly helpful in the resolution of philosophical problems. It deemed an 
analysis of philosophical language in a comparative methodological framework 
to be highly important in achieving clarity of `philosophical disagreement'. The 
foremost analytical philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, unambiguously 
promulgated the dissolutionistic conception of philosophy underlining that 
philosophical problems are impervious to resolution but can be dissolved 
through appropriate linguistic analysis. 
The present thesis is an exploration of Wittgenstein's theory of 
Language and its' impact on epistemology. We shall be outlining 
Wittgenstein's two paradigms of interpretation popularly known as early and 
later Wittgenstein with a view to figuring out Wittgenstein's theory of 
language. It would be in the fitness of things to provide an outline of these two 
paradigms in this introductory account. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) originally hailing from Vienna. 
Austria and subsequently a professor of philosophy at Cambridge university, 
was the foremost analytic philosopher during the first-half of 20th century. He 
pioneered two methodological frameworks known as (1) logical atomism and 
(2) linguistic analysis. The earlier Wittgenstein following Bertrand Russell, 
gave a clear and categorical version of logical atomism in his book "Tractatus-
Logico- Philosophicus". His Picture Theory Of Propositions or of Language, is 
apparently a direct outcome of his atomistic analysis. 
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Propositions are logical pictures of the situations. They have the same 
structure. Language mirrors the logical form of the universe. The function of 
analysis is to resolve all complex propositions into their ultimate units of 
unanalysable names and their combinations, which represent and mean the 
ultimate units of unanalysable simples of the world. The task of analysis is to 
make every statement an adequate picture of the reality it describes. There is 
an essential correspondence between the structure of the sentence and structure 
of the fact. The world or reality is mirrored in the basic patterns of rational 
discourse. Given the syntax of a scientifically correct language, one can 
determine the ontological structure of objective reality. A perfect Ianguage 
would reveal the fundamental ontological structure of the world. 
In the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein developed the 
clearest formulation of the Russelian notion that the world as it would be 
described by a perfectly lucid and logically immaculate language of science, is 
composed of elementary states which constitute the irreducible and simple 
elements of what there is. The world, he said is everything that is the case. But 
the world also divides into facts, any of which can either be the case or not be 
the case, and everything else remains the same. What is the case, the fact, is the 
existence of atomic facts. An atomic fact is a combination of objects or the 
configuration of the objects. Any "object" which can enter into a 
"configuration" and which is not itself a configuration, must be an 
unanalysable and simple "entity". The basis of any true sign must be statements 
which describes atomic facts, that is configuration of things that are themselves 
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absolutely simple. Such statements, moreover, are themselves logical 
"pictures" of atomic facts, and from an analysis of their essential forms, one 
can gain, as it where, a logical photograph of the elementary atomic structure 
of the real world. In short, an analysis of the basic forms of a proper scientific 
language, automatically provides a kind of mirror of the fundamental structure 
of reality itself. Wittgenstein believed that all general scientific truths are 
nothing but logical compounds of true atomic propositions, that is, again, 
propositions which picture basic atomic facts. 
Wittgenstein asks as to what makes it possible for a combination of 
words to represent a fact in the world? How is that by producing a sentence I 
can say something, can tell someone that so- and —so is the case. Wittgenstein's 
explanation consists in the striking idea that a sentence is a picture .Apparently 
this thought first occurred to him during the first world-war, when he saw in a 
magazine anaccount of how a motorcar accident was represented in a law court 
by means of small models. So he said: "A proposition is a picture of reality. A 
proposition is a model of reality as we think it to be". The dolls and toy-cars 
could be manipulated so as to depict different ways in which the accident might 
have taken place. They could be used to construct different propositions about 
the accident —to put forward different accounts, different models of what took 
place. Similarly when we put a sentence together, we construct a model of 
reality. 
Thus the central question of the Tractatus is how is language possible? 
How can one, by uttering a sequence of words, say something? And how can 
0 
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another person understand him? Wittgenstein was struck by the fact that a man 
can understand sentences that he has never previously encountered. The 
solution that burst upon him was that a sentence that says something (a 
proposition) must be "a picture of reality". A proposition shows a situation in 
the world. His picture theory seemed to explain the connection between the 
signs on paper and a situation outside in the world. In their completely 
analyzed form, the propositions are arrangements of simple signs that are 
correlated with simple elements of reality so that the picture touches reality, so 
to say. 
The following propositions from Tractatus can provide us a fair idea as 
to how language operates in relation to the world: 
4.021- A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, 
I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the 
proposition without having had its sense explained to me. 
4.01(2)- A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it. 
	
4.04- 	In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts 
as in the situation that it represents. 
2.14- 	What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one 
another in a determinate way. 
2.15(1)- The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a 
determinate way represents that things are related to one another in 
the same way. 
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2.13- 	In a picture objects have the elements of a picture corresponding_ to 
them. 
2.131- In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of 
objects. 
One would not normally think that a sentence printed on a page is a 
picture. According to the Tractatus it really is a picture, in the ordinary sense, 
of what it represents. Wittgenstein conceived the proof of this to be that 
although words we have not previously encountered have to be explained to us, 
when we meet for the first time a sentence that is composed of familiar words, 
we understand the sentence without further explanation. "I understand a 
sentence without having had its sense explained to me" (4.021). This can 
appear to one as a remarkable fact. If it is a fact, the only possible explanation 
would be that a sentence shows its sense. It shows how things are if it is true 
(4.022). This is exactly what a picture does. A sentence composed of old words 
is able to communicate a new state of affairs by virtue of being a picture of it. 
In any picture, according to the Tractatus, there has to be a one- to —one 
correspondence between the elements of a picture and the things in the state of 
affairs it represents. If one element of a picture stands for a man and another 
for a cow, then the relationship between the picture element might show that 
the man is milking the cow. A picture is a fact, namely the fact that picture 
elements are related to one another in a definite way. A picture fact shows that 
the things the picture elements stand for are related in the same way as are the 
picture elements. 
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Since a sentence is held to be a picture, there must be as many elements 
to be distinguished in it as in the state of affairs it portrays. The two must have 
the same logical or mathematical multiplicity. Again, this does not seem to be 
true of our ordinary sentences. For Wittgenstein this means not that it is not 
true but that our sentences possess a concealed complexity that can be 
exhibited by analysis. 
According to the Tractatus a picture must have something in common 
with what it pictures. This common thing is the picture's "form of 
representation". There are different kinds of pictures, different pictorial 
notations, different methods of projection. But all pictures must have in 
common with reality the same logical form in order to be able to picture reality 
at all, either truly or falsely. This logical form, also called "the form of 
reality", is defined as the possibility that things in the world are related as are 
the elements of the picture(2.18,2.151). Sentences, since they are pictures, have 
the same form as the reality they depict. 
Wittgenstein pointed out in Tractatus that, from the point of view of 
logical atomism, propositions could be stated significantly only if they could 
correspond to an atomic fact or be truth-functions of propositions that did. The 
propositions of Tractatus too were not significant for they did not state facts. 
They, however, show us the insignificance or meaninglessness of metaphysical 
propositions and therefore are relevantly meaningless. They can be thrown 
away as the ladder, after one has climbed up on it. The right method in 
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philosophy would be to say nothing except what can be said ,i.e., the 
propositions of science. 
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein was aiming at the construction of a perfect 
model of language, a language which would be a kind of picture of the world. 
In this ideal language each word has a fixed meaning and there would be 
something common between the structure of each statement and the structure 
of each fact. 
The Tractatus, Wittgenstein can be regarded as proposing an ultra-realist 
position. Propositions are laid against the world in order to determine their 
truth-value. They either picture facts, in which case they are true, or they do 
not, in which case they are false. The world is fully described by the totality of 
true propositions. As a consequence the limits of language are the limits of my 
world. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's `Philosophical Investigations' (1953), advanced 
a radical interpretation of language. He saw the nature of language in a 
- 
	
	 different light. Wittgenstein came to realize the inadequacies of the theory of 
Ianguage upon which his earlier book Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus rested. 
It was inadequate because it assumed that language has really only one 
function, namely, to state facts. It further assumed that sentences for the most 
part derive their meanings from stating of facts. It assumed that the skeleton of 
all language is a logical one. 
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What struck Wittgenstein now was the somewhat obvious point that 
language has many functions besides simply "picturing" objects. Language 
always functions in a context and therefore has as many purposes as there are 
contexts. Words, he said, are like "tools in a tool-box; there is a hammer, pliers, 
a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws- the functions of 
words is as diverse as the functions of these objects". What made him think 
earlier that language had only one function? He had been held capitive by a 
picture of language as being the giving of names to all things. 
Language has multi- functional character. There are numberless or 
countless ways in which language can be used. It can be used metaphysically, 
ethically, aesthetically, scientifically, symbolically, metaphorically, 
allegorically, parabolically, exhortatively, evocatively, prescriptively 
descriptively, informatively, invocatively , investigatively, affirmatively, 
negatively etc. joking, praying, co etc., are other uses of language. There is no 
common factor in all these uses of language and, in view of the same, a proper 
definition of language is almost impossible of formulation. 
A language-game is a specific activity carried on with language. 
Different language-games highlight the different roles that linguistic 
expressions can play and the purposes for which they may be used. Just as 
there are a number of games and there is a set of rules for each game and there 
is no one common element in games, similarly there is no single core 
embedded in various language-games. 
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Wittgenstein's purpose is to undermine the assumption that words have 
just one role viz; to describe or to refer to. Different language-games serve to 
bring out the different roles that language can play and the different purposes it 
can serve. The need is to clarify the rules and make the games more 
understandable. Words derive their meanings from their use and each word has 
a meaning in one context which can change if used in some other context. 
Therefore, the Wittgenstein's dictum "Do not ask for the meaning, ask for the 
use 
Later Wittgenstein came to realize that an account in terms of facts is 
not the only way to describe the world. He rejected his own logical atomism 
and became suspicious of ideal languages as useful tools in any significant 
programme of philosophisation. He felt that it is useless to pinpoint meanings, 
for no words which are philosophically interesting have a fixed meaning. 
We are the victims, he said, of "the bewitchment of our inteIIigence by 
means of language". Our incorrect picture of language is "produced by 
grammatical illusions". To analyse grammar might lead one to discover some 
Iogical structure in Ianguage. But that cannot justify the conclusion that all 
language has essentially the same rules, functions and meanings. It occurred to 
Wittgenstein that the assumption that ail language states facts and contains a 
logical skeleton was derived not by observation but by "thought". It was 
assumed that all language, in spite of certain superficial differences, is alike, 
the way all games are alike. Wittgenstein uncovered the flaw in this analogy by 
taking the case of games and asking, what is common to them all? - Do not say: 
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there must be something common, or they would not be called "games"- but 
look and see whether there is anything common at all. For if you look at them 
you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, 
and a whole series of them at that. To repeat "do not think, but look". He was 
apparently saying that logical atomism was the product of thought, of theory, 
and not of careful observation of the way in fact language operates and is used. 
Wittgenstein therefore shifted the programme of analysis from a preoccupation 
with logic and the construction of a "perfect" language to the study of the 
ordinary usages of language. He moved away from what Russell and Carnap 
were doing and turned now in the direction of G.E. Moore's earlier emphasis 
upon the analysis of ordinary language. Wittgenstein was now of the opinion 
that language does not contain one single pattern alone, that it is as variable as 
life itself, indeed, he said that 'to imagine a language means to imagine a form 
of life". For this reason, analysis should consist not in the definition of 
language or its meanings but rather in a careful description of its uses: we must 
do away with all explanation and description alone must take its place. 
By recognizing the diversity of the functions of language, Wittgenstein 
inevitably altered the task of philosophy. The function of philosophy was now 
to liberate the philosopher from confusion, puzzlement and bewitchment. Its 
role was now therapeutic. It had to battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language. Linguistic analysis had "to show the fly the 
way out of the fly-bottle". The words had to be brought back from their 
metaphysical use to their everyday usage. By doing so, philosophy will not be 
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adding to our knowledge or providing us new information. It will leave 
everything as it is. It will just clarify our pattern of thinking by a careful 
description of language. 
There is no single supreme method of doing philosophy or working out 
philosophical analysis, although according to Wittgenstein, there are various 
methods like various therapies, which can relieve us of our philosophical 
puzzlement. Because philosophical problems grow out of language, it is 
necessary to acquire a basic familiarity with the usages of language out of 
which each problem arises. As there are many sets of the rules of the games, 
similarly, there are many forms of ordinary language of work, play, worship, 
science, metaphysics, poetry, theology etc. Under these circumstances, the 
work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders of the way language 
is used as a way of clarifying the origin, genesis and development of 
philosophical problems. 
In his later work Wittgenstein denies any attempt to provide an overall 
metaphysical picture at all. We find ourselves caught in a language-game, a 
game that provides us with what we understand as the world. The overall 
metaphysical picture of the relationship between language and reality lies 
outside our grasp, for it lies outside language. As a consequence Wittgenstein 
abandoned any notion of truth as correspondence with or picturing of reality, 
and instead understood meaning and truth as an internal function of language. 
The meaning of a word or sentence was not to be found in some external reality 
but simply in terms of its use within language. 
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Previously, thoughts or ideas were deemed to be lurking somehow 
behind or within `words'. It has come to seem progressively more inadequate 
and in need of replacement by a radically improved perspective. If the root idea 
of the older view is that thought and language are, in principle, wholly 
independent, correspondingly the basic insight of the newer position is that 
there can be no fully articulated thought without symbolic embodiment. 
Language is no longer perceived to be a medium of exchange between 
ideas, but as the very "stuff' of which "ideas" are made. To separate thought 
from language is like separating mind from its embodiment in a human 
organism. 
For later Wittgenstein, therefore, not only is there no objective reality, 
but there is no single meaning. Any sentence or proposition has as many 
meanings as there are contexts. Furthermore, anyone who desires to provide a 
final account is to be treated as if suffering from a philosophical disease. There 
are no answers in any ultimate sense, there are only responses within a 
Y 	
language. 
This radical shift of perspective tends to make the study of language 
nearly co-extensive with the study of all human behavior. More importantly, it 
can be assumed that such a conception of language, can be deeply impactful on 
our quest for truth, knowledge and objectivity. Such a conception of language 
makes our very quest for truth or knowledge to be lingocentric and 
lingogenetic. 
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A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ANALYTIC 
PHILOSOPHY 
The analytical approach to philosophy came into prominence in English 
speaking countries throughout twentieth century. Sometimes, analytic 
philosophy has been designated as a movement rather than a school of 
philosophy. However, analytic philosophy has certain distinguishing 
characteristics. What unifies all analytic philosophers is their agreement 
concerning the central task of philosophy; viz, clarification of the meaning of 
language. To analyze means to break something down into its constituent parts. 
Analytic philosophy attempts to clarify by the meaning of statement and 
concepts by recourse to analysis. The fully-fledged analytical approach to 
philosophy comes into prominence during twentieth century. It started with 
Bertrand Russell and G. Edward Moore. 
As against analytical philosophy, the post-Kantian continental 
philosophers worked out hermeneutical, historical, phenomenological and 
existentialist approaches to philosophy to arrive at interpretations and 
conclusions that are in many ways radically different from those of the 
analytical approach. The analytical approach to philosophy was inspired by the 
confusions that were the outcome of metaphysical system-building. Moore and 
Russell were the leaders of analytical approach. Moore defended common 
sense beliefs against the metaphysical and epistemological adventures such as 
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"matter does not exist", "time is unreal" and "knowledge is impossible of 
attainment" etc. Russell through logical atomistic analysis, theory of 
descriptions and more powerfully through symbolic logic initiated the 
emergence and application of analytical strategies to philosophical statements 
and propositions. Thereafter logical positivists and Iinguistic analysts pursued 
philosophical analysis. They succeeded in dislodging the traditional conception 
of philosophy. They were committed to clarify the logic of philosophical 
language and thereby the sources of philosophical disagreement. The analytical 
approach to philosophy ostensibly means to analyze philosophical judgments, 
arguments, proofs, refutations, theories and systems. For a fuller understanding 
of the real nature of philosophical disagreement, the analytical approach 
advocates an in-depth investigation of the origin and development of 
philosophical theories. By concentrating on the nature, function and use of 
metaphysical judgments, analysts hope to reduce and in ideal situations 
eliminate philosophical disagreement. However it does not mean that analytic 
philosophers come with identical answers to philosophers issues. What 
distinguishes them as a group is their common concern to raise certain meta-
questions regarding the nature of philosophical problems. 
The awareness that philosophical disagreements cannot be resolved 
through methods of empirical verification and logico-mathematical deduction 
inevitably focused the attention of analytical philosophers on the logic of 
language. It was natural because the meta-physician apart from manipulating 
language for the formulation of doctrines obviously does not resort to any 
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rigorous methodological research. Of course, he does advance arguments and 
deduce the subsequent doctrines in his overall system from his premises but his 
very premises are neither empirically verifiable nor logico-mathematicaIIy 
demonstrable. Therefore, subsequent doctrines remain shaky sharing the basic 
methodological fallaciousness of their respective premises. Analytical 
philosophers conclude that there is something wrong at the very bottom of 
metaphysical systematizations. The metaphysician divests ordinary words of 
their conventional uses so as to adjust them in his extraordinary metaphysical 
theorization. Therefore, in order to understand the dynamics of philosophical 
disagreement it is necessary to study at a deeper level the logic of language, its 
diverse uses and functions and the consequent role it plays in the rise of 
philosophical paradoxes. 
Disagreement is a perennially characterizing feature of philosophy. 
Philosophical disagreements have been irresolvable throughout the history of 
philosophy. This irresolvability of philosophical disagreements invited the 
attention of philosophers to take a fresh look at the logic and methodology of 
philosophical discourse. The ever-increasing standardization of natural sciences 
through the application of experimental method and maximum possible 
standardization in social scientific research by recourse to appropriate methods, 
also invited the attention of philosophers to re-examine the very project of 
philosophy. In view of the same, philosophers concentrated on bringing out the 
nature, origin, genesis and function of philosophy instead of being engaged- in 
the proliferation of metaphysical doctrines. 
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The analytical approach constitutes a very powerful critique of classical 
or traditional philosophy carried out with a view to arriving at a philosophical 
truth that is certain, objective, universal and eternal. It is a drastic revision of 
the super scientific pretensions of traditional philosophy. The pioneers of 
philosophical analysis were G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. They designed a 
trend of doing philosophy which despite themselves evolved into a radical 
thesis about philosophy. 
The analytical approach to philosophy tries to analyze the statements, 
arguments, theories and systems worked out by various philosophers. It stands 
for fuller understanding of the role of various uses of language in the genesis of 
philosophical theories. Philosophical analysts are convinced that there is 
something wrong at the very bottom of philosophical language. They allege 
that philosophers divest ordinary words of their conventional use and 
superimpose upon them extraordinary philosophical uses and meanings. 
Therefore, the entire logic of philosophical language needs to be probed and 
reconsidered. 
Analytical philosophers stress that the language of philosophical 
theories needs to be clarified with a view to resolving the controversies going 
on in philosophy. The central contention of linguistic philosophers is that 
philosophical problems can be solved or dissolved either by reforming 
language or by understanding more about language we use. The underlying 
assumption is that linguistic factor play a crucial role in the formation and 
continuance of philosophical disputes. In view of the same, neither empirical 
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research nor logical deductions do help us in the resolution of philosophical 
problems. The only way to understand dynamics of philosophical disagreement 
is to carefully analyze the discourse employed by philosophers. 
Philosophical analysis is not interested in defending or rejecting any 
philosophical system. Philosophical analysis tries to be neutral, treating all 
theories with equidistance. The job of philosophical analysis is to bring out the 
merits and demerits of various philosophical theories in the light of established 
methodological criteria. Philosophical analysts do not formulate substantive 
philosophical theories themselves. Rather they try to examine the meaning and 
function of statements which constitute various philosophical theories 
themselves. For example, a philosophical analyst will not formulate or expound 
such metaphysical statements as: "Real is rational", "Ideas are beyond space 
and time". A philosophical analyst tries to explore the uses or meanings of 
multiple philosophical utterances or terms. His concern is to find out the logical 
status of various philosophical claims and statements. 
The statements advanced by philosophical analysts do not belong to the 
domain of philosophy. They are not philosophical statements but statements on 
or about philosophy. They are remarks on the nature of philosophical 
propositions or about philosophy itself. They constitute an analysis or 
evaluation of philosophical discourse. In a word, these statements are 
metaphilosophical rather than philosophical. 
The philosophical analysts do not ask such questions as: "What is 
Reality?", "What is Knowledge?", "What is truth?", "What is freedom?" etc. 
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Rather, they pose such fundamental methodological questions as "What is the 
nature of Philosophy?", "which of the statements are cognitive or non-
cognitive?", "What is the nature of philosophical disagreement?" etc. 
In response to such methodological questions twentieth century 
philosophical analysts broadly agreed that philosophical propositions are 
devoid of any descriptive content. No data can be collected in support of a 
philosophical thesis. A philosophical contention is neither confirmed nor 
disconfirmed by any criterion or method. A philosophical disagreement 
continues even when contending parties do not expect any new information to 
be forthcoming with a view to clinching the disagreement. A philosophical 
dispute seems to be inherently undecidable. Philosophical problems are not 
open to proof or disproof. 
G.E. Moore (1873-1958), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), Wittgenstein 
(1889-195 1) and Logical Positivists or Vienna Circle philosophers in between 
two world wars, have played a leading role in the development of analytical 
approach to philosophy. A brief overview of their contribution to philosophical 
analysis would be in order. 
George Edward Moore (1873-1958), one of the most prominent British 
analytic philosophers was educated at Durwich College and entered Trinity 
College, Cambridge, with a scholarship in 1892. Having passed negotiated an 
intense religious crisis at the age of eleven to thirteen he never thereafter saw 
any good reason to believe in the existence of God. Russell persuaded Moore to 
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turn his attention to philosophy. Russell said about him: "for some years he 
fulfilled my ideal of a genius". In 1898 he was elected to a prize fellowship at 
Trinity which he held until 1904. In 1903 he published his first book 'Principia 
Ethica'. He was editor of Mind from 1921 to 1947. Subsequently, he published 
two collections of articles called `Philosophical Studies', and `Some Main 
problems of Philosophy'. 
It was Russell who engaged Moore's interest in philosophy and 
philosophical discussions, and then led him, at the end of his first year, to start 
reading philosophy. His concern with the subject was in a sense indirect As 
Moore said "I did not think that the world or science would ever have 
suggested to me any philosophical problem. What have suggested 
philosophical problems to me are things which other philosophers have said 
about the world or sciences". In discussions at Cambridge he heard 
propositions asserted to which he could attach no clear meaning; and he sought 
to have it explained what their meaning was. He heard things stress which he 
could see no sufficient reason to believe and he tried to find out on what 
grounds the assertions were made. 
The most striking feature of his philosophical analysis was perhaps its 
simplicity and directness. His mind had always worked most naturally in 
concrete terms. If time is unreal, ought we not to deny that we had breakfast 
before we had lunch? If reality is spiritual, does it not follow that chairs and 
tables' are far more like us than we think them to be? For Moore philosophy 
was not an exercise in displaying one's intellectual brilliance and subtlety at the 
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expense of common-sense beliefs and convictions. Philosophy was the honest 
pursuit of truth and consistency in both thought and action. (William & 
Hennery. 1962, p.522) 
Moore felt that he, for his part, could not brush aside so lightly a number 
of basic common-sense beliefs and convictions, viz. I have a body', `was born 
a certain number of years ago'. `There are physical objects and other persons 
outside me' etc. He could not help thinking that these beliefs were almost 
certainly true. If so, he could not legitimately assert philosophical statements 
that were incompatible with these basic beliefs. Moore in his famous paper "A 
defense of common sense" underlined that common-sense beliefs and 
convictions were not merely respectable enough to be defended by 
philosophers, but were almost certainly true, and thus, did not stand in any need 
of defense. This led to a transformation of the philosophical enterprises as 
hitherto practiced. (Muirhead, 1962, pp.193-95) 
What did Moore mean by analysis? Moore never went explicitly into 
metaphilosophical or methodological questions. He preferred to practice 
analysis rather than propounded a theory of analysis. But what he actually did 
was to attempt a logical translation of the statement that was sought to be 
analyzed. The analysis or the 'analysians' must be clearer and simpler than the 
`analysandum' or the expression sought to be analyzed. To analyze was, thus, 
to reduce a statement to an equivalent but simpler statement. It was one which 
was further irreducible and whose meaning could be grasped only ostensively. 
Thus `this is a hand' was not simple since it could be reduced to statements 
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about sense data e.g. `I see such and such a patch of such and such colour'. 
Now Moore's trouble was that no attempted analysis could satisfy strict 
conditions of simplicity and equivalence that he had prescribed to himself. 
Both perceptual and ethical statements could not be analyzed without reminder. 
Thus, Moore was never happy with, say, a phenomenalistic analysis of physical 
object statements. Nor was he happy with the naturalistic analysis of ethical 
statements. Moore was thus compelled to say that `good' was an unanalysable 
simple property, just like yellow. He was likewise led to admit that no 
preferred analysis of physical object statements was satisfactory, since the 
exact relationship between sense data and the `physical object' though simple, 
was also unanalysable, like the term `good' was an unanalysable simple 
property, just like yellow. 
How and why was Moore led to lay a special emphasis upon analysis? 
He himself confessed his inability to understand such statements as, `Time is 
unreal', `Reality is spiritual' etc. advanced by philosophers. It was not that he 
could not significantly or correctly employs such statements or that he was 
unfamiliar with the English language in which they were made. As a matter of 
fact, at one time he himself employed similar statements while arguing about 
the ultimate nature of reality etc. But he, later on, realized his understanding of 
such statements was very inadequate (William and Hennery, 1962, p. 574). 
Moore's good sense, simplicity, directness and argumentative rigour had 
a powerful impact on conventional mode of doing philosophy. For the rest it is 
believed there is divergency between his theories so far as he ever had one, and 
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his actual practice. In theory he seems never to have abandoned the idea that 
the goal of philosophical inquiry is to establish very general truths about the 
world, even perhaps, about reality as a whole. He believed no doubt that such 
truths, if any such were established, would not be contrary to common sense, 
for he did not conceive of philosophy quite differently from his meta-physical 
predecessors. His practice, however, consisting as it mostly did in the pursuit of 
analysis, naturally tended to give rise to the idea that the business of philosophy 
is clarification and not discovery; that its concern is with meaning, not with 
truth, that its subject matter is our thought or language, rather than facts etc. In 
its influence the practice was far more important than the theory. 
The starting point of G.E. Moore's philosophical analysis was his sense 
of unease with certain philosophical propositions that violated common sense. 
Moore felt that such metaphysical generalizations as `Matter does not exist', 
`Time is unreal?' etc. violated our common-sense beliefs and convictions. He 
felt called upon to defend such common sense beliefs as `All of us were born at 
certain points of time', and `All of us do possess physical bodies', etc. 
Therefore, philosophical utterances about time being unreal or matter being 
non-existence seemed to him to be very strange. Even philosophers in their 
non-philosophical moments themselves could not believe what they professed 
in their philosophical moods. Moore could never doubt the truth of 
commonsense propositions. However, he was not clear as to their proper 
analysis. 
e 
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Bertrand Russell (1872-1970): 
Russell began his philosophical career as an idealist, but was persuaded 
by G.E. Moore to appropriate common-sense empiricism. He co-authored with 
Whitehead three volumes Principia Mathematica on the philosophy of 
mathematics, wherein like Frege, he attempts to show how mathematics could 
be derived from logic. His work in logic led him to examine language. One of 
the most crucial insights of Russell was that the grammar of ordinary language 
was misleading. He thought that the world was ultimately composed of atomic 
facts, and that proposition, if true, would correspond to these atomic facts. One 
of the tasks of philosophy was to analyze propositions to reveal their `proper 
logical form'. Russell thought that terms such as `The average man' could lead 
to confusion. In the sentence, `The average woman has 2.6 children', the term 
`average woman' should be understood as a logical construction. The term is 
not an atomic fact but a complex statement relating to the number of children to 
the number of women. Russell thought that the terms like `the state' and 
`public opinion' were also logical constructions and that philosophers were 
mistaken in treating these concepts as though they really existed. 
Now, what Russell wants to be analyzed? Russell postulates that the 
world is composed of complex facts. In fact, the very concept of analysis 
presumes that there are complex and compound facts which are to be reduced 
to simple or what Russell calls atomic facts. The philosophical analysis should 
start with facts and not with objects or things. Things and objects are related to 
one another in multiple possible ways in the world and that they are 
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situationally related in complex ways are the facts about the world, although 
admittedly, on the other hand, the objects or things are the substance of the 
world. In order to get the actual picture as it is, we will have to resort to the 
analysis of facts which sum up what is obtaining in the world (Russell, 1960, 
pp.33-7). 
A consideration of the analysis of facts naturally leads Russell to the 
analysis of propositions which in turn are composed of words. Now, there are 
vague, ambiguous and complex words like `truth', `philosophy', `proposition' 
etc. which are reducible to multiple and varying interpretational and 
definitional possibilities. However there are also simple words like `red' or 
`yellow' which cannot be subjected to any further simple reductions in terms of 
analysis and which can only ostensively be defined or pointed out. We can only 
ostensively define the word `red' i.e. only by acquaintance with this patch of 
colour can we understand what it signifies or symbolizes. So the word `red' is a 
simple, unanalysable predicate or quality irreducible to any further analysis. 
Corresponding to such predicates as `red' there must be, so Russell thought, 
other simple symbols the proper names which as a matter of fact must be 
qualified by such predicates. Therefore, an ultimately irreducible proposition 
will consist of a proper name and a simple predicate. Such types of 
propositions are called by Russell atomic propositions which correspondingly 
state atomic facts (Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, 1970, P.  97). 
Now on the plane of language we have simple atomic propositions and 
on the level of what language talks about, the atoms are the simple atomic 
f 
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facts, those expressible by atomic propositions. When we connect these atomic 
propositions by connectives like, `and' or `or', we get complex or molecular 
propositions which have no corresponding complex or molecular facts. While 
an atomic proposition corresponds to an atomic fact, there are no molecular 
facts corresponding to molecular propositions. The truth of an atomic 
proposition is determined by a corresponding atomic fact whereas the truth of a 
molecular proposition can only be indirectly confirmed by atomic propositions 
constituting a molecular proposition, to begin with. It is so because there are no 
molecular facts which could directly testify a given molecular proposition. So 
the fundamental thesis of logical atomism is that language must break down 
upon analysis, into ultimate elements that cannot be analyzed into any other 
propositions; and in so far as language mirrors or pictures reality the world 
must then be composed of facts that are ultimately simple. In this way, Russell 
thinks that the truth-functional character of ordinary discourse consisting of 
complex or molecular propositions will be made clear by analytic procedure 
and the truth claims embedded in it can be articulated or verified (Muirhead, 
1962, pp.642-43). 
Besides logical atomism, Russell also propounds what has been called 
logical constructionism. The examples of logical constructions are `nation', 
`state', `society', `chair', `table' etc. They are not platonic forms housed 
somewhere in some supersensible realm or having some trans-empirical 
reference there, but logical constructions calculatedly programmed in the 
gestalt of language for purposes of efficiency, economy and generality. They 
U 
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are so to say constructed out of simples or particulars for classificatory and 
cataloguing purposes and are reducible to them without any remainder. A 
nation, for example, is not something over and above its nationals which 
compose it. Philosophical confusion arises when we take a logical construction 
for an ordinary name and think that it completely symbolizes some objective 
entity. It happens, for example, when we say: 
England is at war, and think that besides Englishman engaged in the 
administration of warfare "England in itself'" is also somehow 
participating in the war activity, "..... since logical constructions and 
descriptions appear to be just like ordinary names, and are apt be 
viewed by us as complex symbols standing for some objective 
entity, they tempt the unwary to posit descriptive phases or logical 
constructions as real constituents of objective facts, or as parts of the 
furniture of Reality. Analysis enables us to avoid such reification 
(Khawaja, 1965, p.85). 
Yet another seminal contribution of Russell to philosophical analyses is that 
`Paradigm of philosophy' the famous theory of descriptions. The main 
contention of Russell's `theory of descriptions' is to show that definite 
descriptions, such phrases as `the author of Waverly', `the present King of 
France', `the tallest building in New York', etc. do not signify or name any 
object although when couched in sentences their grammatical form readily 
misleads us in the naive belief that they are doing so. Russell tries to show that 
even when definite descriptions are referentially used they still do not function 
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as names. The fact that they meaningfully function in ordinary discourse or 
correspondence does not warrant us to conclude that there is any object which 
they name or stand for. 
The basic assumption underlying such a Russellian account is that the 
meaning of a name is the object it denotes. Now if we maintain that all definite 
descriptions name objects or are their meanings, what are we to say about 
definite descriptions like the `round square' or `the golden mountain'? No 
objective entities correspond to these descriptions and still we cannot dub such 
expressions as meaningless. It is so because although such a description as `the 
round square' does not signify, any object the sentence, "`the round square' 
does not exist" does not express a false proposition, Russell through his theory 
of descriptions tries to clarify this apparent anomaly. 
According to Russell, the trouble starts when we assume that any 
description say `the author of Waverly' functions as a proper name, that, it is 
interchangeable with `Sir Walter Scott', the novelist. This very assumption 
leads us into confusion and bewilderment `The author of Waverly,' Russell 
maintains, has no denotative reference, and therefore for purposes of 
philosophical clarification we have got to abandon this assumption (Ayer, 
1982, p.24). 
It becomes clear when we try to understand the internal logical structure 
of the proposition containing a definite description. Analysis shows that the 
description does not function as a proper name in a particular propositional 
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context. Upon analysis it rather disappears while we cash the real logical 
import of the proposition. To take Russell's own example, the statement, "the 
author of Waverly was Scott" breaks down into three conjunctive statements: 
(A) at least one person wrote Waverly, (b) at most one person wrote Waverly, 
and (c) whosoever wrote Waverly was Scott; and these statements extract the 
real logical cash-value from the misleading grammar of the original statement, 
while the descriptive phase "The author of Waverly" in the process vanishes 
into insignificance. 
By eliminating the descriptive phrase, "the author of Waverly", the 
analysis shows while the analyzed proposition or analysandum "The author of 
Waverly was Scott" appears to be a simple subject/predicate proposition and 
names some actual entity which is qualified by the following predicate, which, 
as a matter of fact, is not the case at all (Ayer, 1982, pp. 25-7). 
Russell developed certain techniques of analysis, which revolutionized 
our way of doing philosophy. He did not question the traditional definition of 
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	 philosophy as being the pursuit of truth. The logical atomism developed by him 
is itself considered a metaphysical thesis. However, even then the every 
philosophy of logical atomism, eventually, developed into what may be called 
analytical approach to philosophy. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) 
Ludwig Joseph Johann Wittgenstein was born in Vienna in 1889. To 
begin with, Ludwig Wittgenstein was educated at home, but because of the 
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emphasis which his father placed on the technical aspects of his education, he 
was unable to satisfy the classical requirements for entrance into any of the 
Viennese gymnasiums. Thus, in 1903 Wittgenstein was enrolled in the real 
schedule in Linz, where he could continue to pursue a more practical rather 
than a classical education. Wittgenstein completed his Matura in Linz in 1906 
and then planned to study Physics under Ludwig Boltzmann in Vienna. 
However, following Boltzmann's suicide in 1906, Wittgenstein began instead 
to study mechanical engineering at the technical academy in Berlin. 
Wittgenstein left Berlin in 1908 and with the encouragement of his 
father; he entered the college of technology in Manchester, where he initially 
performed experiments in aeronautics with kites at Glossop in Derbyshire. His 
interest then shifted to the development of aeroplane engines, and he designed 
a reactor jet which was powered by the hot gases from a combination chamber. 
He then began working at the laboratory of the engineering department to 
develop a gas discharge nozzle for this engine, which in turn led him to work 
on the design of a propeller. It was during this time that Wittgenstein became 
involved in a weekly discussion group devoted to the "foundations of 
Mathematics" and it was here that he first heard about Russell's Principia 
Mathematica which had been published in 1903. 
The earlier Wittgenstein substantially followed Russell in his account of 
logical atomism. The Wittgenstein's version of logical atomistic approach in 
Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus is only more rigorous and exacting than that of 
Russell's. Wittgenstein at the very outset also starts with analysis of facts as 
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according to him facts about the objects or things, are the stuff, into which 
entire world can be reduced ultimately. 
For Wittgenstein the most facts about the world are highly complex and 
can be deduced from less complex facts which in turn are deducible from still 
less complex facts and this process continues till we ultimately reach a point 
where the analyzed facts cannot be further analyzed. These irreducible and 
unanalyzed facts are what Wittgenstein calls atomic facts. In the final analysis, 
these are the ultimate building blocks which compose the multi-complex 
world- situation. "Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a 
statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe 
complexes completely" (Wittgenstein T. 2.020 1). 
Again, following Russell, Wittgenstein is led to postulate what he calls 
elementary propositions, those that cannot be analyzed into any further more 
basic ones. It is these elementary propositions which express atomic facts. 
Atomic facts are photographically mirrored by elementary propositions; they 
have a structural correspondence with these basic propositions (Ayer, 1982, 
p.110). 
For Wittgenstein too, all complex propositions are the truth functions of 
elementary propositions and structurally correspond to atomic facts. It is when 
the complex or molecular propositions are reduced to their elementary 
constituent propositions that we get to understand their truth claims. The 
elementary propositions express the states of affairs that go to compose 
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complex propositions as non-elementary propositions are nothing but 
elementary propositions combined. 
It means that all complex propositions are truth-functions of their 
constituent parts. If we were furnished with all the elementary propositions and 
if we knew which of them were true and which false, we would know 
everything that is to be known as the truth value of any molecular proposition 
depends entirely on the truth value of its constituent parts, that is elementary 
propositions: 
If all true elementary propositions are listed, the world is 
completely described. A complete description of the world 
is given by listing all elementary propositions and then 
listing which of them are true and which false. (T. 4.26) 
The central contention of later Wittgenstein is that words of a natural language 
are multifunctional and are used in a variety of ways. The traditional 
philosophers did not pay requisite attention to the multifunctional characters of 
words. Words have descriptive, explanatory, exhortative, interpretative, 
allegorical, metaphorical, symbolic, prescriptive, legislative and numberless 
other uses. Philosophical problems are generated by confusing these diverse 
uses with one another. The confusion of multiple uses or functions of language 
is the main source of philosophical problems. Therefore, the clarification of the 
logic of Ianguage is the most important technique of resolving philosophical 
disagreements (Peursen, 1969, pp.75-9). 
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As a matter of fact, we play multiple language-games in our daily 
engagements. We give orders, report events, formulate hypotheses, make up 
stories, tell jokes, guess riddles, thank, curse, great, pray, etc. All these uses of 
language are perfectly legitimate. However, in most of traditional philosophical 
discourses, philosophers have confused different uses of various words. For 
example, most traditional philosophers have assimilated all declarative 
sentences to one paradigm use, namely, `the descriptive one'. Thus, a 
traditional philosopher will hardly differentiate between such sentences as: "the 
table is brown" and "real is rational", although the first sentence is descriptive 
and the second is interpretative. The logic of various uses of language is 
seldom differentiated in traditional philosophy (Pitcher, 1964, p. 224). 
Logical positivists emerged as a fully-fledged movement in the first half 
of twentieth century. Their work in between the two wars especially attracted a 
very great deal of attention. Their main thesis is immediately intelligible. 
Schilick, Carnap, Waismann were its' leading lights. Logical positivists were 
deeply inspired by Russell's work in logic and Wittgenstein's powerful 
formulation of the relation of Logic and Language in the Tractatus. They were 
also deeply impacted by Wittgenstein's insights that metaphysics was 
impossible in view of limitations of the logic of Language. To differentiate 
themselves from the earlier Comtean positivists and to emphasize that they 
would combine the rigorous techniques of Logic with empirical temper of 
Hume, they called themselves logical positivists or sometimes logical 
empiricists. The basic contention of logical positivists was presented with 
0 
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hypnotic clarity and force in A.J. Ayer's brilliantly lucid and powerfully argued 
book. Language, Truth and Logic (1936). The book popularized the classic 
position of Vienna Circle. It called for a blanket rejection of metaphysics and 
the grounds for this rejection were to be found in the Vienna Circle's famous 
verification principle, viz; The meaning of a statement is the method of its' 
verification' (Ayer, 1982, pp.130-34). 
So the basic attitudes of the so-called Vienna circle from which logical 
positivism originated, were two: on the one hand, an extreme respect for 
Science and Mathematics; and on the other hand, an extreme distaste for 
Metaphysics. Its main aim was to devise some clear criterion by the use of 
which Science and Mathematics would be proved acceptable and metaphysics 
by contrast, would be condemned to the realm of insignificance. The logical 
positivists were not, as philosophers, concerned with the truth or falsehood of 
scientific statements. Their proper concern, as philosophers, was held to be 
with meaning. Accordingly, the criterion they devised was to be a test of 
meaningfulness or significance, a test which the sciences would pass and 
metaphysics would not. This criterion became ultimate court of appeal for 
logical positivists and was known as the verification principle (Cooper, 1996, 
pp.451-54). 
With their strong empirical orientation and scientific temper of mind 
logical positivists put forward an ultra radical version of philosophical analysis, 
an approach worked out in their respective ways by Moore, Russell and earlier 
Wittgenstein. They were especially inspired by the central message of 
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Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, viz. "Philosophy does not result in 
`Philosophical Propositions' but rather in the clarification of propositions". It 
neatly summarizes the logical positivistic programme, both negatively and 
positively; what philosophy is not and what it is. Negatively speaking, 
philosophy is not the sum-total of factual propositions or a descriptive super 
science and positively it is the clarification of language calculated to determine 
what and what not can be meaningfully communicated (Cooper, 1996, p.459). 
Logical positives divided language into two broad categories; (1) 
cognitive statements and (ii) emotive statements. The statements that can be 
interpersonally, intersubjectively, objectively or transculturally understood are 
cognitive statements. On the other hand, the statements that can stir our 
sentiments, impulses, convictions, beliefs or emotions can be said to be emotive 
statements. Logical positivists subdivide cognitive statements into analytic a 
priori statements and synthetic a posteriori statements. Logical and mathematical 
propositions are analytic apriori statements for they are true by analysis or 
definition and need no corroboration by empirical or evidential data. Scientific 
statements are synthetic a posteriori for they are not true by definition and need 
to be verified in the light of appropriate evidential data or suitable and reliable 
experimentation. The statements of metaphysics, mysticism, theology and 
literature etc. are neither amenable to logico-mathematical demonstration nor to 
experimental verification. They are neither true by definition nor by 
verification. Such statements can also not be falsified or disproved. In view of 
the same, such statements are neither true nor false but meaningless and 
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nonsense. The fundamental methodological criterion of demarcation between 
meaningful and meaningless statements is the method of verification. Any 
statement amenable to a method of verification can be said to be a meaningful 
statement. A statement that is not susceptible to any method of verification is 
simply and clearly meaningless and nonsense. 
Moore and Russell on Knowledge 
As analytical philosophers, both Moore and Russell dabbled in 
analyzing the phenomena of knowledge but from relatively non-conventional 
perspectives. Before them they had the legacy of Berkeley's subjective 
idealism with esse est percipi as the capsule principle and also the Humean 
skepticism to which the Berkeliyan theory supposedly led. Both philosophers 
were not in empathy with any of these two models and desired to have a 
`realistic' view of the world and its knowledge. American theorists of nal ve 
and critical versions of realism were not yet under circulation and the only 
model left was that of Mill's phenomenalism in which the objects were reduced 
to permanent possibilities of sensations'. 
In his `Defense of commonsense', as already seen, Moore's concern was 
to attempt the analysis of propositions of such kind as "This is a hand" and 
"That is a sun" etc., assuming already that the `hand' and the `sun' existed as 
facts. But while naively believing the existence of physical objects he was yet 
aware of the fact that these objects in themselves were not exactly and directly 
the subjects of the proposition about them. The real subjects were rather the 
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sense-data which the propositions were concerned about and which could not 
be identical with objects themselves. He was also sure that the sense-data were 
not identical with the surface of the objects which the propositions were 
supposed to be concerned with. 
Were then the sense-data `caused' by the surface of objects as is 
ordinarily supposed. Moore is not sure about this. He would rather say that 
there is some mysterious unanalyzable kind of relationship existing between 
the object's surface and the sense-data. He is non-committed too about the 
Mill's theory according to which the things as such did not exist but were 
bundles of sensations that in their successive configurations produced the 
illusions of material things. The sense-data (alternatively called `sense-
content') were themselves presupposed to be actual and this actuality could 
itself be ensured by merely the presence of a white envelope or a dog or the sun 
or hand etc. 
What one saw while a white envelope was presented before him was a 
`white patch of colour, of a particular size and shape'. And this is what 
constituted the sense-data that was the subject of the proposition about the 
white envelope. But the colour, size and shape were rather the qualities of the 
objects and there was some confusion on the part of Moore whether he thought 
these to be sense-data. Especially, he most often uses the term sense datum as 
particular e.g. to a white patch of colour, it could not be the group of qualities 
themselves. Be that as it may, however, Moore also considers hearing of a 
sound, feeling of tooth-ache etc. also as sense-data. Now these latter are all 
r 
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mental events but Moore would never bring `mind' in his discussion for fear of 
becoming even a part idealist. The realism was to be maintained at any cost. 
Commenting and criticizing this idea, A.J. Ayer writes: 
"The mere fact that an object is directly apprehended is a sufficient 
condition for it to be a sense-datum. Moore does not, however,. Say that it is a 
necessary condition, because he still does not wish to commit himself to the 
proposition that sense-data cannot exist unperceived. In saying that it is a 
sufficient condition, he forgets that he has also spoken of abstract entities, like 
propositions, as being directly apprehended. But perhaps he could have said 
that the sense in which abstract entities are directly apprehended is different 
from that in which sense-data are" (Ayer, 1971, p. 234). 
According to Moore, when for example one sees his right hand, he is 
also seeking something else and that in all cases of perception one always 
`picks out' a sense-datum from a `visual field'. It is a natural view that thing is 
identical not with his whole right hand but with that part of the surface which 
r 
	
	he is actually seeing but will also be able to see in changed conditions. Some 
parts of the surface are within the focus while there are other parts which are 
not in focus. The sense-data is what is in focus and what is picked out from the 
larger field. But obviously, as Ayer said, what was outside the visual focus was 
not the object of perception and hence was excluded from the meaning of 
sense-data. The sense-data cannot be distinguished from the physical objects 
the way one physical object or one sense-datum can be distinguished from the 
other. Moore's own conclusion, however, is that "sense-data cannot be 
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perceived otherwise than directly, and that from the fact that a sense-datum is 
directly perceived, it follows logically that it exists" (Ibid., p. 236). 
The terminology of sense-data was also used by Moore's contemporary 
Russell more extensively and more systematically though only in an altered 
sense. Like Moore, Russell, too, was an analytical philosopher but his analysis 
was more in the domain of logic than language as such. This meant that he 
approached the epistemological issues rather directly instead of analyzing the 
proposition about the objects known. He was indeed involved in the discussion 
of epistemological problems as a result of the consideration of his logical 
atomism, particularly his theory of types and theory of descriptions. Logically, 
a `name' is what refers to an object which is purely existent. Now, in strict 
logical sense is what is given in our direct experience i.e. the sense-data like 
redness, hardness, sweetness etc. The knowledge of these `simples' is 
knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge of things which are inferred from 
these sense-data are knowledge by description as they are described by and 
analyzable into names which stand for sense-data. 
It may be seen that according to these definitions most of our words 
which we take as names are not names at all. Words like Scott', `table', 
`horse' are not names as they are known to exist only through sense-data i.e. 
the qualities which they supposedly inhere. But before all this could be said, 
there was at first the rejection of naive realism'. 
"We all start from "naive-realism" i.e. the doctrine that things are what 
they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is 
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cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, 
and the coldness of snow, are not the greenness, hardness and coldness that we 
know in our own experience, but something very different. The observer when 
he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be 
believed, observing the effects of stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be 
at war with itself when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into 
subjectivity against its will. Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, 
shows that naive realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false" 
(Russell, 1912, p.13). 
Knowledge, in strict logical sense, is knowledge by acquaintance i.e. of 
sense-data. The datum occurring to me at present moment is all that I can be 
sure of knowing at the present. The descriptive knowledge of material things is 
inferred and therefore uncertain. When I say I see a table, what actually I know 
is a red patch of colour; my knowledge of the table to which I think the given 
datum belongs has grounds other than experiential. I think that table must exist 
whether or not I see it. When the table is covered by a cloth, we do not see the 
table. But as the cloth cannot rest miraculously in the air, we infer that there is 
a table which the cloth covers. Similarly, if I reduce for example the cat into 
the data that it gives to me, then our saying that the cat is hungry would mean 
that sense-data are hungry which is pre-posterous. Again, I cannot say that the 
cat becomes non-existent when I shut my eyes and comes again in existence 
when I reopen them. It is much more natural to say that the reason of my seeing 
and not seeing the cat is to be found in myself and not in the cat itself. Thus, 
r 
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our "instinctive faith" in the persistence of material things to cause different 
appearances leads us to assert our knowledge of them. 
In his first philosophical work Problems of Philosophy Russell admitted 
that knowledge of material things is based upon instinctive faith. But what 
about the mind whose contact with sense-data constituted a case of knowledge. 
Is it known directly i.e. by acquaintance or indirectly i.e. by description? 
Russell is hesitant to give any clear and categorical answer to it. On the one 
hand, it is clear that when I think introspectively of myself, what I come across 
are bits of thoughts and not the self disemboweled of its contents. This means 
that the bare self is known only indirectly. But, on the other hand, man is said 
to be privileged in being self-conscious as against the animals who are only 
conscious. An animal only sees the sun, but I know that I see the sun. This 
means that in a case of knowing the whole object of my knowledge is `I (or 
self) acquainted-with-sun', that is to say, the self and datum both are objects of 
my acquaintance in a case of knowing. 
The knowledge of bare selves or minds, whether direct or indirect must 
be admitted, as it is indispensable in explaining the perceptual knowledge. 
Russell, indeed, refuses to believe that the mind is known by acquaintance in 
his subsequent philosophy of phenomenalism. He however continued asserting 
it on the ground that it is a necessary term in the occurrence of relation called 
'knowing'. Knowledge, according to him, is essentially a relational occurrence. 
It is when mind comes in relation to data that the knowing occurs. Both the 
subject and object are necessary and any attempt to reduce one into other is, 
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according to Russell, doomed to be a failure where the explanation of 
perceptual knowledge is required. 
Idealists reduce the objects into subject saying that in every case of 
knowledge, it is our knowing of a thing that makes that thing known. Were the 
mind non-existent, the knowledge and for that reason known object also could 
not exist. But, for Russell, this was a fallacious reasoning. In a case of 
experience, the object experienced must be distinguished from the act of 
experiencing. The latter is mental, but the former need not necessarily be 
mental. We are conscious of data; or, in other words, data are what are given or 
presented to mind which means that they are independent of and external to 
mind. The knowing is a mental occurrence while the object known is 
something physical. 
Russell also rejects the content theory upheld by American critical 
realists according to which the sense being dependent upon the mind are part of 
it. One stick looks straight and bent in two different conditions and it is argued 
that the dissimilarity must be in the appearances not in the stick itself. Thus, the 
appearances pertain to the mind and are parts of it. It is not the stick itself 
which has become bent when dipped into water, but our experiencing it has 
made it appear defectively. Russell, however, denies the argument by saying 
that the socalled defective appearances are infact not defective. The stick, 
inasmuch as it is seen bent, it is bent. It is not at all wrong to say that visually 
the stick is bent. It would however, be wrong to say that tactually also it is bent. 
A ghost may also be real inasmuch as it is seen. Thus, the fact of a thing as 
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appearing in an unusual manner cannot make it unreal or a fancy of the mind. 
The appearance is quite real, objective and external to mind. 
Besides idealism and content theory there is the Jamesean doctrine of 
neutral monism which stands for the reduction of mind and making the mere 
sense sufficient to explain knowledge. Both mind and material substance are 
inexperienced and therefore non-existent. Only sense-data are known and it is 
their inter-relation that constitutes knowing. But Russell rejects this doctrine 
also. James said that one sensum comes in contact with another sensum and the 
event called knowing occurs. From this it followed that if only one datum 
occurred in the biography of a person, he could not know anything. But this is 
incorrect. Russell says that logically it is perfectly possible that amind exists 
for a fraction of a second, experiences a datum and ceases to exist. Moreover, 
when I experience a sensum, there is a sort of intimacy and immediacy between 
myself (I) and the object ('this'). This immediacy cannot be explained by the 
non-relational theory of neutral monism. The argument is what Russell calls 
argument from emphatic particulars. Russell also says that even if you explain 
perceptual knowledge without invoking mind you cannot explain the `belief, 
`remembering', `knowledge of non-temporal object' etc. which are purely 
mental occurrences. In all of these no external presentation is involved, yet we 
know that we know something. Positively, Russell says that the mere fact that 
mind is not directly known does not make it to be non-existent. That there is a 
mind is shown by the fact of privacy and subjectivity that characterize an 
experiencing-subject. When I experience something, what I experience is 
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strictly mine. The object I experience may be experienced simultaneously be 
other people. But my experiencing of the experienced object is my own and 
cannot be experienced by another person. Thus, though inexperienced, mind 
must be believed because in its terms alone we can explain the essentially 
relational character of perceptual knowledge. 
In Our Knowledge of the External World which represents Russell's 
second stage in the development of his ideas concerning the problem of 
perception, Russell felt it necessary to assume the mind to render perceptual 
phenomena explicable. He however did not feel the same necessity in regard to 
material substance. The principle of Occam's razor made it desirable to reduce, 
if possible, the inferred entities into their functions. Russell, in this book 
formed a construction of what he called "sensibilia" and showed it doing all the 
functions that were done by substantial material things. Sensibilia included 
actual sense plus those hypothetical which were inferred from the former. This 
inference of hypothetical sense from actual ones admitted lesser risk as 
compared to the inference of substantial things from them. It was less 
hazardous to deduce from the sense-data the entities of same nature and status 
than to deduce from them the things of radically different nature. And this was 
the justification behind Russell's endeavor to replace the material thing by their 
sensible functions. The greatest advantage of it was that if it was believed there 
did not remain the gulf between the world of sense and the world of physics 
which is caused when we admit physical things on an apriori basis. 
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But phenomenalism is half neutral monism. The analysis of knowledge 
that leads to phenomenalism, when carried further, leads to neutral monism. 
We reject the material substance on its inexperienced and inferred character 
and we can do the same with regard to mental substance as well. The theory of 
neutral monism was, indeed, for many reasons, quite luring for Russell. For one 
thing, it involved minimum of assumptions and, being so, conformed fully to 
Russell's formula of Occam's razor. Moreover, it was in consonance with the 
results of some of the new theories in physics and psychology. Quanta physics 
and theory of relativity disembowelled matter of its `materiality' and 
behaviouristic psychology eviscerated mind of its 'mentality'. It was thought 
that a synthesis can be made between these two opposite trends by treating the 
ultimate stuff as metaphysically neutral. In Russell's own philosophy, the 
sensibles were already doing the function of material things and if the mind 
could be dispensed with, they could also be shown to be the function of mind. 
Russell wished he believed in neutral monism. But the above stated 
objections prevented him from doing so. He, however, made great efforts to 
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overcome these objections and when he wrote Analysis of Mind, he was a full- 
fledged neutral monist. He abandoned the objection based upon emphatic 
particulars saying it to be too abstract and farfetched. The mental occurrences 
like beliefs, memory etc. were explained by saying that they are not mental in 
their essence. They are intrinsically alike with sensations which are physiological 
and neutral. Only they observe laws which are different from the laws observed 
by sensations and physical objects. Physical objects are governed by physical 
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laws and are studied by physics. Beliefs, memories and other such occurrences 
observe psychological laws and are studied by psychology. Sensations are 
neutral in being subject to both physical and psychological laws. 
Perception, according to this theory, consisted in a sensation coming in 
relation to `mnemic phenomena which it itself gives rise. When, for example, I 
experience a prick due to the pinching of some needle, the occurrence becomes 
associated with a similar occurrence occurred in my biography in the past. 
Photographic plates also experience the events inasmuch as they record them, 
but they are not said to `perceive them, as there does not arise in their context 
the mnemic association characteristic to men, Experiences do not only give rise 
to maemic phenomena but are also influenced and modified by them. My present 
experience of the words which I see in the books would have been different if I 
had not already experienced them on many occasions in the past. 
This definition of perception was non-relational in that it explained 
perception without bringing in the notion of mind. A sensation with its mnemic 
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	 associates constituted perception. Russsell presented this theory in his Analysis 
of Mind which was published in 1921. But when again he came to write his 
Analysis of Matter (published in 1927) he abandoned this theory. Russell 
thought that this theory, although logically unassailable, was, however, against 
certain very strong assumptions of common sense and physics. In physics, for 
example, we believe in universal causal laws. We see on many occasions a 
certain event producing another event and postulate a law about the causal 
._ 	 connection between the two events. On the basis of this law we infer the 
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presence of an unexperienced cause-event when the effect-event is experienced. 
It is clear that if in a case the effect-event is actual, its cause-event must also be 
actual whether or not experienced. But according to non-relational theory, a 
cause-event, when unexperienced, existed only hypothetically or `ideally. This 
implied that even an ideally existing cause could produce an actual effect. This 
is clearly improbable; it is much more natural to say that an actual cause exists 
whether or not experienced, when the effect is experienced. 
F 
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CHAPTER-Ill 
PICTURE THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus is a comprehensive work of exceptional 
originality. It is comprised of a series of remarks numbered in decimal notation. 
The following propositions of Tractatus may be cited as typically bringing out 
the basic philosophical vision as well as structure of the book. 
1. The world is everything that is the case.( Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 
1961,T.1) 
2. What is the case, the fact is the existence of states of affairs. (Ibid.T.2) 
3. A logical picture of facts is a thought. (Ibid.T.3) 
4. A thought is a sentence with a sense. (Ibid.T.4) 
5. A sentence is a truth function of elementary sentences. (Ibid.T.50) 
6. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof, one must be silent. (Ibid.T.7) 
As already discussed in the introductory chapter, Wittgenstein 
developed his philosophical ideas under the influence of Russell and against 
the background of positivist ruminations of the scholars of Vienna Circle. They 
were apparently two divergent streams of thought located in two different 
places. RusseII was an epistemologist and a metaphysician in a more or less 
traditional sense while the philosophers of Vienna circle were anti-
metaphysicians having their background not so much in academic philosophy 
but other disciplines. The concern with logic and language was, however, what 
bound them together. 
Chapter III 	 Picture Theory of Language 
It was this consideration of logic and language that made Wittgenstein 
being in empathy with both Russell and the Vienna circle philosophy. Like 
Russell he came to the consideration of the nature of world and reality by the 
consideration of the logical structure of propositions and statements. Firstly, it 
was clear that the logical statements stated or pretended to state the facts of the 
world or the state-of-affairs. But since facts were almost universally complex 
or composite facts the propositions which picturized them were also complex 
and compound. To put it the other way round, since the propositions were 
almost universally complex the facts they described were also complex and 
composite. 
It was therefore the question of analyzing both the complex propositions 
and compound facts in their simpler constituents such that the one may 
correspond to the other in a logical way. The question was however what kind 
of relationship existed in a proposition and the corresponding fact to bind them 
together and also to become mentally comprehensible. Frege who was also 
associated with of Vienna circle had said that every descriptive statement 
carried a `thought' but this thought was not what happened in the mind of an 
individual but something that referred to a reality in objective world that can be 
equally thought of by several individuals. Wittgenstein, simplifying the matter, 
simply said that the propositions simply referred to external facts in order to 
make sense. 
In other words, the `sense' of a proposition was the fact which it referred 
to or represented. A true proposition represented an existing or actual fact or 
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state-of-affair. But what about a false proposition. The problem here was that if 
a true proposition represented a `true' fact, a false proposition would represent 
a false fact. But a false fact was a contradiction in terms. Wittgenstein wriggles 
out from this difficulty by saying that the facts or situation may be either actual 
or possible or existent or non-existent. He also describes them to be `positive 
facts' and `negative facts'. Explaining it, he says that some combinations of 
objects may actually exist while some others may be non-existent. Our actual 
world then consists of positive facts which are composites of positive atomic 
facts. In the words of Pitcher: 
The world, then, includes all the positive atomic facts, all the 
existing states of affairs in their state of existing; reality is 
wider, and includes all the positive and negative facts, all the 
existing and non-existing states of affairs in their respective 
states of existing and non-existing. If this interpretation is 
correct, then Wittgenstein has apparently given to non-actual 
states of affairs a shadowy kind of being; full existence is not 
attributed to them, of course, but rather some kind of 
subsistence in a strange realm of non-existence, of mere 
possibility.., it would seem that states of affairs... can reside 
in either of two realms; either in the realm of existence, in 
which case they are positive atomic facts and parts of the 
world, or in the realm of non-existence, in which case they 
are parts not of the world, but merely reality in general 
(Pitcher, 1964, pp. 47-8) 
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As already seen, a fact is combination of objects and these objects must be 
actual to make facts. The facts, whether actual or possible, existent or non-
existent, are always composed of objects which are actual in all cases. There 
may be possible facts but there cannot be possible objects. The facts therefore, 
even when possible, are composed out of actual objects. The actual objects in 
their right arrangement and combinations make the true actual fact while in 
their wrong configuration they make the non-existent facts. When, for example, 
we say that `the cat is on the mat', it is an existing fact comprised of existing 
objects. But when we say the `tree is on the bird' it is a false fact because the 
objects `tree' and `bird' are arranged falsely. But in both cases the objects, i.e. 
the cat and the mat or the bird and the tree are genuine objects. 
It also follows that the false or non-existent objects do not make either a 
true fact or a false fact. The `fairies' and the `giants' are, for example, false 
objects and hence any fact comprising of two in their interrelationship (e.g. `the 
giant kidnapped the fairy') will be neither actual nor possible fact. It will not be 
a fact at all. All talk of non-existent objects, then, including the suggestion that 
non-existent states of affairs might be non-actual arrangements of them, is 
necessarily nonsensical. So, all states of affairs, both existent and non-existent, 
are arrangements of existent objects only. 
Wittgenstein even goes on to say that a proposition may represent a fact 
(that constitutes its `sense') both in a positive and negative way. When, for 
example, we utter the proposition "the cat is on the mat" it will refer positively 
to its corresponding fact when the objects are in their proper arrangement. But 
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the same proposition will also represent, albeit negatively, the fact when the 
objects are supposed not to be arranged in the natural or normal way. Since, in 
other words, the mat and cat cannot be hanging together in air without some 
support, any proposition purporting to describe that kind of false situation will 
be a false proposition. 
There are negative descriptions of states of affairs but no negative fact 
as such according to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein thought it impossible to admit 
the existence of negative states of affairs. There are negative non-elementary 
propositions which describe negative non-atomic situations. For example, it is a 
negative fact that Indira Gandhi was the president of India or that Indira 
Gandhi was born in England. But the negativity of these propositions can be 
ascertained by reducing them to nothing by analyzing them into atomic 
propositions. A proposition must describe a positive state of affair and a 
negative proposition would describe a negative state of affair. This negative 
state of affairs will differ from the positive one for reasons of there being 
present an extra `not'. The negative state of affairs could be very like the 
positive one except that it would contain one more object. Similarly, two 
elementary propositions — one positive and the other negative — would be alike 
except that the negative one would contain one more name. 
According to Wittgenstein, while ascertaining the `sense' of a 
proposition what is required is to ultimately arrive at the elementary or atomic 
propositions. The sense of any proposition can thus be stated completely by 
means of elementary propositions and what connects those propositions. Thus 
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xz 
if we have a list of all po
.
ihl elbmentary propositions and their connectives, 
we could say anything that is sayable by simply making selections from the list. 
Non-atomic propositions are comprised of atomic propositions. They are, in 
other words, molecular propositions which are structures of atomic or 
elementary propositions. As to the question in what way are the atomic 
propositions combined to make the molecular ones, Wittgenstein's answer was 
that the latter are the `truth function' of the former. Pitcher explains this idea 
thus: 
All propositions, Wittgenstein says, are truth functions of 
elementary propositions. Given all the elementary 
propositions, if I knew which were true and which false, I 
would know everything which there was to know, because 
the truth value of any other proposition is entirely determined 
by the truth-value of its component elementary propositions. 
Even under these favorable circumstances, to be sure, I may 
not know at once the truth-value of a given molecular 
proposition, for I may not realize right away which 
elementary propositions are its components, nor precisely 
how they are truth functionally connected. Nevertheless, the 
whole truth about the world is determined solely by the truth-
values of the elementary propositions. (Pitcher, 1964, p. 58) 
Several questions arise here. The most important among them is can the 
universal propositions be called the truth function i.e. the logical equivalent of 
Chapter III 
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atomic propositions in which it is analyzed. For Russell who had first used the 
term `truth-function' and from whom Wittgenstein borrowed it, had said that 
the universal propositions are not exactly reducible to the totality of analysans. 
But for Wittgenstein, the analysans together do make up for the sense of the 
analysandum propositions. In fact, it may be said that even ordinary complex 
propositions cannot be called the sum total of atomic propositions in which 
they have been analyzed. The whole is never the sum total of its parts. A watch 
not all the parts of which it is comprised and so any proposition about the 
watch cannot be the truth-function of all the statements about its various parts. 
Just as the watch is more than the sum of its parts, the proposition about watch 
is also something more than the total of its constituting propositions. 
A proposition is comprised of `names' but is not merely a concatenation 
of names. The `names' are to the propositions what the `objects' are to the 
facts. Just as the objects exist in a certain arrangement to make up a fact so do 
the `names' occurring in a logical structure that make up for a proposition. A 
proposition becomes understandable i.e. is seen as carrying a sense when the 
`names' are ordered logically. This logical order ensures that propositions 
begin to make sense even when the corresponding facts are not observed or 
even when they could not be practically observed. It is moreover the case that 
by putting the names into different logical orders that new situations become 
perceivable and conceivable. Every new arrangement of names indicates a new 
situation. Wittgenstein says that just by looking at a proposition it is possible to 
tell what situation it describes. A proposition may entirely be new i.e. not heard 
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before but if the names do refer to some observable objects; it will always be 
possible to picturized in the mind what fact has been described even though 
that fact has not been observed as such. 
Early Wittgenstein pointed out that his whole task consisted in 
explaining the nature of sentences. He was deeply puzzled as to how a string of 
words can represent a fact in the world, can say something or can tell someone 
that so and so is the case. 
In response to the above query, Wittgenstein came up with the striking 
idea that a sentence is a picture. G.H. Von Wright has brought out that this idea 
was suggested to Wittgenstein by representation of a motorcar accident in a 
court of law by means of small models (Pitcher, 1964, p. 77). Accordingly, 
Wittgenstein came to realize that a proposition is a picture of reality or a model 
of reality (Paul, 1967, pp. 330-31). The dolls and toy cars could have been 
arranged in numerous ways depicting the occurrence of the accident in other 
possible ways. The different arrangements of dolls and toys could be used to 
construct different propositions about the accident. We could thereby formulate 
different accounts with reference to different models of representation. 
Construction of a sentence entails construction of a model of reality. It depicts 
a state of affairs or a situation. Words can be arranged in different contexts or 
modelled in different sequences with a view to grasping an altogether new state 
of affairs. This, according to Wittgenstein, constitutes a strong proof that a 
sentence or proposition is a picture of a given state of affairs (Pitcher, 1964, 
p. 77). 
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According to early Wittgenstein, in any picture there has to be a one-to-
one correspondence between the elements of a picture and the things in the 
state of affairs it represents (Ibid, 81). If one element of a picture stands for a 
man and another for dog, then the relationship between the two might show 
that the man is fondling the dog. In a pictorial fact, the picture elements are 
related in a definite way. A sentence as a picture portrays as many elements as 
are portrayed in a state of affairs. If ordinary sentences do not seem to be like 
that, for early Wittgenstein, this means that the sentences under consideration 
possess a concealed complexity. Such a complexity can be brought out or 
shown by recourse to analysis. In point of fact, a picture has something in 
common with what it depicts. There can be different pictures and even different 
methods of projection. However, every picture must have in common with 
reality, the same logical form. Only such a common feature can enable a 
sentence to picture a reality. Such a logical form may also be said to be the 
form of reality, which "indicates the possibility of things being related as the 
elements of a picture. As propositions are pictures, they must be having the 
r 	 same logical form as the reality they picturise. 
According to Tractarian analysis, a sentence picturized a corresponding 
reality and it must have as many elements as are in a given state of affairs it 
depicts. The given sentence and the given state of affairs must have the same 
logical or mathematical multiplicity. For early Wittgenstein, the given 
sentences in any language embody a concealed complexity, the job of the 
analysis is to show or bring out that complexity. A picture has to have 
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something in common with what it depicts. Pictures can be of different kinds. 
There can be different pictorial notations. There can be various methods of 
projection. However, all pictures have to have the same logical form as 
qualifies the reality to be picturized. Only by this common logical form can 
sentences depict reality either truly or falsely. This logical form or the form of 
reality indicates that objects in the world are related in the same way as are the 
elements of a picture. 
A picture can depict reality, but it cannot depict its own form of 
representation. It depicts (represents) its subject from "outside", but it cannot 
get outside itself to depict its own form of representation. A picture of another 
form might depict the representational form of a picture in colour. But in order 
for the one to represent the form of the other, there must be something identical 
in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at 
all" (Tractatus: 2.161). Therefore, logical form, the form of reality, which all 
pictures must possess, cannot be depicted by any picture, 
The sentences like pictures can depict reality but cannot depict their own 
form of representations. As it happens, there is a pattern or configuration in 
which things are related in the world. Various sentences in given contexts try to 
describe how things are related in a certain way. However, it is beyond us to 
bring out how sentences succeed in representing reality, truly or falsely. We 
cannot bring out the form of representation which makes them pictures of 
reality. It is beyond our linguistic capacity to say how language represents the 
world. We just cannot formulate the sentences that can describe pictorial form 
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of all sentences. However, we cannot say anything definitively about the 
combination of elements of a sentence. A sentence does show its meaning and 
we can grasp it. However, Early Wittgenstein, insists that the main problem of 
philosophy is to bring out the line of demarcation between what can be said in 
propositions and what cannot be said, but can only be shown (Paul, 1967, p. 
330). 
The picture theory of language advanced in the Tractatus also brings out 
an account of the nature of thought. Language and thought are intimately 
related to each other. Thinking is a kind of language. As thought is a logical 
picture of a sentence, we can say it is a kind of sentence. Whatever is 
conceivable or thinkable, we can make a picture of it (Tractatus, 3.001). A 
thought is the possibility of a state of affairs. The logical form of a thought 
depicts how things in the world are combined. One of the fundamental jobs of 
philosophy is to bring out the distinction between what is sayable and what is 
unsayable. What cannot be said can be indicated only by clearly spelling out 
what can be said? The realm of unthinkable cannot be ruled out although we 
cannot say anything about it. However, that does not constitute a wholesale 
rejection of metaphysics as such. Early Wittgenstein only rejects the possibility 
of the conditions providing sense or meaning to metaphysical propositions. The 
impossibility of stating metaphysics does not constitute the rejection of the 
very realm of metaphysics. 
One of the most important and fundamental assumptions of Early 
Wittgenstein is that language is comprised of propositions that can be reduced 
r 
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to elementary propositions or atomic propositions that are simple and 
unanalyzable. They are deemed by early Wittgenstein to be absolutely basic 
propositions of which no further analysis is possible. These elementary 
propositions consist of names only (Tractatus: 4.22). However, Wittgenstein's 
use of the term `name' is somewhat technical. A name cannot be dissected any 
further by means of a decoration, it is a primitive sign (Tractatus: 3.26). A 
name should be definable only ostensively. A name for Wittgenstein means 
only an object (Tractatus: 3.203). An elementary proposition is one that 
consists entirely of terms that denote simples. When genuine names are 
combined we get an elementary proposition. The analysis of propositions does 
bring us elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate 
combination (Tractatus: 4.221). An elementary proposition shows a certain 
configuration of simple objects. Wittgenstein held that all propositions whether 
elementary or non-elementary are pictures of reality. 
All genuine propositions are analyzable into elementary propositions. 
Every genuine proposition has one and only one complete analysis into 
elementary propositions. A fact may consist of infinity in many state of affairs 
may be compared of infinity many simpler objects. However, the completely 
analyzed proposition will consist of simple names. The meaning of each simple 
name will be a simple object. How we combine the names will show that the 
simple objects in the world are related in the same way. We must be able to 
know what objects they stand for. If we understand the constituents of a 
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proposition we can thereby understand the entire proposition under 
consideration. 
There are scholars who argue that the idea of the elementary 
propositions is an arbitrary assumption. Whether it is arbitrary or not requires a 
detailed elaboration. Wittgenstein was trying to solve the question of how 
language and thought can be related to reality. The basic intuition of early 
Wittgenstein was that language pictures reality. Accordingly, among the 
sentences of a language there must be some that show their sense immediately. 
If this basic intuition of Wittgenstein is correct then there must be elementary 
propositions showing their sense immediately. It furthermore entails that 
complex non-elementary propositions without this feature, possibly no 
sentence could not say anything nor could it be understood. 
One of the fundamental insights of Tractatus was that the truth of logical 
statements is based on their logical structure. Logical statements are 
conclusions that are true under all circumstances. Their truth is independent of 
contingent facts of the world. Logical statements have no factual content and 
do not describe the world as such. The entire body of genuine propositions 
breaks down into (al) propositions of logic or analytic apriori propositions and 
(b) contingently true or false propositions about the world. The propositions of 
logic and pure mathematics are apriori but not synthetic. 
The Tractatus was amenable to several interpretations. Logical 
positivists pointed out that Tractatus had categorically shown metaphysical 
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prepositions to be cognitively insignificant. It had shown that everything that 
can be expressed is knowable. Whatever can be meaningfully talked about is 
within the purview of our knowledge. In principle, all real questions are 
answerable; there are no insoluble problems (Schilick, p. 156). The Tractatus 
did establish the logical incoherence of all metaphysical propositions. It 
demonstrated that the so-called metaphysical propositions about an ineffable 
reality are unintelligible. Propositions are either contingently meaningful true 
or false expressions are meaningless compound propositions, which are true or 
false in all conceivable situations. 
Western philosophers since Thales to Hegel raised metaphysical, 
ontological, cosmological, axiological, teleological and epistemological 
questions. They raised questions about ultimate Reality, nature of Being, origin 
and destiny of the cosmos, status of man in the universe, values, highest good, 
truth, beauty, justice, ideal state, society and economy etc. Their responses to 
these questions emerged and crystallized, in course of time, as philosophical 
theories. Philosophers such as Hume (1711-1776) and Kant (1724-1804) 
questioned the very possibility and validity of the traditional mode of doing 
philosophy. The methodological questions raised by them amplified and 
culminated into various critical approaches to philosophy in nineteenth century 
Europe. It was in the first half of twentieth century that analytical approach to 
philosophy emerged in Britain in contradistinction to Continental appraisals of 
nineteenth century. 
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The analytical approach to philosophy emerged as a powerful 
perspective on philosophy in early twentieth century. An exploration and 
explication of the semantic status of philosophical statements became the 
guiding or motivating force of the analytical approach to philosophy. Or, we 
can say that meaning of philosophical statements became the central concern of 
analytical approach to philosophy. Firstly, it tried to understand philosophical 
statements with reference to phenomena or objects comprising the external 
world. Bertrand Russell, an outstanding twentieth century British philosopher, 
was the first to offer the logical atomistic analysis by way of bringing out the 
meaningfulness or meaninglessness of philosophical discourse. Subsequently, 
Logical Atomism was sharpened and sophisticated by early Wittgenstein in his 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 
Bertrand Russell brought out that things or objects comprising the 
external world are related to one another in multiple possible ways. The 
complex ways in which they are related to one another constitute the facts 
about the world. With a view to appropriating the actual picture about the 
world we will have to carry out analysis of facts. Our attempt at analysis of 
facts leads to an analysis of propositions embodying the facts of the world. The 
propositions in their turn are composed of words. Now, words comprising any 
given developed language are of various logical and grammatical categories. 
There are abstract nouns and adjectives like `Truth', `Justice', `Beauty', 
`Goodness', `Spiritual', `Political', `philosophical', `literary' etc., which can be 
subjected to multiple possible interpretations. However there are certain simple 
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words like `stone', `book', `pen', `toy', `red', `yellow', `green', `blue' etc. 
which are not amenable to analysis or to any further simpler reductions. Or, we 
can point them out only ostensively. For example, we can define the word 
`red', only ostensively. 
We can understand word `red' only by acquaintance. No definition or 
description of `red' can intimate to us its' meaning. Such words s `red' are 
simple, unanalysable predictates or qualities. No further analysis of such words 
is possible. They are irreducible, simple and ultimate. Besides such simple or 
ultimate words as `red' or `blue', Russell regarded proper names to be simple 
as well. They too cannot be subjected to further analysis of any kind 
whatsoever. In view of the same, an ultimately irreducible proposition will 
comprise of a proper name and a simple predicate. Russell designates such 
propositions as atomic propositions. These atomic propositions, 
correspondingly, are statements of atomic facts (Russell, 1960, pp. 33-7). 
The language attempting to describe the world is comprised of atomic 
propositions. The world as it is, is comprised of atomic facts. These atomic 
facts are expressible by atomic propositions. The compound and complex 
propositions of any given language are amenable to analysis and therefore 
reducible to elementary, simple or atomic propositions. However, the world is 
not comprised of compound or complex facts. So, while atomic facts 
correspond to atomic propositions, there are no complexes or molecular facts to 
correspond to complex or molecular propositions. The complex or molecular 
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propositions are the truth-functions of atomic propositions for they have no 
corresponding complex or molecular facts. 
The basic assumption inspiring logical atomistic analysis is that 
complex or compound language is amenable to reduction into ultimate 
elements. These ultimate or simplest possible elementary propositions must, by 
definition, be impervious to further analysis. As these simplest possible or most 
elementary propositions mirror or picture reality, the world must be composed 
of facts that are ultimately simple (Russell, 1960, pp. 40-3). 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was by training an engineer and 
deeply oriented to philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical logic. 
Originally hailing from Vienna, he subsequently became a professor of 
philosophy at Cambridge University. His interactions and conversations with 
Russell instilled in him a deep and abiding interest in philosophical analysis. 
His early book 'Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus' is a categorical and sharpened 
version of Russell's Logical Atomism. Wittgenstein's picture theory of 
language is the culmination of the atomistic analysis pioneered by Russell 
(Encyclopaedia, 1993, pp. 604-5), although Wittgenstein subsequently outgrew 
his earlier atomistic approach and emerged as the foremost linguistic analyst 
during the mid twentieth century. Whereas early Wittgenstein sought to 
establish the meaning of propositions with reference to the world which served 
as referential totality to any given language, later Wittgenstein strove to explore 
the meaning of propositions in the context of human culture, conventions, 
traditions and forms of life. 
r- 
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According to early Wittgenstein, propositions are Iogical pictures of the 
situations. The structure of the propositions reflects the structure of situations 
(Ibid, p 604). The logical form of the universe is mirrored or pictured by the 
language (Peursen, 1969, p. 17). Accordingly, philosophical analysis addresses 
itself to the task of resolving all complex prepositions into elementary 
propositions. These elementary propositions are further reduced into their 
ultimate units of unanalysable names and their combinations. They represent 
and mean the ultimate simples of the world. The function of analysis is to make 
every proposition an adequate picture of the reality it describes. The structure 
of the sentence and structure of the fact essentially correspond to each other. 
The basic patterns of rational discourse picturise or mirror the world or reality. 
The ontological structure of the objective reality can be determined by recourse 
to the appropriation or availability of the syntax of a scientifically correct 
language. The fundamental ontological structure of the world would be 
revealed by a perfect language (Pitcher, pp. 68-70). 
The Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus of early Wittgenstein outlined the 
thesis that the world is composed of simple facts to which correspond logical 
atoms comprising a given compound or complex language. A full-fledged 
correct description of the world can be executed in a perfectly lucid language 
of science. The world is everything that is the case. But the world also divides 
into facts any of which can either be the case or not be the case and everything 
else remains the same. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of atomic 
facts. An atomic fact is a combination of objects or the configuration of 
r,  
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objects. Any `object' which can enter into configuration' and which is not 
itself a configuration, must be an unanalysable and simple `entity'. Any true 
science has to be based on statements describing atomic facts or absolutely 
simple configurations of things. Such statements are logical pictures of atomic 
facts. We can attain a logical photograph, so to say, of the elementary atomic 
structure of the real world from an analysis of the essential forms of a proper 
scientific language which provides a kind of mirror to the fundamental 
structure of reality. All scientific truths are nothing but logical compounds of 
true atomic propositions. These atomic propositions are pictures of atomic 
facts. (lbid, p.72) 
The idea that a sentence is a picture of a given situation or fact occurred 
to Wittgenstein during the first world-war when he saw in a magazine an 
account of how a motorcar accident was presented in a law court by means of 
small models. From this presentation Wittgenstein concluded that a proposition 
must be a picture of reality. Just as toy-cars could be manipulated to depict 
different ways in which accident might have taken place, so while putting a 
sentence together we construct a model of reality. A sentence that says 
something is a picture of reality. A proposition shows its sense; it shows a 
situation in the world. The elementary propositions are arrangements of simple 
signs that are correlated with simple elements of reality. In ideal cases the 
propositional pictures, so to say, touch atomic components of reality. 
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Wittgenstein's basic idea as to how language operates in relation to the 
world may be illustrated with reference to the following quotations from the 
Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus: 
2.13 	In a picture objects here the elements of the picture corresponding to 
them. 
2.131 In a picture elements of the picture are the representatives of objects. 
2.14 	What constitutes a picture is that its' elements are related to one 
another in a determinate way. 
4.01(2) A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it. 
4.04 	In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as 
in the situation that it represents. 
2.15(1) The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a 
determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the 
same way. 
r 
	 4.021 A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I 
know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition 
without having had its sense explained to me. 
Normally or ordinarily we would not deem a sentence to be a picture. 
However, for early Wittgenstein it is a picture for it represents a situation or 
state of affairs. We do understand a sentence without having its sense explained 
to us. The only possible explanation for this remarkable fact is that a sentence 
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shows its' sense. Like a picture, it shows how things or states of affairs are out 
there. The fact that we can use familiar words with a view to communicating a 
new state of affairs or an altogether unfamiliar situation shows that words can 
be so combined and permuted as to show or picturise any new fact obtaining 
out there. 
A picture represents a state of affairs. According to Tractatus there 
must be a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of a picture and the 
elements of a state of affairs it represents. For example, in a given picture 
depicting man and cow, there are two picture elements, namely, man-element 
and cow-element. A picture of man and cow might show man milking the cow. 
A picture is a fact, namely the fact that the picture elements are related to one 
another in a definite way. A picture fact shows that the things the picture 
elements stand for are related in the same way as are the picture elements 
(Ibid., pp. 82-85). 
A sentence is a picture. Accordingly, the elements of the sentence 
r 
	must correspond to elements of the situation portrayed by the sentence. The 
sentence and the situation it depicts must be on the same logical and 
mathematical level of density and multiplicity. For early Wittgenstein such a 
correspondence cannot be negotiated directly or observed clearly. The 
correspondence between a sentence and a situation or state of affairs is 
concealed or hidden. It is by way of analysis that we can explicitly and 
categorically bring out this concealed or hidden correspondence between a 
given sentences depicting a specific state of affairs. In simple terms the picture 
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must have something in common with what it pictures. The common thing 
between a picture and what it pictures is the form of representation of the 
picture itself. There can be different kinds of pictures. We can have different 
pictorial notations. We can have different methods of projection. However, the 
reality as it is and all kinds of pictures have to have the same logical form. 
Only such a common logical form can ensure the very process or phenomenon 
of picturisation of reality by various possible propositions. Only such a 
common logical form can make possible the picturisation of reality, either truly 
or falsely. This `logical form' means the possibility that the things in the world 
are related as are the elements of picture. Sentences as pictures have the same 
form as the reality they depict (Tractatus: 2.18). 
Early Wittgenstein, following Bertrand Russell's lead in logical 
atomistic analysis, maintained that significant or meaningful propositions could 
either be picturising atomic facts or be truth-functions of propositions carrying 
out such depictions. In the light of this principle, Wittgenstein is candid enough 
to admit that propositions embodying Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus are also 
devoid of significance for they do not picturise any atomic facts nor are they 
truth-functions of atomic propositions. However, in view of the fact that 
propositions incorporated into Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus bring out the 
insignificance or meaninglessness of metaphysical propositions, they can be 
deemed to be relevantly meaningless. They function as a ladder. One can throw 
away the ladder after one has climbed up on it. Only propositions of science are 
cognitively significant or meaningful. Philosophy ought to orientate us to 
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adequate methodological sophistication with a view to saying only what can 
significantly be said i.e. the propositions of science (Baker and Hacker, 1980, 
pp. 451-57). 
In the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein was aiming at the 
construction of a perfect model of language such a language, Wittgenstein 
thought, would be a kind of picture of the world. All words would have fixed 
meaning in such an ideal language. In such an ideal language, the structure of 
each statement and the structure of each fact would share a common logical 
form. All propositions of such an ideal language will have to be laid against the 
world with a view to determining their truth-value. If the propositions picture 
facts they are true, if not, they are false. If we can assemble all the true 
propositions, it will constitute a total or complete description of the world. In 
view of the same, the limits of the language are the limits of the world 
(Tractatus: 5.6). 
The upshot of early Wittgensteinian logical atomistic thesis is that an 
analysis of the meaning of any complex or compound proposition would lead 
us to nothing but elementary propositions. Only elementary or atomic 
propositions can completely state the sense or meaning of any compound or 
complex proposition. If we had a list of all possible elementary propositions, 
we could say anything that can be said or that is sayable. The complex or non-
elementary propositions are just combinations of elementary propositions. 
They may be said to be molecular propositions. The molecular propositions are 
truth-functional accounts of nuclear propositions. If we could know all true and 
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false elementary propositions, we would know all that can be known for the 
truth-value of any proposition depends entirely on the combined truth-value of 
respective nuclear propositions. The true elementary propositions determine the 
whole truth of the world. The true elementary propositions bring out the 
complete truth about the world. (Ibid, 563-69) 
All genuine propositions are molecules. These molecules are 
constructed out of logical atoms or elementary propositions. The given 
situations comprising the world confronting us too are molecules. However, 
these molecules are constructed out of atoms or states of affairs. The 
elementary or nuclear propositions are ultimately irreducible, unanalysable or 
absolutely simple. 
The names refer to objects and the propositions refer to facts. A 
proposition becomes true when it represents an actual observed fact but if the 
arrangements of objects being represented by the proposition are not correct 
than the proposition becomes false. There may however be propositions which 
are true in all circumstances and there may also be propositions which will not 
be true in any circumstances or false in all conceivable circumstances. The 
former kind of propositions is called by Wittgenstein as `tautologies' and the 
latter he calls `contradictions' . In the older scholastic logic the tautologies were 
called necessary propositions but were not characterized as devoid of sense. 
But Wittgenstein says that by their very nature these necessary or tautological 
statements are independent of facts which they otherwise seem to refer to. That 
the proposition "all black crows are black' or that "all triangles have three 
f 
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angles" are not only true necessarily and universally but are also not dependent 
on the objects and facts corresponding to the names occurring in those 
propositions. The same can be said about the contradictions. Their 
impossibility can be ascertained not by referring to them to some facts but just 
by looking at their structures. The proposition "the triangle has four angles' is 
necessarily false not because it refers to a negative fact but because a 
contradiction is involved in the subject name and predicate name occurring in 
that proposition. 
On the basis of above analysis, Wittgenstein makes the interesting 
suggestion that all logical propositions are tautologies. We can know the truth 
of logical propositions with certainty being fully assured that they can never be 
reputed. These logical propositions are true simply by virtue of the definitions 
of their basic constituents. A triangle cannot be defined otherwise than by 
saying that it has three angles. And so, when it is said that triangles have three 
angles they cannot but be true logically and universally. Similar, when the 
converse is uttered i.e. when the triangles are said to have four angles. They 
cannot but be necessarily false: 
There is no need whatever to postulate a special realm of timeless 
logical objects which reason can somehow miraculously perceive; 
what we need is much less exalted than that ..." (Pitcher, 1964, 
p. 109). 
Wittgenstein concludes that the logical propositions as tautologies say nothing 
even though cannot be said to be entirely non-sensical. They are not non- 
r 
74 
Chapter III 	 Picture Theory of Language 
sensical when compared to a grammatically absurd sentence "table chair is sky 
made of'. But they are empty of meaning in the sense that they do not refer to 
any objects, nor even that belonging to Platonic world of ideas. We have 
knowledge of them precisely because of their inherent emptiness. A tautology 
is empty and says nothing, simply because it is true under all conditions, no 
matter what kind of facts is out there. 
Against the tautologies and contradictions are the `descriptive' 
propositions which describe some definite situation. The truth of these 
descriptive propositions depends upon the existence of some observable fact. 
These propositions are, moreover, neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. 
They are, in fact, possibly true or false i.e. they may be true, and may be false. 
They describe situations which may exist or may not exist. We cannot tell 
apriori whether they are true or false. 
To sum up, Tractarian atomistic analysis carried out by early 
Wittgenstein posits three types of significant propositions; tautologous, 
contradictory and descriptive. Logically speaking, the tautologous propositions 
such as "All triangles have three angles" are true under all circumstances; 
contradictory propositions such as "The teacher drew a square circle on the 
blackboard" are false under all circumstances; only descriptive propositions 
such as "Rose is red", "Diamond is the hardest metal" or "Oxygen helps in the 
burning of fire" etc. can be true and falsifiable or false and verifiable. The 
tautologous and contradictory propositions express only relations of ideas or 
they are true and false by implication. The entire intelligible discourse is 
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comprised of descriptive propositions which can be either true or false. The 
limits of language impose corresponding limits on the describable reality. 
There is no reality that is mysteriously beyond the limits of language. The 
limits of language and of reality are co-existensive and correlative. What is 
sayable is accommodated in the propositions of natural sciences. Philosophical 
propositions do not belong to any natural science as such. Philosophical or 
metaphysical propositions are devoid of any sense or meaning. They are 
meaningless or nonsensical propositions. Philosophical analysis or 
methodology should make us understand that the so-called metaphysical 
propositions or typical traditional first-order propositions advanced by 
philosophers of varying hues and colours signify nothing cognitively and we 
must remain in the realm of sayable and advance only propositions of science 
or basic observable propositions. Metaphysical propositions, philosophical 
analysis reveals, are not false but devoid of sense. Most philosophical 
propositions and questions arise out of our logical and grammatical confusions. 
It is not the job of philosophy to discover new facts. Philosophy is not a body 
r 	of true propositions; the job of philosophy is rather clarification of various 
types of propositions. (Pitcher, 1964, p. 109). 
Early Wittgenstein's Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus is the most 
radical restatement of Bertrand Russell's' logical atomistic analysis. The 
foundational thesis of early Wittgenstein as outlined in Tractatus is that 
language is ultimately comprised of atomic statements and the world is 
ultimately reducible to atomic facts. The atomic statements are logical pictures 
76 
Chapter III 	 Picture Theory of Language 
of atomic facts. These atomic statements can reveal a logical photograph of the 
structure of the real world. An analysis of the basic forms of scientific language 
can provide a kind of mirror to the fundamental structure of reality itself 
(Pitcher, 1964, pp. 172-75). In view of this basic thesis, early Wittgenstein 
declares metaphysical statements to be meaningless and nonsense. Meaning is 
a function of correspondence between atomic statements and atomic facts. 
Since there are no atomic metaphysical facts to which can correspond atomic 
metaphysical statements, the entire metaphysical discourse is devoid of sense. 
So are religious, theological, mystical and even ethical statements. They try to 
say what cannot be said. 
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CHAPTER-IV 
GAME THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
With the appearance of Ludwig Wittgenstein's `Philosophical Investigations' 
(1953), a radical framework of interpretation of language was made available 
to philosophical analysts. Analysts saw the nature of language in a different 
light. Wittgenstein came to realize the inadequacies of the theory of language 
upon which his earlier book Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus rested. It was 
inadequate because it assumed that language has really only one function, 
namely, to state facts. It further assumed that sentences for the most part derive 
their meanings from stating facts. It also assumed that the skeleton of all 
language is logical one (Cooper, 1996, pp. 446-47). 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's therapeutic conception of philosophy emanates 
from his new perspective on philosophy. There is something fundamentally 
wrong with the philosopher and the problems of Philosophy. The philosopher is 
puzzled, perplexed and baffled; philosophical problems are puzzling perplexing 
and baffling. Philosophical problems are rooted into puzzlement. Philosophers 
cannot avoid puzzlements. Puzzlements are a pre-condition for being a good 
philosopher. Understanding the fullest implications of a philosophical problem 
inevitably lands us into deep disquietude, confusion and bewilderment. 
Philosophical problems are puzzling because they are unavoidably paradoxical. 
George Pitcher brings out the same in following lines : 
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He thought that these philosophical puzzles had certain 
characteristic features. One of them is that they are very like 
paradoxes. This is, a set of apparently true propositions about 
the matter at hand Iands to a conclusion about it which is 
wildly implausible, which contradicts what we all know to be 
the case, or at least which contradicts another statement for 
which we have grounds that are just as good. Sometimes it 
lead to a conclusion which seems not so much implausible as 
positively senseless, which can only be expressed by what 
strikes us as an illegitimate combination of words (Pitcher, 
1964, p. 190). 
Our consideration of philosophical problems always places us on the horns of a 
dilemma. We are trapped into undecidability when we try to respond to 
following philosophical questions: 
(a) Is man free or is he determined? 
(b) Does God exist ? 
(c) How is mind related to body ? 
(d) Do intentions or consequences determine the goodness of an action? 
(e) Are values subjective or objective ? 
(f) Is truth subjective or objective ? 
(g) Is reality material or spiritual ? 
(h) Is knowledge acquired through sense-experience or reason ? 
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(i) 	What is good-maximization of pleasure or execution of duty? 
There are always arguments for and arguments against these 
philosophical questions. For example, it seems that we all have free-will, that 
there are many actions we freely choose to do and others we freely choose not 
to do. We think this is what justifies us in holding people responsible for what 
they do and fail to do, in praising them for their good deeds and punishing them 
for bad ones. On the other hand, we all believe that everything that happens has 
some cause. An action by a human being is also an event that happens, and so it 
must be caused and its causes must themselves have had previous causes and 
so on. Hence ultimate causes of a human action are factors in the remote past 
on which a person who acts is in no way responsible. In this way, we are led to 
conclude opposite of what we all believe to be true. We are led to conclude that 
no one has free-will that no one ever really chooses to do the things he does, 
that each one of us while taking any so-called initiatives is already determined. 
As Wittgenstein said: 
A person caught in a philosophical confusion is like a man in 
a room who wants to get out but doesn't know how. He tries 
the window but it is too high. He tries chimney but it is too 
narrow (Pitcher, 1964, p. 193). 
The philosopher undertakes a great intellectual struggle to escape from his 
perplexity. However, each formulation of an argument is characterized by 
irresolvable difficulties. All philosophical arguments have to instantaneously or 
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simultaneously face the counter-arguments. Being philosophical is not only a 
thankless job; it is also a hopeless condition. 
There are great difficulties encountered in other areas of investigation as 
well. However, investigators engaged in non-philosophical disciplines can hope 
that a new clue or new piece of information may resolve their respective 
difficulties. The philosopher according to Wittgenstein can entertain no such 
hope. He is not in need of new information or new facts. Everything is at his 
disposal. However, there is something profoundly wrong with his approach to 
and perspective on philosophy. There is something wrong at the heart of his 
ways of thinking. Philosophers commit special mistakes and entertain special 
misconceptions. It is not even what Ryle's calls a category-mistake. It is a 
mistake of framework, of paradigm, of understanding and of interpretation. It is 
a perspectival mistake. It is a mistake, in the philosopher's way of looking at 
problems, his way of thinking and talking about them etc., which is at the heart 
of philosophical puzzlement. It is the muddles that are felt as problems by 
philosophers. The philosopher's condition may thus be likened to that of a 
psychotic. A psychotic deeply feels that there is something wrong with the 
world. He feels that people are harmful and dangerous. However, the real 
source of trouble lies within him. The real source of difficulties lies within his 
reaction to the world. For Wittgenstein, a philosophical condition is 
comparable to a psychotic condition (Suter, 1982, p. 12). 
The philosopher is the man who has to cure himself of many 
sicknesses of the understanding before he can arrive at the 
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notion of sound human understanding. If in the midst of life 
we are in death, so in sanity we are surrounded by madness 
(Wittgenstein, 1956, Sec. 53). 
Thus, profound puzzlement is a characterizing condition of being 
philosophical. A philosopher is intellectually sick and conceptually iII. The 
understanding of a philosopher is caught into traps or tied up in knots. Many a 
philosopher remain interminably puzzled throughout their philosophical 
careers. Various philosophers formulate philosophical systems and theories 
with a view to liberate themselves from their unhappy condition. Thus, 
depending upon manifold of variables, philosophers may take their sides. 
Various philosophical doctrines and metaphysical theories such as idealism and 
materialism, monism and pluralism, theism and pantheism, mechanism and 
vitalism, are the deposit of same philosophical quest. However, such a remedy 
is worse than the cure. 
Now, the job of philosophy is to undertake appropriate analysis with a 
view to curing the philosophical puzzlement. Philosophy is to cure ills of the 
understanding. The aim of philosophy is to show the fly way out of fly-bottle. 
The philosopher is ill and needs to be cured; he is imprisoned and needs to get 
free. Philosophy is thus therapeutic. The complete dissolution of all 
philosophical problems will constitute complete therapy for the philosopher. 
The clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. 
But this simply means that the philosophical problems should 
completely disappear (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 133). 
r 
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Philosophical theories don't constitute a cure for puzzlement. The cure for 
philosophical puzzlement requires that the real source of difficulty be located 
and removed. Philosophical theories can at best be temporary pain killers. They 
are asprin but what is needed is surgery. In order to cure philosophical 
puzzlement, we need to trace its sources and devise proper method of removing 
them (Pitcher, 1964, p. 197). 
The fundamental contention of Wittgenstein is that words have various 
functions or uses. Language has many functions besides simply "picturing" 
objects. Language always functions in a context and therefore has as many 
purposes as there are contexts. Words, he said, are like "tools in a tool-box; 
there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails 
and screws — the function of words is as diverse as the functions of these 
objects" (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 11). What made him think earlier that 
language had only one function? He had been held captive by a picture of 
language as being the giving of names to all things. 
Language has a multifunctional character. There are numberless or 
countless ways in which language can be used. It can be used metaphysically, 
ethically, aesthetically, scientifically, symbolically, metaphorically, 
allegorically, parabolically, exhortatively, evocatively, prescriptively, 
descriptively, informatively, invocatively, investigatively, affirmatively, 
negatively etc. Joking, praying, commanding, asking, promising, story-telling, 
play-acting, thanking, greeting, cursing, swearing, promising etc. are other uses 
of language. There is no common factor in all these uses of language and, in 
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view of the same, a proper definition of language is almost impossible of 
formulation (Ayer, 1982, p. 14). 
A Language-Game is a specific activity carried on with language. 
Different language-games highlight the different roles that linguistic 
expressions can play and the purposes for which they may be used. Just as 
there are a number of games and there is a set of rules for each game and there 
is no one common element in games, similarly there is no single core 
embedded in various language-games. 
Wittgenstein's purpose is to undermine the assumption that words have 
just one role viz, to describe or to refer to. Different language-games serve to 
bring out the different roles that language can play and the different purposes it 
can serve. The need is to clarify the rules and make the games more 
understandable. Words derive their meanings form their use and each word has 
a meaning in one context which can change if used in some other context. 
Therefore, the Wittgenstein's dictum "Do not ask for the meaning, ask for the 
use" (Peursen, 1969, pp. 78-9). 
Later Wittgenstein came to realize that an account in terms of facts is 
not the only way to describe the world. He rejected his own logical atomism 
and became suspicious of ideal language as useful tools in any significant 
programme of philosophisation. He felt that it is useless to pinpoint meanings, 
for no words which are philosophically interesting have a fixed meaning. 
We are the victims, he said, of "the bewitchment of our intelligence by 
means of language". Our incorrect picture of language is "produced by 
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grammatical illusions" (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 109). To analyze grammar 
might lead one to discover some logical structure in language. But that cannot 
justify the conclusion that all language has essentially the same rules, functions 
and meanings. It occurred to Wittgenstein that the assumption that all language 
states facts and contains a logical skeleton was derived not by observation but 
by "thought". It was assumed that all language, in spite of certain superficial 
differences, is alike, the way all games are alike. Wittgenstein uncovered the 
flaw in this analogy by taking the case of games and asking, "what is common 
to them all? — do not say: there must be something common, or they would not 
be called "games" — but look and see whether there is anything common at all. 
For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but 
similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat, do not 
think, but look". He was apparently saying that logical atomism was the 
product of thought, of theory, and not of careful observation, of the way, in 
fact, language operates and is used (Hennery, 1962, pp. 714-15). Wittgenstein 
therefore shifted the programme of analysis from a preoccupation with logic 
and the construction of a "perfect" language to the study of the ordinary usages 
of language. He moved away from what Russell and Carnap were doing and 
turned now in the direction of G.E. Moore's earlier emphasis upon the analysis 
of ordinary language. Wittgenstein was now of the opinion that language does 
not contain one single pattern alone, that it is as variable as Iife itself. Indeed, 
he said that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life'. For this reason, 
analysis should consist not in the definition of language or its meanings but 
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rather in a careful description of its uses: we must do away with all explanation 
and description alone must take its place (Pitcher, 1964, pp. 236-3 8). 
Wittgenstein characterizes these similarities as "Family Resemblances". 
Different languages-games have resemblances that can be fruitfully likened to 
resemblances among members of a family, who resemble in build, features, 
colour of eyes, temperament, gait etc. The resemblances of language-games 
may be said to be overlapping and criss-crossing the way members of a family 
overlap and criss-cross with regard to their various features. Language operates 
like spinning a thread of a wire in one twist of a fibre upon another fibre. The 
strength of the thread does not depend upon someone fibre running through all 
along but in the over-lapping of many fibres. Language also operates over-
lapping many games one into another (Wittgenstein, 1956, Sect. 66). 
Wittgenstein asks us to consider to what we call "Games". There are 
board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games etc. Is there something 
common to them all? According to Wittgenstein, our natural response is that 
there must be something common to all. He asks us to look and see as to 
whether there is really anything common to them all. We shall justify 
similarities and relationships for Board-games have multiple relationships with 
one another. However, a consideration of card-games will reveal many 
correspondences with the board-games. Yet various common features may 
either drop-out or disappear. A further consideration of ball-games will 
similarly retain some common features and drop out some other features. 
Wittgenstein suggests that we can go on comparing and contrasting 
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immunerable games such as chess, tennis, etc. However, we shall never capture 
anything that can be singled out as the essence of all games (Wittgenstein, 
1956, Sect. 66). 
Wittgenstein talks of different or countless uses or functions of words or 
symbols or sentences and He also talks of new types of languages, new 
language-games coming into existence and others becoming obsolete and 
forgotten. Wittgenstein cites following examples of language-games. 
1. Giving orders and obeying them. 
2. Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurement. 
3. Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) 
4. Reporting an event. 
5. Speculating about an event 
6. Forming and testing a hypotheses 
7. Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams. 
S. Making up a story; and reading it. 
9. Play-acting 
10. Singing catches 
11. Guessing riddles 
12. Making a j oke; telling it. 
13. Solving a problem in practical arithmetic 
14. Translating from one language to another 
15. Asking, thanking, greeting cursing etc. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 23). 
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By recognizing the diversity of the functions of language, Wittgenstein 
inevitably altered the task of philosophy. The function of philosophy was now 
to liberate the philosopher from confusion, puzzlement and bewitchment. Its 
role was now therapeutic. It had to battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language. Linguistic analysis had "to show the fly the 
way out of the fly-bottle". The words had to be brought back from their 
metaphysical use to their everyday usage. By doing so, philosophy will not be 
adding to our knowledge or providing us new information. It will leave 
everything as it is. It will just clarify our pattern of thinking by a careful 
description of language. 
The meanings of words go on changing when used in different contexts. 
The diverse functions or uses of words are known to us all. We put words to 
multiple uses in our ordinary natural speech. However, we tend to overlook 
their differences while philosophizing. Philosophical problems arise, 
Wittgenstein says, because of an insufficient grasp over the logic of our 
language. We don't command a clear view of diverse uses with one another. 
This confusion generates puzzles or paradoxes philosophers have been arguing 
for or against various paradoxes. However, they ignore the sources of 
paradoxes. Wittgenstein does not take sides in the ongoing march of 
philosophical paradoxes. He tempts to uncover the diverse functions of words 
their multiple in contexts, in order to expose the underlying confusions that 
have generated the question of dispute. Such a kind of analysis leads to the 
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dissolution of the problems. Thus, the philosopher is liberated from 
philosophical perplexity (Khawaja, 1965, p. 98). 
Confusion the diverse uses of language is one of the fundamental 
sources of the genesis of philosophical problems. For example, if we, confuse 
descriptive and evaluative functions of words we shall be landing ourselves 
into great philosophical trouble. We shall be raising philosophical questions 
and inspiring philosophical responses which can eventuate into irresolvable 
philosophical disagreements. Let us take two statements: 
a) Killing is bad. 
b) Roses are red. 
In the above statements `bad' and `red' both are adjectives. However, 
they are radically different in terms of their functions. In the first proposition 
the adjective functions evaluative. In the second proposition, the adjective has 
descriptive function. In the second proposition, the adjective has descriptive 
function. The first is a value judgment and the second is a factual judgment. 
This distinction is crucial, for ignoring such a distinction may persuade us to 
raise the following questions: if all meaningful adjectives refer to some 
qualities, what is the meaning of "good" or "goodness", what is the essence or 
core of goodness that must characterize all things or state of affairs that are 
qualified by the adjective "good" etc, similar questions can be raised about 
adjective like "real", "beautiful", "true" etc. 
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Such confusion can arise in the context of other two propositions as 
well. For example, we may assimilate "5 is a number", "red is a colour" and 
maintain that numbers too exist as colours do exist. We may assume that 
numeral "5" must be having some objective referent. But since we can never 
point out the existence of "5" as distinguished from five books or five chairs, 
we are tempted to say that numbers subsist though they do not exists, than we 
may realize that colour cannot be pointed out in separation form coloured 
objects. We may then be tempted to say that all universals subsist in a trans-
empirical realm of Being. Thus the problems of nominalism, realism and 
idealism are generated. The logic of "number" is poles apart from the logic of 
"colour". By assimilating a mathematical predicate i.e., "number" with a 
descriptive predicate i.e., "colour", we may create unnecessary philosophical 
questions and responses leading to paradoxical stand-points. The similarities of 
grammatical from should not conceal the dissimilarities of functions of words 
and statements (Khawaja, 1965, p. 100-02). 
According to Wittgenstein, words of a natural language do not have a 
single use, or function. They have a complex logic. They are used in different 
contexts and for different purposes. However, philosophers are tempted to be 
held captive by selected models or uses of the words in a particular context. 
They then proceed to make it a standard or paradigm use. Thereafter, the 
questions that may appropriately be suggested by paradigm use or context, are 
then raised in those cases where the word is used in a different context. Such 
questions generate philosophical puzzles or disputes. For example, take the 
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word "measurement". Ordinarily we can use this in various contexts. The 
following uses of the word may be illustrative. 
1. The carpenter is measuring tables. 
2. The psychologist can measure human intelligence. 
3. Politicians must measure the feeling of the peoples. 
4. We must measure the trends of time. 
5. He must measure the depth of her love before taking a decision on 
separation. 
Here the word "measure" is used in several contexts. Now with regard to the 
measurement of the time, if we ask how can measure the past that does not 
exist, we adopt the use of "measurement" in the case of measurement of rooms 
and tables as our paradigm case. By doing so, we ignore the case, e.g., the 
measurement of the past through the present observable effects of the past 
events or the measurement of intelligence etc. Similarly, we prove a theorem, a 
point of law, a scientific hypothesis, an ethical judgement, a philosophical 
interpretation etc. The word "Proof' is here used in multiple contexts. We 
cannot prove a philosophical interpretation the way we can prove a geometrical 
theorem or even a scientific hypothesis. A geometrical proof is deductive and a 
scientific proof in inductive whereas philosophical proof can be teleological. 
Some philosophers are questioning the teleological proof for the existence of 
God. They are assimilating teleological proof with the deductive proof of 
geometry. God, obviously can never be proved like a geometrical theorem 
(Khawaj a, 1965, pp. 103-08). 
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This exclusive fixation upon one particular paradigm use of a word is 
caused due to an implicitly held one-to-one correspondence theory of the 
meaning of words. We implicitly assume that every single meaningful word 
must be referring to an objective entity. The statements too must be referring to 
an objective state of affairs. The correspondence theory of meaning is an 
illustration of the diverse uses of words in a single paradigm case. The simple 
one-to-one correspondence words such as the word "table" corresponding to 
the actual table or the word "book" corresponding to actual book or the word 
"tree" corresponding to actual tree etc. or the words which a child is able to 
grasp, to begin with are made paradigm cases. The more complex uses of word 
come much later. The correspondence theory of meaning makes earliest and 
simplest naming use to be the paradigm case, assimilating aII other uses to it. 
The following words make it clear: 
There is no one logically correct use of a word. But different 
philosophers or individuals are inclined to make one 
particular model of use as the standard or paradigm case, and 
to dispute with other against other chosen paradigms. 
However the business of philosophy is not polemics but 
conciliation. This is brought about by pointing out all the 
various models by an individual, i.e. the reason prompting a 
person to make that choice. This is repeated for all the 
different models or theories that exist. The comparative 
linguistic survey or mapping of `logical geography' of words 
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releases the individual from exclusive fascination for or 
fixation upon a particular model. He is enabled to see the 
point of each and every rival theory or formulation, and thus 
conflict is resolved. The grip of a single formulation or model 
upon the individual's mind is loosened, enabling him to move 
about freely in linguistic and logical space, instead of being 
bound or chained to a single paradigm case. 
Philosophical perplexity in the symptom of a failure to grasp 
the logic of language, or more especially, the variety of the 
types of discourse and a concrete survey of their functions. 
The dissolution of philosophical perplexity is the essence of 
the proper solution of philosophical problems (Khawaja, 
1965, p.104-05). 
According to Wittgenstein philosophers have more than their fair share of 
"craving for unity". They have craved for some first principle, for some 
supreme truth, which explains everything. Philosophers are especially tempted 
to scumb to carving for unity in their thinking but language. They are 
powerfully tempted to suppose that all sentences are used in the same way. 
Their "Craving for Unity" seeks to find a single function common to all 
sentences. This craving may lead them to assimilate words to a model or a 
paradigm. For example, individual words are assimilated to the familiar kinds 
of objects such as "chairs", "trees", "tables" or familiar names such as "John", 
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"George" and "bill" and familiar properties like `red", "white", "yellow" etc. 
We master all these words from the very beginning and feel completely at 
home with them. The difficult philosophical words such as "time", "mind", 
"matter", "knowledge", "belief' etc. are easily modeled onwards which most 
familiar (Pitcher 1964, p. 203) Thereafter, difficult philosophical sentence too 
are assimilated on familiar kind of sentences. For example, "Reality is 
Spiritual" or "Ideas are beyond space and time" may be modeled on `Rose is 
red" and "Taking up such a weight is beyond my capacity". Philosophers 
assimilate grammatically similar sentences to one another, leading to 
unavoidable philosophical puzzlements. One of the prime sources of 
philosophical puzzlements is confusing grammatical similarity of sentences 
with their logical similarity. For example, sentences such as "Real is rational" 
and "Diamond is hard" are grammatically similar but Iogically poles apart. The 
first is a metaphysical statement and second is a physical statement. The 
philosophers are strongly tempted to assimilate metaphysical statements to 
physical statements. No wonder that philosophers are convinced that their 
systems of metaphysics are super-scientific systems. Another source of 
puzzlement according to Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is our tendency to have a 
certain kind of a mental picture. Wittgenstein points out that we tend to have a 
picture or more than one picture of time, space, the mind, memory etc. and we 
tend to think and talk of these things in accordance to those pictures. We often 
picture time, for example, as a vast stream which flows form future towards 
present and into the past, carrying events along with it. Space is pictured as an 
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infinitely huge empty container. We picture the idea as a mental entity 
hovering before our consciousness. We picture the. mind as a queer kind of 
place. Similarly, we picture various mental processes akin to physical processes 
only occurring in that place known as the mind (Wittgenstein, 1956, Sect. 
305- 604). 
In view of these pictures, we tend to talk about time or space or mind as 
if they are physical entities. Thus we may say that "Keep it in mind" and "Keep 
it in Pocket" and think that we are talking about similar logical entities. 
Philosophers talk about universals such as redness or goodness as if they are 
kind of particulars or individual substances. Such a picture develops quite 
naturally. For example, the word `red' does not refer to any particular red thing, 
any particular red patch, or any particular red book etc. but the word `red' can 
not designate all red things either. One is strongly inclined to suppose that even 
if all red things should be destroyed, the colour red shall remain forever. The 
colour "red" cannot be identified with any red objects. Redness seems to be a 
property or predicate which qualifies all red objects and yet seems to be 
transcending them all. The philosopher may then quite naturally argue that 
even though redness is exemplified or instantiated through red objects, the 
redness must be beyond space. Similarly redness can be shown beyond time as 
well (Wittgenstein, 1956, p. 203). 
One cannot say that redness at one time did not exist and later came into 
being, or that redness changes, or that redness might cease to exist one day. 
Redness, then, like all universals must be an eternal object existing outside time 
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as well. In this way, the philosopher is led to posit a separate realm of being, 
where non-spatio-temporal universals reside. Then, puzzling and perplexing 
questions start cropping up as in Plato's dialogue Parmenides. 
Parmenides asks, Socrates whether, when an individual thing 
participates in a `Form' does it receive as its' shares the entire "Form" or only a 
part of it. Socrates, at once, finds  himself in a quandary, for there are, 
insuperable objections to either alternatives. If "Form" as a whole can be said 
to be in a number of things, it will be deemed to separate from itself as well. If, 
on the other hand, we say only a part of the form is in each of its instances, we 
are commenting an absurdity suggesting that a universal can be broken into bits 
and scattered into space and time. Plato is clearly picturing "Forms" as a kind 
of ghostly particulars. It is precisely this picture which led him into difficulties. 
Thus, philosophical confusions are worse confound when a philosopher 
pictures: 
(a) The mind as a spiritual thing which is somehow connected with a certain 
kind of physical organism. 
(b) The subconscious as a special region of the spiritual thing known as the 
mind. 
(c) The memory as another, perhaps partially overlapping, region, a kind of 
store-house of the mind. 
(d) A proposition as a ghostly entity apprehended by the mind and expressible 
by sentences. 
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(e) The meaning of words as a kind of halo or atmosphere surrounding the 
word (Pitcher, 1964, p. 205). 
In this way multiple pictures can hold us captive and inspire us to bring out 
puzzling and paradoxical positions. As Wittgenstein said: 
A picture held us captive and we could not get outside it for it 
lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us 
inexorably (Wittgenstein, 1956, Sect. 115). 
Our craving for unity, when directed towards language results in assimilations 
which produce misleading pictures. Take for example, two propositions "John 
cut an apple" and "John deduced a conclusion". We are inclined to assimilate 
the two statements and conclude that just as John while cutting an apple is 
performing an action, so John while deducing a conclusion must also be 
performing an action. However, whereas, there are bodily movements 
characteristic of cutting an apple, and there are no bodily movements which are 
characteristic of deducing a conclusion we tend to think that the former action 
is overt, publicly observable and physical; the later is very much like it, only it 
is hidden and not publicly observable. They are mental; deducing is a mental 
act, thinking is a mental process and being upset is a mental state. Now, we 
think as no physical action can exist without some body to do it; so no mental 
process can be carried out without something — a mind -- in which it can take 
place, and no mental state, without something — a mind -- to be in that state. In 
this way be indulging in our craving for unity, we are led by certain 
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grammatical similarities in our language to think of the mind on the model of 
body. We are led to have the picture of mind as a ghostly kind of body. Thus 
the famous mind-body problem may start dominating the philosophical agenda 
in modern times (Suter, 1989, P.  96-7). The famous formulation is found in the 
writings of the father of modern philosophy, Rene-Descartes. Descartes finds 
himself deeply puzzled by consideration of the relationship of mind and body. 
His solution is accepting both mind and body as two substances. He qualifies 
mind to be pure consciousness and body to be pure extension. While trying to 
explain the relationship between mind and body, Descartes postulates 
interaction of mind and body at the pineal gland. Subsequently, the problem is 
taken by Spinoza and Leibnitz as well; Spinoza offering a paraIIelistic 
explanation of the problem and Leibnitz forwarding his famous doctrine of pre-
established harmony. 
Gilbert RyIe, while commenting upon the mind-body dualism, points 
out that it is a category-mistake to raise the very question of mind-body 
relationship. Following Wittgenstein, Ryle argues that we confuse mind-
statements with body-statements and thus generate a puzzle which is essentially 
irresolvable through forwarding of arguments. It is a category-confusion where 
the category of mind is assimilated to the category of body. Unless we rectify 
this basic category confusion through appropriate analyses, we can't liberate 
ourselves from this dilemma. Mind is not something over and above the 
activities of behavior we indulge in day in and day out. If we don't deem mind 
U 
to be a collective noun for our multiple activities such as talking, walking, 
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calculating, gesticulating etc. we shall always place mind as a substantial 
category paralleling body. The dissolution of mind-body problem can be 
worked out only by understanding that grammatical similarities of mind-
statements and body-statements do not warrant us to postulate their logical 
similarities as well. Ryle, following Wittgenstein, says that mind-body problem 
is a product of confusing grammatical similarities. Metaphysical problems are a 
function of grammatical confusion and it is through grammatical clarity with 
regard to multiple kinds of propositions that such problems can be dissolved. 
Language incorporates in a full-blood form, the very pictures that entrap us into 
doing philosophy (Russell, 1960, pp. 71-6). 
The picture-embodying feature of our language, of certain forms of 
expression, is one of the main things Wittgenstein has in mind when he speaks 
as if language were the main culprit responsible for philosophical puzzlement: 
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language. [PI, Sec. 109] 
Philosophy ... is a fight against the fascination which forms 
of expression exert upon us [BB, p. 27] 
When Wittgenstein accomplished his Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus around 
1920, he was hundred percently sure that he had discovered a method or 
fashioned a technique of resolving the problems or dilemmas of philosophy. In 
principle, his atomistic analytical technique was capable of resolving all 
philosophical queries or pseudoproblems. The method was finally discovered. 
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It's concrete applications could be worked out, in course of time, by the 
upcoming competent practitioners of the method. He did not bother about 
actually carrying out the requisite analyses of the problems. He was rather 
satisfied in outlining a broad framework or paradigm of atomistic analysis. 
Hopefully, philosophical problems could be satisfactorily resolved within this 
framework. 
However, intellectual integrity was the characterizing feature of 
Wittgenstein's philosophical engagements. In course of time, while doing 
miscellaneous jobs in Europe in between 1921 upto 1929 — he worked as a 
school teacher, gardener and architect during these years — Wittgenstein came 
to realize that there was something fundamentally flawed about his atomistic 
analysis. During these years he was in constant touch with F.P. Ramsey and his 
Vienna circle friends and admirers. In his philosophical and methodological 
conversations with these people, Wittgensteins' sense of inadequacy of his 
atomistic analysis was further aggravated. He was too honest not to return to 
the battlefront of philosophy. He returned to philosophy and to Cambridge in 
1929. Convinced of the basic refutability of his Tractarian position 
Wittgenstein restarted his philosophical endeavours. 
Thereafter, during 1930s and 1940s, Wittgenstein, through slow and 
steady intellectual struggle, assembled and brought out a powerful critique of 
his Tractatarian atomistic analysis or what is famously known as picture theory 
of Language or Meaning. Of course, everything outlined in Tractatus could not 
be repudiated lock, stock and barrel. Many of the Wittgenstein scholars discern 
subtle similarities between earlier and later Wittgenstein. Nevertheless, it can 
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be categorically asserted that later Wittgenstienian position is a thorough 
rejection of some substantial and fundamental doctrines advanced by early 
Wittgenstein (Pitcher, 1964, pp. 171-72). 
The Tractatus-Logico-Phiiosophicus is anchored on two fundamental 
theses. Firstly, it assumed that the world is divided into facts rather than things. 
In the final analysis, the world is divided into a uniquely determined set of 
atomic facts. Secondly, by recourse to analysis, each proposition can be 
ultimately resolved into one uniquely determined truth-function of elementary 
propositions. These two theses were anchored on an assumption that in the very 
nature of things the constituents of anything are fixed. 
Later Wittgenstein realized the unwarranted nature of this assumption. 
There is no uniquely determined way as to how a thing divides itself up or what 
the parts or components of a thing are. So, there is no one necessarily right 
account of a thing or a phenomenon under consideration. Conversely, it is not 
the case that other accounts of the same thing or phenomenon are necessarily 
wrong. Early Wittgenstein was thoroughly mistaken in assuming that world 
divided itself into facts and not into things. We can develop several accounts of 
the world. It is how we look at the world. It is how we choose to formulate our 
account of the world. It is how we are inclined to work out an interpretation of 
the world. It is perfectly legitimate to say that the world divides itself into facts 
or objects or events or in some other possible ways. All these ways of 
describing the world are equally valid. They are alternative ways of describing 
the world. There is no one standard way of working out an exact, infallible, 
true or paradigmatic account of the world. There is no one and only one final 
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analysis of anything. Just as there are alternative ways of describing the world 
and aII of them can be equally valid and legitimate, so is the case with 
propositions. The propositions too can be subjected to alternative ways of 
analysis. We can have radically different accounts of various types of 
propositions. The constituents of any propositional gestalt too can be specified, 
designated, qualified or analysed into different combinations and permutations. 
There is no exact analysis leading to exact final results which we can apply on 
philosophical propositions or propositions with regard to various aspects of the 
world (Pitcher, 1964, p. 173). 
The author of the Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus was convinced that 
all propositions must ultimately be reducible to or analyzable into atomic or 
elementary propositions. The atomic or elementary propositions, in their turn, 
have to be innocent of all ambiguities and free from all possibilities of 
misinterpretation and even misunderstanding. An atomic or elementary 
proposition was to early Wittgenstein, the ideal form of the proposition. A 
complex or compound proposition had an apparent logical form but its real 
logical form was represented by the atomic or elementary proposition. The 
apparent logical form was a misdirection of our understanding motivated by the 
misleading grammatical form of the proposition under consideration or 
analysis. The real logical form of a proposition was hidden or blurred in the 
proposition. The task of the analysis is to bring to light the hidden structure of 
the proposition. 
The author of the Philosophical Investigations came to realize that in his 
earlier phase he had not looked at propositions objectively and found them to 
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contain this ideal logical structure. Rather it was the structure of the Tractatus-
Logico-Philosophicus, which had oriented him to expect the propositions to 
having that logical structure, He was preconceived about propositions in view 
of the requirements of his personal theories during his Tractarian phase. He 
was thoroughly mistaken in supposing that propositions must be logically in 
accord with his theoretical requirements. He needed to liberate himself from his 
earlier view of the logic of language. All propositions do not have and cannot 
have an exact, definite, true and perfectly determinate sense. Most of the 
propositions incorporated into any system of language, are, as a matter of fact, 
vague, ambiguous, inexact and indefinite "The more narrowly we examine 
actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between "it and our 
requirement" (Wittgenstein, 1953, Sect. 107). 
The later Wittgenstein appropriated the realization that Tractarian 
demands on language where impossible. The earlier Wittgenstein had unfairly 
demanded that the proposition was not really a proposition at all unless it had 
an absolute determinate sense. A proposition must completely be innocent of 
any ambiguity. We must not entertain any possible doubt or uncertainty about a 
proposition. Whatever a proposition has to say, it must be able to say so with 
utmost precision and specification. Such as standpoint is fundamentally 
erroneous. It is not so erroneous to require an absolutely determinate sense; 
what is fundamentally erroneous is to entertain the possibility of a thought that 
such a sense is even intelligible (Hennery, 1962, p. 521). 
Wittgenstein's new insights about the logic of language disclosed a new 
perspective to him. The new perspective on language fizzled out the crucial 
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Tractarian assumptions and germinated an appreciation of the finest 
distinctions and most sophisticated nuances about the uses and functions of 
numberless words comprising any functional language operating across social, 
political, economic and cultural frames of reference. The words such as `truth', 
`exact', `definite', `standard', `determinate etc., are not absolutely unisemically 
employed in multifarious practical contexts. They are used with reference to 
the functional context or operational background. For instance, it is impertinent 
to say that a watch is useless unless it keeps an absolutely exact time. There is 
no ideal of the absolutely exact time. The use of the word `time' is not 
completely divested of all operational or practical contexts. All words function 
in their given contexts. They operate with reference to human purposes and 
goals, aims and objectives, values and ideals and needs and requirements. 
Suppose my watch measures time well enough for ordinary purposes; I am not 
late for appointments, I do not miss my trains or airflights etc., then my watch 
is in perfect order. It would be fastidious of me to hanker after some 
supposedly absolute standard of keeping time and then to rue that in 
comparison to that standard my watch measures time in a way that is woefully 
mistaken. Similarly if what I say conveys my thought without any 
misunderstanding then my proposition, for all practical purposes, is in perfect 
order. It would be silly of me to posit some absolute standard of 
determinateness in comparison to which I can go on complaining about the lack 
of absolutely determinate sense in the propositions I keep on advancing. 
Propositions are formulated in response to the demand of the circumstances. A 
fisherman has to use a net with a mesh fitting the size of the fish in the water. 
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Propositions do not have an absolutely determinate sense in isolation from the 
contingencies of human discourse. The absolute determinateness of 
propositions is as mythical as a supposedly absolute standard of time: 
No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do 
not know what we should be supposed to imagine under 
this head unless you yourself lay down what is to be so 
called. But you will find it difficult to hit upon such a 
convention, at least any that satisfies you (Wittgenstein, 
1953, Sect. 88). 
Later Wittgenstein launches a frontal attack on the very notion of analysis 
itself, which was so central to the Tractatarian project. The Tractatus assumed 
that a proposition can be analyzed into atomic propositions which can together 
express the original proposition. In Investigations, Wittgenstein mounted a 
severe critique on the very idea of analysis. He brings out that in order to 
appreciate or understand the meaning of any proposition under consideration; 
analysis is neither the only nor the most important way of doing so. 
Furthermore, the difference between a simple and complex proposition was not 
an absolute one as was advocated by the order of the Tractatus. It is true that 
the task of analysis was by definition reduction of complex propositions into 
the simplest propositions describing the simplest situations. However, there are 
no absolutely simple or absolutely complex propositions out there. Such an 
assumption is groundless. We just cannot bring out anything that is absolutely 
simple in itself. A simple thing in one context or for some purpose or from a 
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certain point of view may be complex from another point of view or context. 
Thus simplicity and complexity' are contextual and are not absolute qualities 
inherent in anything. Anything divested from all its contexts is neither simple 
nor complex. Any question, isolated from all contexts or in complete isolation, 
is unanswerable, for it lacks sense. According to later Wittgenstein, typical 
philosophical mistakes emerge when philosophers talk in ways that are shorn 
of all contexts. The author of Tractatus had blundered on similar grounds. He 
had deemed things to be simple in complete isolation. He realized the error of 
his unwarranted assumption. He realized that philosophers since the very 
inception of philosophy had fallen to the natural temptation to go in for 
absolute simplicity. Such an unwarranted assumption had cramped them into 
irresolvable dilemmas and paradoxes. 
Reviewing or reconsidering Tractatarian account of meaning and 
language, later Wittgenstein brought out a paradigm-shift in our understanding 
and interpretation of meaning and language. Early Wittgenstein had thought 
that the meaning of any word which is a genuine proper name is the thing it 
denotes and the names of his absolutely simple objects are the only genuine 
proper names that there are. Hence, he said that the meaning of a name is the 
object it denotes. Later Wittgenstein in his perhaps deeper and profounder 
understanding of the relationship between language and the world, came to 
realize that names of the objects and meanings of the objects are too different 
descriptions and to deem them identical leads to unacceptable absurdities. The 
meaning of a name is not object-dependent. An object should not necessarily 
correspond to a name with a view to having meaning. The assumption of 
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correspondence between a name and its object leading to meaningfulness of 
names was an assumption appropriated by most of the classical, medieval and 
even modern philosophers. Later Wittgenstein realized that a name can have a 
meaning even though nothing may exist corresponding to it. Early Wittgenstein 
was wrong in assuming that there are absolutely simple objects. Earlier 
Wittgenstein was also wrong in assuming that the meaning of a name is the 
object it denotes. Early Wittgenstein's theory of meaning was accordingly 
impossible of sustenance (Ayer, 1982, p. 150). 
Later Wittgenstein was also highly critical of his earlier view that 
meaning is a mental act. He now regards mental act view of meaning as absurd. 
It is absurd to assume that a speaker's mental act accompanying certain words 
constitutes the meaning of the words. The image of an intended thing does also 
not constitute an act of meaning. It can be readily conceded that something 
goes on in the mind of the speaker when he utter's certain words or phrases or 
propositions. The speaker while blurting out certain words or phrases or 
propositions can and often does mean some things from what he speaks. 
However, what is importantly to be underlined is that the speaker's act of 
intention does not constitute the act of meaning. Even when the speaker 
certainly means something by words, meaning should not be equated with the 
images of the speaker. According to later Wittgenstein, words do not get 
related with objects and facts in the world by the performance of mental acts of 
intending or meaning them to refer to those things. 
Both early and later Wittgenstein were profoundly committed to 
bringing out a methodologically informed account of or perspective on 
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`meaning'. Later Wittgenstein finds meaning rooted in the uses of the words. 
For later Wittgenstein, meaning is irredeemably, ineradicably and inextricably 
or radically contextual. Search for a transcontextual meaning is impossible of 
formulation and articulation. Words, phrases, descriptions, idioms, figures of 
speech, propositions, utterances etc. are operating across the context of 
numberless language-games and forms of life. The wider history and culture 
provide a backdrop against which numberless propositions can be said to be 
operating either meaningfully or meaninglessly. The structure of human society 
comprised of innumerable forms of life provides the context of meaning. The 
operations of life and language-games are the ultimate repository of meaning. 
For early Wittgenstein meaning could be appropriated with reference to objects 
of the world. For later Wittgenstein, the multicomplex situations of life or 
language-games provide a backdrop against which meanings could be 
appropriated. 
The later Wittgenstein, thus, brings out a radical refutation of the 
fundamental assumptions of Logico-Tractatus-Philosophicus. He lifts the 
debate of the nature of language and of philosophy unto a new plane. In the 
context of philosophical investigations, the language gets largely world 
independent. A radical account of language and of philosophical problems is 
outlined in Philosophical Investigations. The basic orientation or direction of 
Logical Atomism is most powerfully recast by the Later Wittgenstein. Our very 
understanding and conception of philosophy is radically redrafted by later 
Wittgenstein. For later Wittgenstein philosophical problems are inextricably 
embedded in linguistic confusion, the confusion between logic and grammar of 
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various types of statements. Philosophical problems suffer largely from their 
confusionary as well as illusionary character. The genesis of philosophical 
problems is in linguistic confusion and it is through working out of the 
appropriate linguistic analysis that philosophical problems can be resolved. As 
John Wisdom put it, philosophical problems arise out of the misleading 
structure of language. It is only through Iinguistic illumination that these 
problems can be appropriately resolved or dissolved. Later Wittgenstein, 
accordingly, proposed a radical programme of dissolution of philosophical 
problems by recourse to linguistic analysis. Only a radical surgery of 
philosophical propositions can restore us from confusion to clarity and lead to 
the dissolution of philosophical problems (Finch, 1997, pp. 93-7). 
Thus, later Wittgenstien brings out an extraordinarily radical account of 
language. Philosophical problems are lingogenetic or lingocentric. 
Philosophical problems are not substantial to be ultimately susceptible to some 
consensual or methodical verification or falsification. Philosophical problems 
are not waiting an ultimate philosopher who is going to finally crack the DNA 
of Philosophy. No philosophical Newton will one fine morning discover a 
Universal Philosophical Law which can largely make a substantial contribution 
towards understanding of our philosophical horizons. Classically, philosophy 
was deemed to be mother of all sciences. Greeks defined philosophy 
etymologically to be `love of wisdom'. Indians deemed philosophy to be a 
science which vouchsafes to us the vision or the beatitude of God. Here 
Wittgenstein comes with a dampener tracing the roots of philosophy in 
linguistic confusion and prescribing linguistic analysis as the surest therapy 
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leading to the liberation of the philosopher from his linguistic puzzlement or 
bewitchment. 
One of the fundamental assumptions of the Tractatus was that the 
ultimate elements of language are names that designate simple objects. Later 
Wittgenstein pointed out that such words as `simple' or `complex' have no 
absolute meaning. There is nothing absolutely simple or absolutely complex. 
`Simplicity' and `complexity' are necessarily relative to a language-game. It is 
the context within which names or propositions are to be qualified as simple or 
complex. There are no readymade cases that can be easily or ostensively 
pointed out to be either simple or complex. The Tractatarian Wittgenstein 
assumed that the existence of a simple object was correlated with the 
requirement of the definite sense of a sentence. The author of the Investigations 
brings out that such a requirement is itself a philosophical illusion. The definte 
sense might be the characterizing feature of an ideal language in an ideal world. 
We neither live in an ideal world nor have an ideal language at our disposal. 
The world we live in and the language we speak in are both imperfect. In our 
context precision and exactness are realted to some particular purpose. We can 
never have an ideal of exactness laid down for all situations or there cannot be 
any transsituational or universal standard of exactness. Early Wittgenstein 
wrongly supposed that there is complete exactness underneath the surface of 
everyday speech and we can bring it to light by recourse to exact logical 
analysis. Such as analysis would reveal that a proposition would have one and 
only one complete analysis (Paul, 1967, p. 335). 
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The author of the Investigations came to realize that the ideal of perfect 
exactness is impossible of formulation in our day to day languages. However, 
we are so enamoured of the ideal of perfect exactness that we become deeply 
dissatisfied with ordinary words or sentences. We want a pure and clear 
structure in our actual languages and when we cannot find it, we think there is 
something fundamentally wrong with our actual languages. However, the more 
closely we examine actual languages, the sharper becomes the conflict between 
them and our philosophical ideal. To our dismay, we can not even understand 
as to how it could be realized in actual languages. We are overwhelmingly 
bewitched by the picture of idealness that we have subterraneously imagined 
and carried on in our minds. The problem is that we are Iike a blind-man in a 
dark room searching for a black cat which is not there. We cannot find what is 
not in our language, to begin with. We cannot dictate terms to language with a 
view to manufacturing the ultimately exact sense of propositions. Actual 
languages have been basically designed for communicative and commercial 
purposes. They were not designed to enshrine or embosom philosophical ideals 
of purity and exactness. Philosophers will have to have a deeper understanding 
of actual languages; they need to be more clear what is really there. They must 
give up their preconceived ideas of purity, exactness or incorruptibility. Rather 
they must take up a more modest endeavor of describing the manifold uses of 
language with a view to removing their philosophical perplexities (Paul, 1967, 
p. 337). 
Early Wittgenstein thought that language is ultimately composed of 
names. The simple objects constitute the meaning of the names. A sentence 
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says something because it is composed of names that stand for things. Later 
Wittgenstein advanced the view that the meaning of a word is never the thing 
that corresponds the word. The meaning of all names is intralinguistically 
accomplished not trans linguistically discovered. Understanding of language is 
prior to grasping the meaning of words. We must already have mastered the 
language-game featuring a name or several names with a view to appreciating 
their meaning. All names rather acquire meaning in their use, in understanding 
the situations in which they are employed. Meaning is use-dependent not 
object- independent. The early Wittgenstein was aiming at the construction of 
the perfect model of language. Such a language would have had a complete 
logical structure. Such a language would be a kind of the picture of the world. 
Later Wittgenstein completely abandoned his quest for a perfect or ideal 
language. He came to realize that such a quest is not motivated by any really 
pressing philosophical or methodological requirements. Rather such a quest is 
artificially and capriciously designed by philosophical pseudopuritans in their 
so-called quest for truth, for certainty, for reality etc. It is neither necessary nor 
feasible to arbitrarily impose an artificial language on natural or social world. 
The world can be multiversionally and multiformulationally shown or brought 
out or described. An account of the world in terms of so-called facts and so--
called factual statements is only one of the several possible ways of responding 
to the world-situation in all its multicomplexity and multidimensionality. 
Philosophers cannot devise an ideal language or radically improvise our 
ordinary languages. Language can always be a functional medium and never 
transmute into a perfect transmissionary system for description and 
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communication. Most words and most importantly most philosophically 
significant words do not have a fixed meaning. Polysemicism is at the heart of 
all languages. Philosophers as the products of polysemic of languages cannot in 
a sudden turnaround, come up with an ideal, logically perfect and 
grammatically exceptionless language intimating to us the essence of truth, 
certainty or reality. 
We cannot carry out a scientific investigation of language for words do 
not have meaning independent of us or independent of the uses within which 
they are operating. A universal, eternal, transcendental and essential definition 
of language is impossible of agreement and attainment. We cannot figure out 
any factor, common to all our uses of language. The words of any given 
language operate multicontextually, multiversionally, multiformualtionally, 
multifucntionally, multilaterally, multistructurally etc. The uses and functions 
of words are too numerous to be exhaustively and neatly catalogued or 
packaged in a detailed table. The games we actually play or can possibly play 
are inexhaustible. The polysemicity of words and creativity of human mind can 
eventuate into infinite combinations and permutations of language-games 
beyond the scope of the most fertile imaginations of semanticists, syntacticists 
and philosophers of language. There are logical, mathematical and scientific 
language-games. There are metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, theological and 
mystical language-games. There are metaphysical, allegorical, parabolical and 
symbolic language-games. There are descriptive, prescriptive, performative, 
evocative and invocative language-games. There are language-games in which 
we display our wits, blurt out jokes, engage in prayers, deliver commands, sing 
J 
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songs, ask clarifications etc. Greeting, thanking, congratulating, condoling, 
apologizing etc. are distinctive language-games that we carry out and carry on 
day in and day out. 
Language-games comprising any language do not share any common or 
essential element. Just as various games operating across the spectrum in 
keeping with their own rules, structure and format do not share any essence, so 
language-games also do not share any single core. Philosophers have been 
obsessed with fixed meanings and pictures of words. In view of this obsession 
philosophers have fallen under the spell of language. Philosophy, says 
Wittgenstein, is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means 
of language (Pitcher, 1964, p.1). 
A philosopher caught into a philosophical problem such as freedom of 
will and determinism or mind-body relationship etc. is not dealing with 
problems which are amenable to standardized methodical adjudication. They 
cannot be resolved through empirical verification or logical demonstration. An 
apparently or ostensibly time-honoured philosophical problem is actually a 
function of linguistic confusion or puzzlement; a confusion of grammar of 
various types of statements with the logic of various other types of statements. 
The central and crucial metaphysical problems are deeply abiding subterranean 
confusions of assimilating grammatical and logical similarities and 
dissimilarities to each other and getting up caught unto the horns of various 
dilemmas. A person caught into a philosophical confusion is like a man in a 
room who wants to get out, but does not know how. He tries a window, but it is 
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too high. He tries the chimney but it is too narrow. Only if he could turn around 
and see the door was always open to him. 
Later Wittgenstein realized that language is not only multifunctional but 
multiformulational as well. Human beings can engage in innumerable 
language-games. They can choose to go in for numberless modes of projection. 
There is no standard of meaning or criterion of meaning which can stultify the 
creativity of man blossoming forth into limitless combinations and 
permutations of language-games. The metaphysical statements, the poetic 
expressions, the theological formulations, the mystical fulminations, the 
literary flashlights, the fictional stories, the artistic projections, the 
philosophical interpretations, the ideological manifestos, the ethical 
recommendations, the critical revisions, the interpretative reconstructions, the 
hermeneutical deconstructions and what not cannot be declared to be nonsense 
because we cannot discern or design their method of verification. Beyond the 
standard procedures of verification, there are limitless chartered and 
unchartered linguistic territories which in their limitless contexts have to offer 
important meanings and significant insights. We cannot brush off the limitless 
linguistic applications operating meaningfully in their respective contexts to be 
meaningless. They are not expressions of nonsense but significant language-
games operating within their own contexts. 
The propositions which are not amenable to verification or do not have a 
method of verification, cannot be lock, stock and barrel declared to be 
nonsense, meaningless and insignificant. The unverified and unverifiable 
propositions can be significant and meaningful in their respective contexts. We 
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have to understand the role and function of various types of propositions with a 
view to appreciating their significance and meaningfulness in the economy of 
life. The various types of propositions or language-games need to be clarified 
and made more understandable by clarifying the rules of respective language-
games. Language is operating at various levels and in various ways. Learning 
the names of objects is an important component of our struggle for mastering a 
language. However, it is relatively, an elementary part of the complex exercise 
which mastering a language is. The meaning of the term "Scissors" does not 
consist simply in the object it names, but in the ways it is used in carrying out 
various tasks by it. Wittgenstein's maxim "Do not ask for the meaning, ask for 
the use" (Pitcher, 1964, p. 253) signified a paradigm-shift in our understanding 
of meaning as well as in our understanding of the multicomplexity and 
multidimensionality of language. 
The search for `meaning' has been long drawn-out. The ancient, 
medieval and modern philosophers across continents and cultures have been 
engaged in figuring out the standards and criteria of meaning. However, 
philosophers across continents and cultures have attempted to discover or 
explore universal, eternal, essential, transcendental or transcultural standards or 
criteria of meaning. As against the classical, medieval and modern 
transcendental or transcultural criteria, contemporary European philosophers 
led by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger have underlined on 
exploring cultural and contextual criteria of meaning. The search for `reality', 
for `truth', for `knowledge', for `value', for `meaning', for `interpretation' 
cannot be cross-cultural or trans-cultural. The theories of reality, of truth, of 
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knowledge, of value, of meaning and of interpretation cannot be objective, 
rational, universal, transcendental or transcultural. Whatever, we deem to be 
reality or truth or knowledge, or value or meaning or interpretation, is 
culturally conditioned and cannot have transcultural justification. Thus 
contemporary philosophical semantics and hermeneutics have registered a 
paradigm-shift, a turnaround, a reversal and Ludwig Wittgenstein's 
contribution in working out this paradigm-shift has been exceptionally 
outstanding. He recast the entire project of doing philosophy. 
The atomistic analysis of early Wittgenstein was highly sophisticated 
and transparent piece of analysis with a view to working out a clear-cut 
criterion of meaning thereby demarcating significant and meaningful 
propositions from insignificant and meaningless ones. Early Wittgenstein was 
firmly convinced that the world as it is, is comprised of elementary, simple, 
irreducible or atomic facts. These atomic facts at the level of reality or world 
are corresponded by atomic statements at the plane of language. Only we need 
to subject compound or complex propositions in a given language to a process 
of minute or micro analysis till we reach irreducible or unanalysable 
propositions. Now these atomic propositions are the logical pictures of the 
atomic facts. These atomic facts are directly picturised by corresponding 
atomic propositions. This process of picturisation is the basis of 
meaningfulness of atomic propositions. In so far as atomic propositions directly 
picturise atomic facts, to that extent, the atomic propositions directly acquire 
the credentials of being meaningful. The entire world could be completely 
described by a logically immaculate language. 
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Later Wittgenstein as represented by Philosophical Investigations 
provides a new paradigm of understanding and interpretation. Wittgenstein 
brings out that linguistic expressions can have references or can be breft of 
definite references. However meaning of statements or propositions is 
essentially independent of references. The entire choir and furniture of the 
universe is amenable to linguistic descriptions. However, the meaning of words 
and propositions is independent of the choir and furniture of the universe. 
Nevertheless, the independence or autonomy of language is not absolute or 
unqualified. Language is deeply rooted in human culture, tradition, history and 
customary modes of human behavior. Indeed, language is rooted in our "forms 
of life". It is our "forms of life" that lend meaning and significance to our 
language. The complex logic of language cannot be judiciously appropriated 
either by the atomistic analysis of early Wittgenstein or by the verificationistic 
criterion of Logical Positivists. The meaning of statements or propositions is 
rooted or embedded in "forms of life" (Finch, 1977, p. 80). 
The meaning of words in a statement is determined by their use. Human 
understanding does not mean mere acquaintance with some entity. It is not 
merely a cognitive state of mind either. Understanding is not entirely a matter 
of "know what", but more importantly, a matter of "know how". It signifies 
mastery of a technique akin to a craftsman's understanding of tools. Words of a 
language are like tools. Both words and tools are understood by their use. Both 
words and tools have their meaning within shared practices. Tools become 
meaningful in their technical applications. Words too operate like tools or more 
like chess-pieces on a chessboard. Words are moves within language-games. 
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We do not understand words by recourse to theoretical definitions. 
Understanding words is a practical capacity to obey rules of their application in 
multiple contexts and situations of life. We learn to obey rules by practice. 
Obeying the rules of a language-game entails participation in customs and 
traditions alongside other people. We understand the meaning of words through 
participating in shared practices. Understanding and meaning are intimately 
linked to human participation in wider cultural practices, customs, traditions, 
ways of life and modes of operation — both vertical and horizontal across the 
spectrum. 
The questions pertaining to meaning, truth, understanding and 
interpretation of words, phrases and statements can go on endlessly. Even when 
we say that words, phrases, idioms and statements do not acquire meaning by 
their picturisability of facts, their verifiability or falsifiability etc., but by their 
usability in various contexts, it can still be asked as to why we use words and 
phrases in this and that context, this way and that way. We can never bring out 
final reasons in philosophy but we cannot go on perennially coining fresh 
reasons in response to insatiable philosophical introspections and 
interrogations. We will have to stop somewhere and say `enough is enough'. 
The search for rational justification has to stop somewhere. The reasons have to 
run out at some point of time. Our spade will have to turn when it reaches the 
bedrock. Nevertheless, the business of the use of words does go on incessantly 
even when all reasons and justifications are run out or exhausted. We have 
agreement on form of life. We just find it natural to go on in certain ways, have 
been "trained" or "oriented" to react on various occasions. If we did not, no 
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amount of rules or conventions would ensure that we will continue to 
understand one another (Perusen, 1969, pp. 82-5). 
Thus metaphysical, theological, ideological, ethical, mystical and 
literary language-games are rooted or embedded in culture, history and 
tradition of a particular community, society or country. They are organically 
connected with the culture and ethos of an area evolved over mellenia. These 
language-games are not delivered to us out of blue so to say. Now, these 
language-games, dissected from their cultural, historical or traditional roots 
cannot be deemed either to be true or meaningful for they derive their truth and 
meaningfulness from their cultural and historical traditions. These traditions are 
the "forms of life". The values we adopt, the norms we appropriate, the criteria 
we invoke, the standards we measure up with, the reasons we advance etc. stem 
from the culture we are conditioned with or trained in. We cannot advance 
reasons or criteria in justification of the culture we are born in. There are no 
transcultural, transcommunitarian or trans-societal criteria which can be cited 
in justification of a culture, a community or a society. Even the so-called 
scientific and rational criteria of experimental research are not privileged to 
evaluate a culture, a religion or a tradition. There are no transcendental grounds 
upon which a culture, a religion or a tradition can be grounded for culture, 
religion or tradition are themselves transcendental metanarratives claiming to 
justify subnarratives. A culture or religion can be intelligible on its' own 
traditional or scriptural standards. A culture as a "form of life" is, however, 
ultimate with reference to understanding of truth, knowledge, reality, value etc. 
Understanding and interpretation are carried out within a context of "form of 
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life". The form of life may be anchored on unwritten traditions or primordial 
patterns of behavior. Or, it can be grounded on certain scriptural injunctions, 
rules, values, criteria, practices, rituals, beliefs and assumptions. 
Thus, we may conceive Hindu, Christian and Muslim societies as 
"forms of life" operating in keeping with the Vedic, Biblical and the Qur'anic 
standards, criteria, beliefs and values. Now to ask for standards, criteria, values, 
beliefs or reasons which can justify Vedic, Biblical or Qur'anic forms of life 
would be asking for the moon or asking for the impossible. There are no Trans-
Vedic, trans-Biblical or Trans-Qur'anic standards, criteria or reasons which can 
justify Vedic, Biblical or Qur' anic world-views and value-systems. 
Philosophical prudence demands that we stop somewhere and accept some 
standards or criteria of a `form of life' to be ultimate. So is the case with 
meaning of propositions or meaning of words. The words or propositions or a 
language itself, are ultimately rooted in a "form of life" or "forms of life". A 
form of life provides the cultural soil to words or propositions. Seeking the 
meaning of words or propositions in isolation from their respective forms of 
life would be as unwise or imprudent as uprooting a tree from it's soil or 
habitat and then wondering as to why its fruits, flowers, leaves, branches, trunk 
etc. are getting lifeless. A proposition isolated from a form of life is as 
meaningless as a tree uprooted from its soil is lifeless. 
Wittgenstein advocates that when we imagine a language-game, we 
imagine a form of life. Our activities, our methods, our behavior, our modes of 
thinking, feeling and doing, our attitudes, emotions and responses, our 
orientations to happiness or sorrow, our articulations or gesticulations; our style 
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of functioning and body language, our angry outbursts and frustrations, our 
greetings and congratulations, our condolences and apologies, our thanks-
givings and gratitudes, our irritations and cursings, our flirtations and tantrums 
etc., too contribute to the complex network of a form of life. We engage in 
various language-games as well while being engaged in such multidimensional 
activities constituting a form of life. Human beings agree in the use of words 
because they agree in a form of Iife. Their opinions differ but their agreement 
in the use of words stems from their agreement in a form of life. Forms of life 
are the original habitat of language-games. Words or statements become 
meaningful by being rooted in a form of life. Words or statements do not 
become meaningful by their potential picturisability of atomic facts or by their 
possible methodical verifiability. Words and propositions rather operate 
meaningfully by their contextual understandability and interpretability (Finch, 
1997, pp. 84-90). 
Later Wittgenstein, contrary to classical, medieval and even modern 
expectations from philosophy, underlines that a philosopher is not blessed with 
requisite methodological wherewithal to deliver accurate, exact and true 
substantial ontological, cosmological, theological, ideological or axiological 
statements, theories or systems. Rather, he is caught into an unenviable 
situation. He is deeply bewitched by the indecipherable beguilements of 
countless linguistic operations being carried out day in and day out by all the 
competent practitioners of speech and writing. Consequently, he is deeply 
confused and puzzled. People may be taking his bewitchment, puzzlement or 
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confusion for something of a profound omniscience or depth of commitment to 
divulgement of the mystery of the cosmos. 
However, it is the operations of language that can inspire grandiloquent 
metaphysical doctrines or drive the philosopher to excessive or radical 
skepticism. For example, philosophers can read into language what is not there 
in language or driven by their wishful thinking what they want to impose on it. 
Philosophers are, more often than not, inclined to think that ordinary language 
is like an exact calculus. Thus, they may imagine that every word can be 
assigned one and only one precisely perfect meaning. Philosophers can also be 
driven by the idea that our ordinary language operates by following the exact 
rules. When they look for these exact rules in language, they to their dismay are 
rudely shocked into awareness that innumerable linguistic operations or 
transactions are carried out quite arbitrarily and language is not necessarily 
rule-bound or programmed in keeping with rules and regulations. One response 
of the philosopher can be that philosophically significant words have no 
meaning and should not be used at all. Thus, he might become a skeptic. Or, he 
can choose to invent artificial rules and come up with examples where the 
application of his so-called rules can generate paradoxes. 
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CHAPTER — V 
WITTGENSTEIN'S IMPACT ON EPISTEMOLOGY 
(1) Epistemology 
Epistemological issues and concerns have been dominating 
philosophical discourse since the very dawn of philosophical enquiry. Our 
innate and acquired quest for knowledge implies an analysis of the origin, 
sources, development and conditions of knowledge. It implies an exploration of 
the nature of knowledge and of the extent, possibility, scope and limits of 
human knowledgeability. Etymologically speaking the world `Epistemology' 
is comprised of two, words 'episteme' and `logos' or `knowledge' and `theory', 
thus meaning, theory of knowledge or logical investigation of the problems and 
issues pertaining to knowledge. There are knowledge-claims and counter-
claims and then there are many types of knowledge-claims and then there are 
millions and millions of them. Which of these claims are verifiable, 
confirmable and justifiable and which are not, has been a challenge to every 
kind of philosophical enterprise. Consequently, epistemological skepticism, has 
been at the heart of all philosophical theories or systems. All philosophical 
theories or systems have faced the challenge of skeptics throughout history of 
philosophy. Infact, all major philosophical achievements have been grounded 
on radical critiques of previous philosophical accomplishments. Philosophers 
have often wallowed into radical critical evaluations of their rival philosophical 
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interpretations and more often then not advanced their philosophical positions 
in contradistinction to those of others. 
The world we encounter seems, to all intents and purposes, devoid of 
any sense or significance. It is man who imparts to it some sense or 
significance by recourse to some ontocosmological interpretation. It is man 
who ascribes a world-view to the world, as well as, a corresponding value-
system. Such an exercise is possibly fundamentally based on a vision or an 
intuition. However, no vision or intuition can be capriciously superimposed 
upon the world. No weltanschauung can sustain itself in flagrant violation of all 
cannons of logic, science, methodology and epistemology. Therefore, we need 
to be knowledgeable about the world in so far as it is humanly possible. 
Besides, we are both intrinsically and instrumentally inclined and obliged to 
cultivate a quest for knowledge. Infact this very quest is rooted in our 
primordial wonder and puzzlement about things, phenomena, objects, events, 
affairs and features that constitute both our natural and historical realms. We 
have this innate orientation to formulating or constructing of theories with a 
view to achieving a basic understanding of the world. As it happens, the 
complex world we are living in is not amenable to simple explanations. In view 
of its' overwhelming complexity, most of the human beings, engross 
themselves in non-philosophical engagements, finding it extraordinarily 
difficult to pursue a quest for coherent account of things to their utmost and 
logical limits. Most of us confine ourselves to a minimum or functional 
understanding of the world we live in. However, philosophers cannot reconcile 
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themselves to a bare or functional understanding; they go in far formulation of 
narratives or accounts of the world which can provide consistent, synoptic and 
true explanations of the phenomena and events across the spectrum. 
Epistemologists, especially carry out a relentless struggle with a view to 
arriving at indubitable and unassailable knowledge. Epistemologists can 
themselves start with assumptions with a view to achieving unqualified 
certainty of knowledge with regard to the world. However, additional reflection 
upon their awed knowledge-claims can disrupt their initial naivity about their 
claiming. Thus, they can themselves appreciate the uncertain character of their 
assumptions as well as claims. Their quest for certainty can be seriously jolted 
once they encounter the complexity of the anomalous features of the world 
(Paul, 1967, p. 466). 
(2) Nature of Knowledge 
The most fundamental problem of epistemology is the very nature of 
knowledge itself. Throughout history, epistemological philosophers have faced 
one of the perplexing problems, viz, delineating the concept of knowledge. 
Many epistemological philosophers have made various distinctions while 
outlining their accounts of knowledge. For instance, Russell has distinguished 
between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. For 
Russell, knowledge is either based or not based on direct experience. The 
knowledge that we gather by recourse to direct experience is categorized by 
him as knowledge by acquaintance. However, the knowledge that we gather 
from historical accounts or scholarly narratives is categorized by him as 
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knowledge by description. What empiricist epistemologists such as John Locke 
and David Hume stipulate as knowledge based on sensations or impressions is 
what Russell calls knowledge by acquaintance. On the other hand, our 
knowledge of historical events or knowledge about makers and shakers of 
history, cannot be knowledge by acquaintance. For example, our knowledge of 
Alexander the Great is knowledge by description for whatever we know about 
Alexander has been culled from historical narratives advanced by various 
historians and scholars. Knowledge by acquaintance, for Russell, is our 
knowledge of objects. Such a knowledge, according to Russell, we gather 
through sense-data. Such sense-data Russell argues, are mental entities 
reflecting the characteristics of physical objects. Thus knowledge by 
acquaintance is identical with the perception of sense-data (Ibid., p. 467). 
Similarly, Gilbert Ryle makes a distinction between `knowing that' and 
`knowing how'. `Knowing how' refers to some skill as for example, knowing 
how to dance. A person can have such knowledge without being able to explain 
such knowledge to someone else. As against, `knowing how', `knowing that' 
does not refer to some skill or aptitude. Such knowledge is rather both 
informative and communicative. One has some pieces of information with 
regard to some phenomena, events and objects and one can communicate or 
pass on such knowledge to someone else. Such knowledge is propositional 
knowledge and warrants abiding epistemological questions. Epistemologists 
have, historically speaking, negotiated deep and abiding debates with regard to 
such propositional knowledge. They have asked as to whether such 
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propositional knowledge is true or false, valid or invalid, verifiable or 
falsifiable, justifiable or unjustifiable (Hospers, 21005, p. 39). 
Some philosophers have made a distinction between mental and non-
mental conceptions of knowledge. Plato regarded knowledge as some kind of a 
mental state. However, such contemporary philosophers as Wittgenstein and 
Austin do not accept knowledge to be an appropriation of a mental state. For 
Wittgenstein, knowledge is not a state of consciousness, our or someone else's 
being knowledgeable entails satisfaction of certain complex behavioural 
conditions. Austin too does not admit knowledge to be a mental state. Any 
claim to knowledge indicates that the knower has the reasons and credentials to 
assert a proposition. 
Epistemologists have also distinguished between a priori knowledge and 
a posteriori knowledge. A statement such as "All Bachelors are unmarried" is a 
standard example of a priori knowledge. The truth or falsity of such a statement 
is not dependent upon any empirical investigation. Such a statement can be 
known without undertaking any factual enquiry. We can know such a statement 
on the basis of pure reflection or understanding of the subject and predicate 
terms. As against such statements, there are propositions that are amenable to 
empirical investigation. For example, "Diamond is the hardest metal" is 
perfectly understandable. However, knowledge of such propositions entails 
empirical investigation. A chemist in order to ascertain the truth of such a 
proposition will have to compare diamond with all other metals and have a 
complete analysis of their physical and chemical properties. He will then have 
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to carry out a comparative analysis of the physical and chemical properties of 
the diamond with such properties of every other metal. Only such a detailed 
investigation will reveal diamond to be the hardest metal. Such propositions as 
"Lead is the heaviest metal", "carbon dioxide helps in extinguishing of fire", 
"Taj Mahal is made of marble stones", "the red book is on the brown table" 
etc., are examples of a posteriori knowledge. The attainment of such 
knowledge has got to be bucked up and certified by appropriate empirical 
research. A priori knowledge can be achieved just by mutual correlation 
between the subject and predicate terms. 
Epistemologists have also worked out other distinctions with regard to 
the concept of knowledge. Some propositions are necessarily true and others 
are contingently true. So we can have knowledge that can be categorized as 
necessary and knowledge that can be qualified as contingent. Thus "all 
triangles have three angles" is a standard example of necessary knowledge. A 
triangle is necessarily three-angled geometrical figure. Under no circumstances, 
come what may, hell or high water, can we conceive a triangle which has either 
two angles or four angles. A triangle will remain a three-angled figure even 
when the entire universe can be snuffed out of existence. It has to remain three-
angled figure in all possible worlds. On the other hand, a statement like "That 
rose is red" is a clear example of contingent knowledge. Given certain 
conditions, a rose can be red, and under other certain conditions it may not be 
red. It may even be blue or white or of any other colour. All mathematical 
propositions are examples of necessary knowledge and all empirical 
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propositions constitute the examples of contingent knowledge. Similarly, 
propositions can be analytic or synthetic. While a propositions priori are 
analytic, a posteriori propositions are synthetic. When we say all triangles have 
three angles, we know the proposition merely by the analysis of the triangle, 
for a triangle is by definition a figure having three angles. On the other hand, in 
a proposition, like "That rose is red", the term rose does not contain the 
property of redness for a rose can be of any standard colour. So, if it is red, then 
our knowledge is synthetic in the sense that we add the property of redness to 
the subject term of rose. All standard logico-mathematical propositions are 
analytic propositions whereas all standard empirical propositions are examples 
of synthetic knowledge. 
(3) Conditions of Knowledge 
The classical, medieval and even modem epistemologists have defined 
knowledge to be justified true belief. Such a definition entails that a proposition 
or knowledge-claim must be independently true or true-in-itself in order to 
count as knowledge. Secondly, any claimant of knowledge must be believing 
he proposition to be true. Thirdly, the claimant must have adequate reasons or 
;rounds constituting the justification of a knowledge-claim under 
onsideration. Knowledge is not merely true belief, it is adequately or 
ppropriately justified true belief. 
Philosophers have been wallowing into countless philosophical 
isagreements since times immemorial. They have been debating numberless 
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metaphysical, ontological, cosmological, axiological, teleological and 
epistemological questions. They have hardly agreed upon anything. However, 
surprisingly enough, right from Plato upto A.J. Ayer, they have been 
unanimous in agreeing upon three conditions of knowledge: the Truth 
condition, the Belief condition and the justification condition. The fundamental 
or the foremost condition of knowledge is that a propositional knowledge - 
claim must be true. Any knower must believe the proposition under 
consideration to be true. Furthermore, the person claiming to have knowledge 
of a proposition or a set of propositions must advance adequate grounds 
justifying the truth of a propositions or propositions with reference to a given 
context. If a justified true proposition is believed by a person, then that person 
can be said to be having the knowledge of that proposition. Such an analysis of 
knowledge is known as traditional or standard analysis of knowledge (Hospers, 
2005, pp. 41-3). 
In traditional or standard analysis of knowledge, truth is the defining or 
characterizing condition of knowledge. It is the essential condition of 
knowledge. The truth is almost interchangeable with knowledge, or we can say 
truth is equivalent to knowledge, the traditional or standard analysis of 
knowledge is largely indicative of the propositional character of truth. Just as 
we characterize human actions to be either good or bad or objects of the world, 
to be either attractive or repulsive, so are propositions characterized either to be 
true or false. However, only descriptive propositions can be categorized as true 
or false. Various other types of statements such as metaphorical, symbolic, 
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exclamatory, imperative, interrogative and interpretative statements cannot be 
subsumed under true or false category. Similarly metaphysical or theological 
statements and various other types of statements are not amenable to true/false 
categorization. The time-honoured methods of induction and deduction or 
rational inferences and arguments cannot settle the truth of such statements. 
The truth or falsity of such statements is beyond the ken of verification, 
demonstration or proof. Anyways, in order to be part and parcel of our 
knowledge, a proposition has go to be true. In this sense, even metaphysical or 
theological statements can be deemed to be conceivably true and to that extent 
we may concede them to be a possible part of our knowledge-stock. 
Knowledge is unavoidably and inextricably dependent on Truth. If a statement 
is true, it can be a component of our knowledge. If a statement is false, it just 
cannot be deemed to be so. However, truth is independent of knowledge. Such 
statements "Lead is the heaviest metal", "Oxygen helps in the burning of fire" 
and "Akbar was a sixteenth century king of India" etc., are normally deemed to 
be true statements and therefore also deemed to be integral to our stock of 
knowledge (Encyclopedia Americana, 1991, pp. 185-86). 
For a proposition to be a part of our stock of knowledge, it has to be 
believed in by someone or the other. While countless statements believed in by 
countless knowers are true, there can be countless true statements which are not 
a part of our knowledge as such. True statements can be a part of our 
knowledge only when they are discovered by someone, verified by someone, 
appropriated by someone, or believed in by someone. The law of universal 
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gravitation was eternally and universally operating all along. However, when it 
was discovered by Newton in seventeenth century did it become a part of our 
knowledge. The same can be said about "Earth is moving round the Sun". 
However, we came to know about it only through the investigations of 
Copernicus and Galileo. It signifies that true propositions become a part of our 
knowledge only when we understand them to be true and believe them to be 
true. Thus, belief may also be said to be integrally connected to our knowledge 
(Hamlyn, 1970, pp. 87-95). 
Apart from truth-condition and belief-condition, justification-condition 
is the real test of human knowledge-claims. Propositions can be true 
independent of human understanding and any knower can believe in a 
proposition or set of propositions without knowing the truth of the propositions. 
The real test is whether a knower has a sufficient set of reasons establishing the 
truth of propositions under consideration. In order to claim the knowledge of a 
proposition we must have the capacity to carry out necessary and sufficient 
research with regard to any proposition. We must be able to mathematically 
demonstrate a proposition or scientifically a proposition or historically 
establish the truth of the proposition with the support of authentic evidence. Or, 
we must be able to establish the truth of a proposition under consideration by 
recourse to field-survey, data-collection or any other appropriate 
methodological strategy. Or, we must be able to establish average responses 
through statistical treatment. What is important is to be aware of the relevant 
processes of justification of various propositions or truth-claims. Any real 
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' 	 knower must be having adequate grounds with a view to establishing a truth- 
claim such as heliocentric hypothesis or law of universal gravitation or theory 
of biological evolution etc. Thus, in the light of -traditional or standard analysis 
of knowledge, a person can be said to be having knowledge of a proposition, if 
the proposition under consideration is true, he believes it to be true and he has 
adequate or requisite grounds with a view to justifying the truth of a 
proposition. 
(4) Sources of Knowledge 
Historically speaking, epistemologists have advanced three theories of 
knowledge; empiricism, rationalism and intuitionism. According to empiricists, 
sense-experience or perception is the primary or fundamental source of 
knowledge. According to rationalists, human reason is the primary or basic 
source of knowledge. According to intuitionism it is intuition - an immediate 
flashlight — that intimates to us the real or authentic knowledge. All these three 
theories of knowledge, claim that they can furnish us justified true beliefs or 
true knowledge grounded on solid indefeasible or unassailable arguments or 
proofs. 
(i) Empiricism 
According to empiricism, experience through which we acquire 
knowledge is sense-experience or what is interchangeably called perception. 
We may perceive an object, experience a flash of light or feel some hard or 
warm object etc. Such a perception or experience is the fundamental source of 
136 
Chapter V 	 Wittgenstein's Impact on Epistemology 
knowledge or the most reliable source of knowledge. As an epistemological 
theory, empiricism believes in the reliability of sense-experience as a way of 
knowing. Conversely empiricists have abiding distrust in the validity of 
conceptual knowledge. Empiricism is radically critical of the claims of 
rationalists advocating independent powers of reason which can disclose to us 
knowledge regarding objects, relations, events, processes etc. Empiricism is 
also highly suspicious of the claims of intuitionism or authoritarianism with 
regard to knowledge (Stroll, 1961, pp. 94-6). 
The father of modern European empiricism was John Locke. He was an 
eloquent advocate of empiricism and profoundly influenced European 
philosophy of science. For Locke, the most important source of human 
knowledge is our sense-experience. He is highly critical of Cartesian doctrine 
of innate ideas -- the doctrine that human mind is naturally endowed with 
certain innate powers, to furnish us knowledge independent of human sense-
experience. Locke is famous for comparing human mind with a clean state 
which is devoid of all ideas whatsoever. All our knowledge is finally traceable 
to human sense- experience. The British Empiricists such as Berkeley and 
Hume followed Locke's basic epistemological framework. They accepted 
Locke's contention that all knowledge is from experience. However, they 
further interpreted his basic doctrine to the effect that all knowledge is from 
sense-data. This was a rigorous interpretation of Locke's basic empiricist 
contention. From this sensationalistic interpretation of sense-experience, David 
Hume derived the conclusion that all material objects in minds were clusters of 
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sensations. In this way, Hume turned empiricism into skepticism. Hume's 
empiricism was also instrumental in the rise and development of twentieth 
century logical positivism. They advanced the view that propositions which are 
cognitively significant must be either formal statements of logic and 
mathematics or empirical statements derived either from observation or 
verification. Other statements such as ethical, theological, metaphysical or 
mystical statements must be cognitively insignificant and neither true nor false 
but meaningless and nonsense (Hamlyn, 1970, pp. 33-41). 
(ii) Rationalism 
According to Rationalists the most important and the most fundamental 
source of knowledge is reason. Greeks were the first who advanced the 
doctrine of unqualified rationalism both in the epistemological and ontological 
senses. The pre-Greek civilizations were mostly oriented to mystical, religious 
and intuitive approaches and reason was deemed to be of secondary importance 
in the validation of both religious and epistemic beliefs. Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle were the foremost rationalist trio who laid unqualified emphasis on 
the capacity of reason to arrive at true ontological, cosmological and 
epistemological beliefs. Socrates advanced the view that reason is fully 
competent to discover objective truth and arrive at objective values. Plato 
defined his Ideas or Universals to be rational and understandable only by a 
rational intuition. Aristotle defined man to be a rational animal. In modem 
Europe, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were defined to be Age of Reason 
or the period of Enlightenment. Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz were thorough- 
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going rationalists and deemed reason to be the most important source of 
knowledge. According to these modem European philosophers human mind 
was blessed with certain innate capacities or a priori truths, which can serve as 
a basis or foundation upon which a complex edifice of knowledge can be built 
up. It is through reason that we can discover scientific, mathematical and 
logical truths. Reason was also fully competent to discover objective moral 
principles and values with a view to guiding us in the multiple situational 
contexts of life. It is through reason that we can control our impulses, drives 
and desires. Christian theologians during Medieval Ages employed reason in 
defence of theological doctrines and values. As against sense-experience reason 
can provide us conceptual knowledge. It can go beyond perceptual particulars 
to form general or universal laws. Whereas, sense-experience can furnish us 
particular instances of knowledge, reason can furnish us general patterns of 
experience. 
Some of the most important philosophers of west such as Pythagoras, 
Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant 
and Hegel were advocates of rationalist epistemology. They were convinced 
that reason was the only source of true and certain knowledge. As against 
reason, sense-experience can gives us only pieces of perceptual knowledge and 
intuition or mystical experience can Iand us into the vortex of obscurantism. 
(iii) Intuitionism 
Most religious and cultural conditions have anchored themselves on 
intuitive understanding of their basic beliefs and values. Intuition is deemed to 
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be furnishing us direct, immediate and certain knowledge. Mystical 
philosophers especially have underlined the supra-logical, supra-rational and 
supra-empirical sources of knowledge. Intuition signifies an immediate feeling 
of certain knowledge even when there is no apparent evidence for any 
knowledge-claim one is convinced about. Historically speaking, various 
religious and mystical traditions have claimed that highly advanced men of 
intuition have experienced immediate and direct visions, illuminations, inner 
voices etc. Such an intuitive knowledge leads to a sudden resolution of 
metaphysical, moral or religious conflicts within a seeker or inquirer. More 
often than not a sudden intuitive flashlight has the potential to completely 
reorient us and overhaul our very mode of being and doing. Mystical 
philosophers of all ancient traditions have confirmed that we can know the 
hidden reality behind the veil of the apparent universe by recourse to an 
intuitive flashlight. Plato underlined that we can understand the real world of 
ideas through rational intuition. Many Sufis have claimed to have had the 
experience of One Divine Reality beyond this illusory world. Great artists, 
philosophers and scientists have achieved excellence in their respective 
domains through their deep, profound and abiding intuitions. It is through 
intuition that scientists arrive at revolutionary hypotheses. Great artistic and 
philosophical accomplishments have been made possible by recourse to 
intuitive experiences. Great scientific laws are a function of powerful intuitive 
flashlights rather than a result of perceptual observations, rational 
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demonstrations or scientific inductions and deductions (Cooper, 2003, pp. 191-
92). 
There are many who have been critical of intuitive knowledge-claims. 
For example, psychologists have interpreted the so-called intuitive knowledge 
in terms of complex forms of latent sensory and emotional build-ups. They 
have not accepted the mysterious faculty called intuition. Many critics of 
intuitionism have argued that intuitive knowledge is not amenable to public 
verification. It is essentially a private flashlight. 
Besides, perception, season and intuition, there are other sources of 
knowledge as well. For example, most of our beliefs we acquire through 
authority. When we study books, we acquire the knowledge of many things 
through authority of the author. Our parents, teachers, friends, preachers, 
leaders, media personalities etc., impart us innumerable beliefs. Each item of 
our knowledge need not be acquired by each one of us through personal 
research. Scholars, historians, scientists and teachers transmit to us numberless 
propositions of unimpeachable validity and authority. 
(5) Picture Theory of Language 
According to early Wittgenstein, there are three types of meaningful 
statements: Tautologies, contradictions and empirical statements. The 
tautologies such as `All triangles have three angles', `All bodies are extended', 
`All Bachelors are unmarried' etc. are meaningful and true under all conditions. 
They are true by definition. They are analytic apriori because their predicate 
141 
Chapter V 	 Wittgenstein's Impact on Epistemology 
terms are already contained in their subject terms. They are tautologous 
because they are true under all conditions. On the other hand, such propositions 
as `The teacher drew a round square on a black-board', `He is the son of a 
barren woman', `That triangle has four angles' etc. are contradictions. Now, 
tautologies and contradictions are not part of human knowledge for tautologies 
are self confirmatory,whereas contradictions are self-contradictory. We have 
not to go in for any methodical, technical, data-based or empirical research 
with a view to certifying tautologies or contradictions. It is the countless 
empirical propositions which are neither self-certifying nor self-contradictory 
and are or can be true or false under given conditions, which comprise or 
constitute human stock of knowledge. 
According to early Wittgenstein's account of knowledge, propositions or 
utterances which are neither tautologies nor contradictions nor empirical 
statements, are at the very outset outside the pale of meaningfulness and 
therefore of knowledge. The non-tautologous, non-contradictory and non-
empirical propositions can be of diverse types. Such propositions can be 
metaphysical, mystical, theological, ethical, ideological, religious or 
axiological -- such propositions cannot be categorized either as true or false. In 
point of fact, they cannot even be deemed to be meaningful or significant 
propositions. They are neither true nor false nor meaningful but simply 
meaningless and non-sensical propositions. The true or false propositions have 
got to be empirical propositions. Only empirical propositions can be confirmed 
to be either true or false. Only statements of science qualify as empirical 
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propositions. And only such propositions can have significance, of course, by 
recourse to observation, experimentation or other necessary and relevant 
procedural strategies. The metaphysical philosophical and axiological 
propositions, according to early Wittgenstein are condemned to be cognitively 
insignificant and meaningless propositions. The question of the truth or falsity 
of such propositions does not arise at all. For, in order to count to be either true 
or false, a proposition has got to be meaningful. Meaningfulness is a necessary 
condition of the truth of a proposition. A meaningless proposition can not be 
even false not to speak of its being true. 
Wittgenstein in his Tractarian phase worked out what is famously 
known as picture theory of language. Early Wittgenstein is deeply impacted by 
Russell's logical atomism. He advances an all the more sophisticated version of 
Russell's atomistic doctrine. Early Wittgenstein accepts Russell's distinction 
between compound and simple propositions. The simple or the simplest 
propositions are derived from complex or compound propositions. The simplest 
propositions are ultimate propositions or unanalyzable propositions or 
irreducible propositions. They are atomic propositions which just refuse to be 
further reduced or simplified. Such atomic propositions are logical pictures of 
atomic facts which comprise the world outside language. The atomic 
propositions picturise or mirroriseatomic facts. Or, we can say atomic facts are 
photographically represented by atomic propositions. This picturisibility of 
atomic facts by atomic propositions is the basic condition imparting meaning to 
atomic propositions. Every atomic proposition is meaningful in so far as it 
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works out a logical picture of a corresponding atomic fact. In this way, the 
atomic propositions become directly meaningful. The compound or complex 
propositions out of which atomic propositions are derived, to begin with, 
cannot be directly testified to be meaningful. They can be said to be indirectly 
meaningful in so for as a given set of atomic propositions derivable from a 
given compound proposition are directly certified to be meaningful 
propositions. 
Metaphysical, theological, axiological and other such propositions are 
beyond the pale of atomistic analysis. It is so because, we just cannot have 
atomic propositions derivable from compound metaphysical, theological and 
axiological statements. In view of the fact that theological, metaphysical and 
axiological propositions cannot operate within the paradigm of atomistic 
analysis, Wittgenstein deems such propositions squarely to be neither true nor 
false but simply meaningless and nonsense. 
Wittgenstein's theory of propositions in the Tractatus has far reaching 
and important consequences. All propositions, according to that view, are truth-
functions of elementary propositions. It follows that there are only three kinds 
of propositions. (1) tautologies, those whose truth-tables assign them truth-
values of truth only, (2) descriptive propositions, those whose truth-tables 
assign them truth-values of both truth and falsity, and (3) contradictions, those 
whose truth-tables assign them truth-values of falsity only. Since tautologies 
and contradictions "say nothing", the only kind of propositions that say 
anything are descriptive propositions. And all that a descriptive proposition can 
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say, in the end, is that certain states of affairs exist or do not exist, or that 
certain "truth-functional" combinations of them exist or do not exist. This, 
then, is all that can be said. All intelligible discourse is thus limited to 
assertions about states of affairs (Pitcher, 1964, p. 139). 
According to early Wittgenstein, any thought can, in principle, be put 
into words. There cannot be a thought which cannot possibly be put into words 
or we cannot have a thought which it is impossible in principle to put into 
words. Thus Wittgenstein limits significant discourse to statements of natural 
science. It is empirical or descriptive propositions which assert the existence 
and non-existence of states of affairs. Descriptive or empirical propositions can 
be physical object statements as well. However, it is the propositions of natural 
science which can be said to be constituting the hard-core of true propositions. 
The following propositions from the Tractatus bring out the same: 
Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. 
(T.4.1) 
The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole 
corpus of the natural sciences). (T.4.1 1) 
Descriptive propositions, as a matter of fact, constitute the entire body of what 
can be significantly said. The tautologies and contradictions can say nothing. It 
is the propositions of natural sciences which assert all that can be said: 
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The correct method in philosophy would really be the 
following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. 
propositions of natural science — i.e. something that has 
nothing to do with philosophy — and then, whenever someone 
else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to 
him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his 
propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other 
person — he would not have the feeling that we were teaching 
him philosophy -- this method would be the only strictly 
correct one (T.6.53) 
The early Wittgenstein as represented by Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus, is 
not carrying out any epistemological investigations. He is not forwarding any 
epistemological theory. He is not defending rationalism, empiricism or 
intuitionism like Descartes, Locke or Bergson. He is not finding truth, belief 
and justification conditions of knowledge to be insufficient to the purpose and 
recommending indefeasibility condition like Gettier, with a view to arriving at 
indubitable knowledge claims. He was not an advocate of skepticism like 
Hume and advancing a critique of causality, induction or law of uniformity of 
nature. He is not defending religious beliefs and values by recourse to mystical, 
intuitive or revelatory experience. 
He is rather carrying out logical and methodological investigations of 
philosophy. He is evaluating the meaningfulness or meaninglessness of 
propositions or statements under consideration with a view to demarcating the 
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sphere of sayability from the sphere of unsayability. He is trying to figure out 
what can be meaningfully asserted and what can be meaninglessly blurted out. 
Now, the quest for such methodological clarification or logical 
investigation can be multidimensionally impactful. It can horizontally impact 
multiple spheres of human discourse. It entails a comparative and cross-
ventilative clarification of the propositions of mathematics, natural sciences, 
social sciences, religious sciences, humanities etc. Within philosophy, it can 
have deeply disturbing implications. It can provide a devastating critique of the 
entire philosophical discourse. The most time-honored and entrenched 
metaphysical, cosmological, axiological, ideological and epistemological 
claims can be shaken to their foundations. By surveying the logical geography 
of philosophical discourse, it can question the truth-value of metaphysical, 
ethical, aesthetic, theological and ideological statements. Most importantly, it 
can interrogate the truth of theories of knowledge and knowledge-claims of 
various disciplines. 
(6) Game Theory of Language 
Later Wittgenstein was a semantic non-objectivist, and pluralist. He 
opened up a radically new paradigm of understanding and interpretation within 
which he encountered an altogether new set of expectations, ambitions as well 
as conceptions with regard to both language and philosophy. Later 
Wittgenstein is a thoroughgoing semantic pluralist. Whereas for early 
Wittgenstein, scientific propositions were privilegedly serving as paradigm 
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cases of both meaningfulness and truth, for later Wittgenstein no proposition 
from whatsoever field of investigation or interpretation can have any privileged 
status or special significance. All propositions are sailing in the same 
methodological boat and no proposition can have any privileged significance 
with reference to epistemic truth or validity. From mythology to metaphysics to 
natural sciences etc., all of us are playing language games of varying hues and 
colours. The meaning as well as truth of propositions operate 
intralinguistically. We just cannot have a translinguistsic realm serving as a 
standard bearer or criterion of meaning or truth, we do not know what is 
beyond language. Any realm transcending language is beyond the ken of our 
understanding and interpretation. We are, so to say, condemned to 
intralinguistic realm and there is no universal, eternal and transcendental 
criterion which cuts across all the so-called incommensurable language-games. 
In fact, truth is not the central concern of later Wittgenstein's linguistic 
analysis. Later Wittgenstein is centrally concerned with numerous uses of 
words and numberless functions of propositions as earlier Wittgenstein was 
centrally concerned with examining the meaning or sense of propositions 
against the backdrop of the world comprising of objects, phenomena or states 
of affairs. Later Wittgenstein is centrally concerned with examining the 
meaning or sense of language against the backdrop of forms of life. The earlier 
Wittgenstein was partly referential, the later Wittgenstein undercuts radically 
the role of reference in grasping the meaning or sense of language. For later 
Wittgenstein, language is essentially self-referential. The meaning of the 
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propositions is not to be determined by recourse to references comprising the 
non-linguistic world, but by recourse to examining the uses of words in their 
concrete forms of life. The earlier Wittgenstein was fundamentally carrying out 
logical analysis of the types of language. The later Wittgenstein was basically 
carrying out a phenomenological analysis of numberless functions of words 
and propositions in their concrete situational contexts. 
Accordingly, later Wittgenstein submitted himself to the patient and 
painstaking phenomenological analysis of the entire linguistic terrain. His 
fundamental contention was that any quest for meaning is itself a metaphysical 
exercise, and the question, "what is meaning", is as metaphysical as the 
question, "what is reality". Rather we must abandon the grand metaphysical 
quest for meaning and engage ourselves in the modest task of understanding 
the uses of words and functions of language. Later Wittgenstein has tabulated 
various types of language-games we engage in while speaking out or using 
language in various contexts. 
The view of philosophy which Wittgenstein takes or believes that he 
takes, in his later writings, is clearly set out in one of the paragraphs of 
`Philosophical Investigations'. We may not, he there says, `advance any kind of 
theory, there must not be anything hypothetical in our consideration. We must 
do away with all explanation and description alone must take place. This 
description gets its power of illumination i.e. its purpose from the philosophical 
problem. There are, of course, empirical problems, they are solved, rather by 
looking into the workings of our language; and that in such a way as to make us 
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recognize those workings in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The 
problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we 
have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
intelligence by means of language [PI, Sec. 109]. 
A philosopher is also deeply puzzled by certain kind of mental or 
intellectual pictures. He tends to have a picture of such philosophical words as 
`time', `space', `mind' etc. Thus a philosopher may picture the mind as a 
spiritual thing, the memory as a kind of storehouse and the meaning of the 
word a kind of halo etc. This picturing also does lead philosopher to 
assimilating philosophical words such as mind to common words such as some 
kind of a place. Thus when we say "Keep this book in the box". The 
philosopher may model his philosophical statements such as "keep these ideas 
in mind" on such statements as "keep these ideas in mind" or "Register this 
result in mind" etc. Thus we may assume mind to be like body and ask 
questions like, "How is mind related to body"? Thus, Descartes may be caught 
in the paradox of mind-body dualism. Similar other philosophical paradoxes 
can be traced to linguistic confusion through appropriate analysis of various 
type of statements (Pitcher, 1964, p. 205). 
Wittgenstein's rejection of his own earlier conception of language has 
had consequences of fundamental significance. The later Wittgenstein rejected 
the view that language has one basic use, the statement of facts. He rejected the 
notion that sentences are logical pictures of the facts with which they purport 
to deal. Language, he now argues, is not essentially a pictorial art, language is 
150 
Chapter V 	 Wittgenstein's Impact on Epistemology 
rather more like a tool for getting various jobs done. The meaning of words and 
sentences is to be analyzed in terms of their uses within the linguistic and extra-
linguistic contexts in which we employ them. 
The notion of a logically perfect language is itself unclear and confused. 
It is a fundamental mistake to attempt to analyse or to reconstruct the meanings 
of expressions in ordinary language. By doing so, we ignore their familiar 
linguistic functions. There is no ideal structure or syntax to which words in any 
proper use must conform. We can discover illuminating likenesses between 
various language-games. What we call simplicity and clarity are not the 
characteristics of certain unique concepts. Nor is their any one absolute 
direction which philosophical analysis of statements ought to take. The ideal of 
atomic facts, like that of Descarte's distinct ideas, is based upon a myth. A 
useful and clarificatory analysis can only describe how a term is used in the 
contexts in which it is normally applied. 
While early Wittgenstein was certifying scientific propositions as 
paradigmatic instances of knowledge, for later Wittgenstein physics was as 
much comprised of Language-games as was metaphysics. We are condemned 
to be operating within the numberless networks of language-games. We just 
cannot jump out of our linguistic skin, so to say. We can never command a 
translinguistic with a view to omnicompetently sift true propositions from false 
ones. We can, at best, attempt a comparative analysis of all possible or 
available types of propositions with a view to liberating ourselves from 
confusions and puzzlements. 
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Wittgenstein's greatest contribution to epistemology is his depth-
linguistic analysis of philosophical discourse in a comparative methodological 
frame of reference. There were many who carried out analysis of philosophical 
discourse before Wittgenstein. Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, James 
and many more employed analytical method with a view to clarifying the logic 
of philosophical discourse. Wittgenstein's immediate predecessors, Mach, 
Frege, Russell and Moore carried out intensive and extensive methodological 
investigations of philosophy with a to accomplishing clarification of 
philosophical issues and problems. However, Wittgenstein's treatment of 
philosophical issues and problems by recourse to linguistic analysis was a 
turning point in the onward march of philosophy to self-authentication. 
Wittgenstein advanced as well as inspired others to advance an analysis of 
philosophical problems by bringing out the logical cash-value of various types 
of prepositions and statements. 
Wittgenstein came to realize that the assumption that all language starts 
with facts and contains a logical skeleton was derived not by observation but 
by thought. Just as various games have similarities, relationships and other 
common features in between them, so various language-games can also share 
similarities, relationships and common features. His earlier doctrine, namely, 
Logical Atomism was not the product of careful observation of the way 
language actually operates. Wittgenstein therefore, shifted the programme of 
analysis from a preoccupation with logic and the construction of a perfect 
language to the study of ordinary usages of languages. The early Wittgenstein 
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' 	 was in accord with Russell and Carnap. The later Wittgenstein directed his 
attention upon the analysis of ordinary language as emphasized by Moore. The 
later Wittgenstein rejected the assumption of a single pattern in language. Now, 
he found language as complex as life itself. Now, he recommended that 
analysis should consist not in the quest for meaning. Rather, a philosopher must 
engage in a careful description of its uses. There is no scope for explanation is 
philosophy. A philosopher must engage in description of multiple uses of 
language. Most importantly, he must be methodologically sophisticated and 
nuanced enough to appreciate the multidimensional and multicomplexional 
character of words and sentences in all their multicontextual frames of 
reference, meaning, interpretation and understanding. At least, he must 
categorically distinguish between descriptive and non-descriptive uses of 
language. If he is devoid of this distinction, his confusions can get worse 
confounded. 
We can cite various philosophical problems as having fundamentally 
arisen in view of philosophers confusing descriptive language-games with non-
descriptive language-games. Take, for example, the so-called philosophical 
problem of `Other Minds'. 
Philosophical trouble regarding other minds arises due to the 
impossibility of a direct and independent check-up about them. There seems to 
be no sufficient proof which could conclusively convince one person of the 
actual occurrence of mental states on the part of other person. The analogical 
argument regarding other minds is basically different from ordinary type of 
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analogical inferences. Ordinarily, we can gather direct evidence and verify our 
claims. If we argue for instance, from various similarities between two human 
bodies and presence of brain in one of them, to the presence of brain in the 
other, the conclusion itself is clearly open to direct surgical examination. But if 
a person A, on the basis of the regular concomitance of his own mental states 
with certain aspects of his behavior, infers similar mental states as concomitant 
with the other person B's behavior then he cannot by any known or even 
conceivable procedure convince himself of the truth of his conclusion. 
Although the problem of other minds can be traced back to Platonic 
Dialogues, yet it figured prominently in philosophical discussions after 
Descartes made a strong plea for mind-body dualism. The dualist interpretation 
of mind and body introduced the familiar tone of talking about mind as a 
separate entity which cannot be verified by observation. Nevertheless, the 
problem was subjected to searching analyses in the hands of analytic 
philosophers. Russell felt the problem to be an intractable one and concluded 
that no amount of logical or empirical investigation can justify the probability 
of the existence of other minds, although he advised that admission of other 
minds is both necessary and desirable if we are to save ourselves from falling 
into the trap of solipsism. 
The problem has received a novel treatment in the hands of therapeutic 
analysts such as Wittgenstein and Wisdom. They have attacked the very 
traditional metaphysical view of the problem of other minds. Instead of 
offering a philosophically satisfactory answer to the problem or replacing the 
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old view by a new one, they have rather tried to dissolve it through linguistic 
analysis. 
Wittgenstein puts forward the thesis that problem about other people's 
minds is mainly due to the misunderstanding about the language. It crops up 
because of confusing mind-statements with ordinary descriptive statements. 
We think just as ordinary statements like, "I eat food", "I wash my clothes", 
describe certain physical states of affairs about me, similarly the mind-
statements or sensation-statements such as, "I am in pain", or "I am angry" also 
describe some of my mental states of affairs. Because we are confused about 
the logic of the sensation-statements, we think, "I am in pain" or "I am angry" 
and the like first- person present-tense utterances give a privileged position to 
the speaker of such utterances and he becomes aware of his mental states in his 
own private language and none of us therefore can have access to the sanctum 
sanctorum of his mind. 
Wittgenstein thinks that the whole rub about other minds lies in 
ascribing any descriptive content to mind-statements or senation-langauge-
games. If it can be convincingly shown that language-games relating to so-
called mental phenomena are shorn of any descriptive content, the problem of 
mind and with it the problem of other minds will crumble down like a house of 
cards. Wittgenstein points out that words and sentences in themselves are dead. 
They become alive in actual language-games which are rooted in our forms of 
life. What creates philosophical tangles is that the philosopher due to his 
inordinate craving for unity or his quest for abstract essences, does not want to 
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contemplate the untidy range of diversified language-games and outline the 
complex logical geography of philosophical discourse. 
Let us take, for example, a sensation-statement such as, "I am in pain". 
In the ordinary or trivial sense the word `pain' in the above utterance does 
name a sensation. In this sense `pain' is a sensation-word, just as `five' is a 
number-word. However, the point of contention is that how the word `pain' 
denotes a sensation. It is quite natural to suppose that the relation between 
`pain' and a certain familiar kind of private sensation are very similar indeed to 
those between, say, `red' and a certain familiar kind of publicly observable 
property. It seems that, `I am in pain' attributes a sensation to me just as, "His 
book is red", attributes red colour to his book. We talk about pain, very much 
as we talk about colour or sound. It is just this view that Wittgenstein most 
forcefully tries to repudiate (Pitcher, 1964, p. 293). 
Wittgenstein points out that the word `pain' does not denote anything in 
pain-language-games in the way words `red' or `blue' denote something in 
various colour-language-games. It is so because the words `red' or `blue' as 
against the word `pain' have a descriptive use. The word `pain' acquires its use 
in the concrete `pain behaviour' of human beings and does not describe any 
private sensation as such; if there were no express manifestations or 
expressions of pain, i.e., if people just inwardly had pains, but did not cry or 
grown or grimace or plead for help then there is no conceivable way that 
anyone could learn the use of the word `pain'. The `pain behaviour' plays an 
indispensable part in the teaching and learning of the word `pain'. The pain- 
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language-games owe their very existence to the pain behavior; for example, to 
crying, groaning, administering of sedatives and applying of bandages by the 
physicians etc. The private sensations, whatsoever they might be, play no part 
at all when we come upon a man who just has been run over by a car and who 
is bleeding, moaning, crying out for help and we rush him to the doctor and do 
everything we can to make him comfortable. It is the linguistic as well as non-
linguistic behavior on his and on our part that enters into this kind of pain-
language-games. His private sensations do not enter into them, they are 
completely unknown to us. We have no idea what he might be feeling and it is 
not in the least needed also. We proceed in exactly the same way no matter 
what his sensations may be like. 
Wittgenstein is not denying the fact of pain as such. As a matter of fact, 
there are acute and terrible pains and it would be extremely absurd to deny 
what is obvious. He is only denying a particular thesis about language, namely 
that the word `pain' or for that matter such sensation-words as `anger', 
`sorrow', `joy' and `repentance' etc., designate something which is even 
remotely identical to how descriptive words designate their objects of reference 
(Pitcher, 1964, pp. 282-83). 
Thus Wittgenstein thinks that confusion about other minds arises from 
the failure to appreciate the way in which language of sensations functions. 
Once we appreciate that sensation-language-games are not designative of 
private language in which people specially communicate to themselves, the 
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problem of other minds is automatically and simultaneously dissolved into 
oblivion. 
There is no royal road to philosophy. There is no single supreme method 
of doing philosophy or working out philosophical analysis, altHough according 
to Wittgenstein, there are various methods like various therapeutics, which can 
relieve us of our philosophical puzzlement. Because philosophical problems 
grow out of language, it is necessary to acquire a basic familiarity with the 
usage of the language out of which each problem arises. As there are many 
kinds of games, there are many sets of the rules of the games. Similarly, as 
there are many forms of ordinary language of work, play, worship, science, 
metaphysics, poetry, theology etc., so there are many usages or corresponding 
language-games with corresponding rules we engage ourselves different 
confronting situational matrices or negotiating various contexts or frames of 
reference. Under these circumstances, the work of the philosopher consists in 
assembling minders of the way language is used with a view to clarifying the 
origin, genesis and development of philosophical problems. 
Now, if the philosopher cannot make the simple distinction between 
descriptive and non-descriptive statements, he can be quagmired into 
irresolvable philosophical paradoxes or dilemmas masquerading as time-
honoured and respectable philosophical problems. As if these dilemmas or 
paradoxes are amenable to solution, only if the philosopher produs enough to 
recognize their truth. 
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The issues pertaining to knowledge or justified true beliefs etc., can have 
their own complex logic. There can be various criteria of knowledge or various 
conditions of knowledge. There can be various theories of knowledge as well 
as various theories of truth. Philosophers can engage in numberless 
disagreements with regard to knowledge, truth and justification. They can 
negotiate various conditions of knowledge, truth and justification and even 
stipulate various conditions thereof. However, they cannot afford to be 
oblivious to the basic methodological distinctions or sophistications with 
regard to the logical terrain of language. They cannot afford to be ignorant with 
regard to the logical topography of language. For if they cannot command a 
clear view of the logical terrain of language, they can perennially get 
circumlocuted in the labyrinthine tangles of language and may never be 
negotiating the orbit of propositional truth or untruth in view of their blissful 
ignorance of basic methodological distinctions within the multicomplex terrain 
of language. Being aware of the logic of language may not be the sufficient 
condition of knowledge but it is a necessary condition of knowledge. The 
philosopher must know how language is actually operating across the 
spectrum. He musts be aware of the descriptive and non-descriptive operations 
carried out by a given language. He must grasp the multifunctional, 
multidirectional and multicontextual character of language. 
Only then can a philosopher grasp that all that glitters at the 
propositional plane need not be golden at the epistemic plane. Language carries 
out an infinite number of operations. In this onward march of linguistic 
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infinitum, there are propositions that are referentially true and contextually 
meaningful. However, the primary business of language is not to go on 
engaging in truth-operations or knowledge-operations. Propositions can be 
descriptively true, viz; "The cat is on the mat" and "That rose is red" or 
experimentally verifiable, viz; "Oxygen helps in the burning of fire" or "H20 = 
water" or logically or demonstrably necessary, viz; "If A = B, and B = C, then 
A = C" or "Any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third" etc. 
However, language as such is not addressed to exploring truth or arriving at 
sure and certain knowledge. Scientific researchers can aspire to discovering 
correspondent truth or mathematicians and historians can aspire to exploring 
coherent truth and thereby expand the frontiers of knowledge. However, the 
fundamental mood or direction of any given language is pragmatic. Any given 
language operates pragmatically. Wittgenstein's radical emphasis on functions 
or operations of language smacks of perfect congruence with the basic 
direction or orientation of pragmatism. We employ language with a view to 
doing something. We carry out myriad operations through language and in all 
such operations, words and sentences are perfectly meaningfully employed. We 
never question the doing character of language, the functional or operational 
mode of language. The questions with regard to meaning of words or 
propositions arise when, as Wittgenstein said, language goes on holiday. 
However, the questions pertaining to truth and knowledge, are, broadly 
speaking, irrelevant to the fundamentally doing character of language. As it 
happens, language is, primarily oriented to pragmatic operations or commercial 
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transactions and only figuratively or metaphorically extrapolated to questions 
pertaining to truth and knowledge. 
We have this irresistible quest for truth, for understanding, for 
realization. However, as Wittgenstein underlined, there is no pure or unalloyed 
truth, understanding or realization. Human understanding is co-extensive with 
language. There is no non-linguistic understanding. Our understanding can 
have pictorial components. Besides early Wittgenstein's picture theory of 
language or meaning even later Wittgenstein talked of our being trapped into 
mental or conceptual pictures. However, for later Wittgenstein, our 
understanding is primarily interpretative or hermeneutical and, more 
importantly, there is no translinguistic understanding which can yield 
absolutely clear truth or unqualified knowledge. 
Besides giving us an overall framework of linguistic analysis within 
which to tackle the larger questions of truth, justification and knowledge, 
Wittgenstein has also tried to tackle the ancient epistemological issue known as 
skepticism. Sceptics, throughout the history of western philosophy, have 
questioned the veracity, reliability and authenticity of knowledge-claims. As a 
philosophical attitude, scepticism is the doubting of knowledge-claims set forth 
in various areas of research, investigation and interpretation. Sceptics have 
challenged the adequacy or reliability of these claims by asking what they are 
based upon or what they actually establish. They have raised the question 
whether such claims about the world are either indubitable or necessarily true 
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r, 	 and they have challenged the alleged grounds or accepted assumptions of 
knowledge-claims. 
From ancient times onward sceptics have developed arguments to 
undermine the contentions of dogmatic philosophers, scientists and 
theologians. The sceptical arguments and their employment against various 
forms of dogmatism have played an important role in shaping both the 
problems and the solutions offered in the course of western philosophy. In 
ancient times sceptics challenged the claims of Platonism, Cartesianism, 
Kantianism and Hegelianism too have been challenged by modem European 
sceptics. Various religions and theologies have also come under sceptical 
attack in our times. 
David Hume was one of the most celebrated skeptical philosophers in 
modern philosophy. He started with empiricist epistemological assumptions 
and ultimately arrived at a powerful sceptical standpoint. Accepting sensations 
or impressions to be the basic source of all knowledge, Hume argued that it is 
impossible to guarantee the validity or veridicality of inductive generalizations, 
causal connections, soul or afterlife by recourse to sense-impressions. 
Accepting relations of ideas or analytic statements and matters of fact or 
synthetic statements to be meaningful, Hume recommended to consign all 
metaphysical and theological discourse to flames for it could contain nothing 
but sophistry and illusion. 
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In western philosophy, scepticism has raised basic epistemological 
issues. For example, human beings have various experiences. Skeptics question 
as to which experiences are veridical and which are not. Human beings have 
different perceptions of what is presumed to be one object. Skeptics question as 
to which is the correct view. Human beings have iIIusory experiences, skeptics 
question as to whether it is really possible to distinguish illusions and dreams 
from reality. Whenever any criteria of knowledge or of value or of beauty are 
formulated or advanced, skeptics question the basis of the criteria or demand an 
indubitable justification of the criteria. On what basis does one tell whether one 
has the right criteria? By other criteria ? Then, are these correct? On what 
standards? The attempt to justify criteria seems either to lead to infinite regress 
or to just stop arbitrarily. If an attempt is made to justify knowledge-claims by 
starting with first principles, the skeptics ask as to what are they based upon ? 
Can it be established that these principles cannot possibly be false? If so, the 
proof itself must be such that it cannot be questioned. If it is claimed that the 
principles are self-evident, it is asked as to whether one can be sure about it, 
sure that one is not deceived? And can one be sure that one can recognize and 
apply the principles correctly? Through such questions skeptics have tried to 
question the very possibility of knowledge? 
Skeptics have been critical with the entire epistemological project. They 
have denied the very possibility of knowledge. Rationalist epistemologists such 
as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz have struggled to find indubitable or self-
evident principles which could serve as axioms from which to derive 
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subsequent knowledge-claims. However, all such attempts have been debunked 
by sceptics. The sceptics have argued that unless knowledge is indubitable and 
infallible, it cannot be deemed to be knowledge. 
While the principles of Logic, analytic statements and statements about 
one's personal pain have generally been deemed to be outside the purview of 
sceptical interrogations or questions, the inductive statements, laws and 
generalizations have been most prone to sceptical attacks. The skeptic may ask, 
"How do you know the sun will rise tomorrow?" , "How do you know that the 
law of gravitation will continue to hold true?" , "Do we really have the 
evidence that the laws of nature will continue to operate as they have thus 
far?" etc. We can respond by saying that we do know. Does not the fact that a 
law has operated all these many years without a single exception constitute 
very good evidence that it will continue to operate tomorrow? The skeptic can 
retort by saying that the fact that a law of nature has continuously and 
consistently operated in the past does not provide either the evidence or 
guarantee that it will continue to operate in the future as well. How are we 
convinced that the operations of the universe in the past give us any clue with 
regard to its future operations? Not only do we not know that the Law of 
Gravitation, for example, will continue to operate tomorrow, but we have no 
evidence that it will. The so-called evidence from the past cannot be granted to 
be the evidence, as past is not a reliable guide to the future. 
The foremost condition of knowledge is the availability of evidence. 
However, the question arises as to how much evidence is needed with a view to 
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be assured that we know a particular proposition under consideration. The 
skeptic will retort that `some evidence" would not suffice as an answer. There 
may be some evidence that tomorrow will be sunny, but you do not yet know 
it. How about "all the evidence that is available?" But this would not do either; 
all the evidence that is now available may not be enough. All the evidence that 
is now available is far from sufficient to enable us to know whether there are 
conscious beings on other planets. We just do not know, even after we have 
examined all the evidence at our disposal. 
Critics of scepticism have claimed that anyone who tried to be a complete 
skeptic, denying or suspending all judgements, would soon be driven insane. 
Even Hume thought that the complete skeptic would have to starve to death 
and would walk into walls or out of windows. Hume, therefore, separated the 
doubting activity from natural practical activities in the world. Skeptical 
philosophizing can be carried on only in theory. Practical activities do 
unavoidably lead to beliefs. 
Some recent thinkers like A. J. Ayer and John Austin have contended that 
scepticism is unnecessary. If knowledge is defined in terms of satisfying 
meaningful criteria, then knowledge is open to all. The sceptics have raised 
false problems. As a matter of fact, it is possible to tell that some experiences 
are illusory since we have criteria for distinguishing them from actual events. 
We do resolve doubts and reach a state of knowledge through various 
verification procedures, after which doubt is meaningless. 
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However, scepticism throughout history has played a dynamic role in 
forcing dogmatic philosophers to find better or stronger bases for their theories. 
It has forced a continued re-examination of previous knowledge - claims and 
has stimulated creative thinkers to work out new theories to meet the sceptical 
challenge (Cornman, Lehrer & Pappas, 1982, pp. 39-45). 
Wittgenstein, in his last book "On Certainty" takes up the question of 
knowledge and the perennial possibility of scepticism. This book is in response 
to Moore's so-called proof of the external world, holding up his hands and 
saying, `Here is one hand' and `Here is another', and concluding therefrom that 
the external world does really exist. Wittgenstein is sure about the relevance of 
Moore's examples. He also coins several examples of his own. However, he 
argues that when Moore speaks of `knowledge', he is not using the word in 
accordance with normal conditions. When one says "I know", one is ready to 
give compelling reasons. But it is not clear how such conditions could be met 
with reference to Moore's examples, such as `Here is a hand'. While 
responding to Moore's examples and his own coinages such as "The earth 
already existed sometime before my birth" etc, Wittgenstein is really puzzled 
as to what to make of this peculiar situation. Knowledge is what we can justify 
by advancing relevant, cogent and coherent reasons. Now when I say "Here is 
my hand', we do not have relevant, cogent and coherent reasons to justify it. 
Can we say that Moore's example does constitute a case of knowledge? 
Wittgenstein would like to reserve the expression "I know", for the cases it is 
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used in normal linguistic exchange. If I say "I know" that I am now sitting in a 
chair", here the word "know' is not used in its appropriate context: 
Moore was advancing certain propositions which he, "knew, with 
Certainty, to be true". Like Descartes he was trying to defeat scepticism and 
rehabilitate knowledge by advancing certain unassailable and indubitable 
propositions. Wittgenstein is not in full agreement with this foundationalist 
programme advanced by rationalists, empiricists or G. E. Moore. He 
questioned as to whether Moore's propositions were cases of knowledge at all. 
However, for Wittgenstein propositions such as `I know this is my left hand', 
`The earth has existed for a long time before I was born', `the mountains are 
older than trees', `I know I am sitting in the chair now' etc, do play a logical 
role in our system. According to Wittgenstein, such propositions must be taken 
for granted if there is to be any doubting or questioning at all. Our questions 
and doubts make sense only if certain propositions are exempt from doubt (On 
Certainty, 1969, p. 341). Such propositions are, according to Wittgenstein, part 
of one's `world-picture', `the inherited background against which I distinguish 
between true and false' (OC, 1969, p. 94). Such propositions cannot be doubted 
without giving up all judgement. Somebody who doubts such propositions 
cannot be communicated with for he undercuts the very scope for arguments 
and counterarguments. If somebody says he doubts whether he has a body, we 
simply do not know what it means to try to convince him that he has one (OC, 
1969, p. 257). We can engage with someone only if he deems such propositions 
to be beyond doubt. However, it does not mean that such propositions are 
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r 	 strong cases or examples of knowledge for they do not confirm very well to the 
normal conditions for knowledge (Oswald Hanfling, 1989, p.160). 
From the above observations of Wittgenstein with regard to skepticism, 
we can assume that he has attempted to deal with one of the most crucial and 
recurring problems of epistemology. As already pointed out, skepticism as an 
attitude or standpoint has been, for better or worse, an extra-ordinarily 
impactful as well as insightful response of philosophers to working out an 
overall estimate of philosophical enterprise. The upshot of Wittgenstein's 
critique of skepticism is that a wholesale skepticism is impossible of 
formulation as well as understanding. In launching the wholesale or fully-
fledged skepticism, the philosophers literally throw the baby with the 
bathwater. Such a skepticism is self-refuting. It cannot be that we run with the 
rabbits and hunt with the hounds. Skeptics will have to admit some 
propositions whether logico-mathematical or observational to be true in order 
to impart some sense or significance to their skeptical posers. 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations', is a radical interpretation 
of language. In this work of seminal significance, Wittgenstein brought out the 
limitations of his understanding of language upon which his earlier book 
Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus rested. His understanding of language was 
inadequate because he deemed language to be monofunctional rather than 
multifunctional . He had assumed that description of facts was the only or most 
fundamental function of language. He had also assumed that statements derived 
their meanings from stating facts. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein 
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brought out that language has many functions besides picturing of facts. A 
language is multifunctional because it is multi-contextual. It is impossible to 
count numberless ways in which language can be used. Some illustrative uses 
of language are metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, scientific, symbolic, 
invocative, informative, descriptive, prescriptive, evocative, exhortative, 
parabolical, allegorical, metaphorical, affirmative, negative etc. Wittgenstein 
points out that promising, asking, commending, praying, joking, swearing, 
cursing, greeting, thinking. Play-acting and story-telling etc. are some other 
uses of language. All these are multiple language-games bringing out multiple 
roles and purposes for which linguistic expressions can be used. By 
highlighting multiple language games, Wittgenstein tries to undermine the 
assumption that words have only the descriptive role to play. The different 
language-games bring out the different roles that language can play. Words 
derive their meanings from their use and each word has a meaning in one 
context which can change if used in some other context (Pitcher, 1964, p. 224). 
The later Wittgenstein's emphasis on the diversity of the functions of 
language fructified into an alternative conception of philosophy. The task or 
function of philosophy now was to liberate the philosopher from confusion, 
puzzlement and bewitchment. Philosophy had now to fight against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. The words had to be 
brought back from their metaphysical use to their everyday usage. By doing so, 
philosophy will not be adding to our knowledge or providing us new 
information, it will just clarify our pattern of thinking by a careful description 
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of language. Such a linguistic analysis of multiple expressions will show the fly 
the way out of the fly-bottle. The role of linguistic analysis will not be 
informative or communicative but therapeutic. 
According to later Wittgenstein there is no royal method of doing 
philosophy. There are various methods like various therapies, which can relieve 
philosopher of puzzlement. The genesis of philosophical puzzlement is in 
language. Philosophical problems grow out of language. In view of the same, it 
is necessary to be familiar with the usages of the language out of which such 
problems arise. Work, play, worship, science, metaphysics, poetry, theology 
etc. require corresponding usage of language. The job of the philosopher is to 
assemble reminders of the way language is used as a way of clarifying the 
origin, genesis and development of philosophical problems. 
Later Wittgenstein like early Wittgenstein is categorically opposed to 
providing any overall metaphysical picture of the world. For later Wittgenstein, 
we operate in countless language-games. It is these language-games which 
provide us our understanding of the world. The metaphysical picture of the 
relationship between language and reality lies outside language. Therefore, it 
is impossible to arrive at truth defined as correspondence with or picturing of 
reality. The meaning and truth operate intra-linguistically. They are not to be 
understood with reference to some external reality. They are to be understood 
within the context of multiple uses of language. Our ideas are not lurking 
within words. Such a perspective needs to be replaced by a radical paradigm-
shift. Early Wittgenstein, maintains that ideas and language are wholly 
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r 	 independent. For later Wittgenstein, ideas are always symbolically embodied 
and essentially inseparable. Words do not serve as a medium of exchange for 
ideas. Words are the very stuff of which ideas are made. It is as impossible to 
separate thought from language as it is to separate mind from it is organic 
embodiment. 
In view of the above considerations, the metaphysical quest for objective 
reality is impossible of realization, says later Wittgenstein. The quest for 
finding a single meaning of words and especially of philosophical terms, is also 
a hopeless struggle. The meanings of words are dependent upon their context. 
Therefore, it is pointless to try to jump out of our linguistic skin. Philosophers 
who are itching for a final, objective, transcendental, universal and eternal 
philosophical account or perspective upon the universe, are to be treated as 
suffering from conceptual illusions and linguistic confusions. They are to be 
treated as patients and relieved of their confusions and misconceptions though 
requisite and appropriate methodological field-illumination. Analysis of the 
multiple functions, purposes and usages of language is the most appropriate 
method of liberating the philosopher from his puzzlement. Appropriate 
linguistic analysis can lead to dissolution of philosophical problems by 
revealing the hidden motivations of philosophical questions, thus leading to the 
withering away of questions themselves. Such an analysis can lead to 
dissolution of philosophical conflicts and disagreements (Khwaja, 1965, 
p.105). 
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	 Later Wittgenstein asserted that philosophy is a purely descriptive 
enterprise. The task of philosophy is neither to reform language nor to try to 
place the various uses of language on a secure foundation. Through the analysis 
of the uses of language, Wittgenstein attempted to undermine the idea that 
philosophy is a foundational enterprise. Rather, philosophical problems are 
removed by having a correct understanding of how language actually functions. 
The key notion in later Wittgenstein's conception of language is the notion of a 
language-game. We should think of the words in language as being like the 
pieces in a game. They are not to be understood by looking for some associated 
ideas in the mind by following some procedure of verification or even by 
looking at the objects for which they stand. Rather, we should think of words in 
terms of their use. Referring to objects in the world is only one of many uses 
that words have. The meaning of a word is given by its use and the family of 
uses that a group of words has constitutes a language-game. For example, the 
language-game we play in describing our own sensations, or the language-
game we play in identifying the causes of events. This conception of language 
leads Wittgenstein to the rejection of the conception that the task of 
philosophical analysis is reductionist or foundationalist. That is, Wittgenstein 
rejects the idea that language-games either have or need a foundation in 
something else. He also rejects the idea that certain language-games can be 
reduced to certain other kinds of language-games. Wittgenstein says, 
philosophical analysis does not alter our existing linguistic practices nor does it 
challenge their validity. 
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For Wittgenstein, knowledge is not the mental representation of what is 
outside the mind. It is this notion of knowledge as accurate representation that 
Wittgenstein struggles to set aside. There is no all-encompassing discipline 
which legitimizes or grounds the other disciplines. Epistemological 
foundationalism is itself devoid of foundation or justification. For Wittgenstein, 
there is no way to stop the infinite regress in the knowing process by an appeal 
to some point or source that is self-evident and self-authenticating and serves as 
a bedrock validating the claims that are subsequently built upon it. For 
Wittgenstein there is no such ultimate source of evidence. There is simply no 
way to move outside of the humanly created languages, cultures, institutions 
and practices within which human beings reside, participate, know and 
undertake their multiple projects. For Wittgenstein, every justification or 
evidence is rooted in forms of life. For later Wittgenstein language is a form of 
activity rather than a form of representation of world. Language is a social 
practice and it has no mechanism to tell what the structure of world is. 
Language is not like a map but is like a set of game played by the users of the 
language. 
In a sense, Wittgenstein's critique of traditional epistemology was in 
continuation with the Kantian critique of epistemology. Hume's skepticism 
seemed to Kant to be a great challenge to the project of knowledge. It struck at 
the very foundations of philosophy and science. If there is no rational 
justification of our beliefs, then the foundations of both philosophy and science 
rest on thin air. If skepticism is to be avoided, says Kant, we must show, how 
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universal and necessary connections are rationally justifiable. Kant says that 
the necessary quality of causal and inductive judgements is determined by the 
structure of mind itself. The mind is not like an inert block of wax passively 
receiving and recording the impressions of sense, as Locke and other British 
sensationalists held. The mind is a creative, active and dynamic process. It is 
equipped with certain innate forms which order and interpret sense-experience. 
The understanding, according to Kant, possesses twelve innate forms or 
categories. It is from these categories that our experience derives its' quality of 
universality and necessity. Those general and necessary judgements which 
Hume declared impossible to justify are the products of the categories of the 
mind upon the stuff of experience. 
According to Kant, the conceptual knowledge is subjective in the sense 
that concepts come to us as products of the categories of our minds rather than 
from external world. Percepts are derived from an objective source external to 
us. But, since percepts are organized by concepts which owe their nature to the 
structure of the mind, everything that we know is coloured by our knowing 
faculty. We can never know the real nature of the external world, if by external 
world is meant, the world as it exists independently of human knowledge. 
Things-in-themselves, as Kant calls them, are unknowable or forever hidden 
from us. What we do know are the appearances (phenomena) produced by the 
operations of the forms of mind upon this unknowable x-world. 
Now, if Kant's theory is correct, we are born with mind like ordering 
glasses. Through these mental lenses there filters the flux of the external world 
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in such a way that we say this world is an ordered, connected, rational whole. 
By finding the source of natural order as a whole within man rather than the 
external world, Kant believed that he had accomplished a Copernican 
revolution in philosophy. 
Wittgenstein, in his own way, accomplished another Copernican 
revolution in twentieth century. Just as for Kant all our knowledge — claims are 
ultimately traceable to the structure of our mind, so for later Wittgenstein all 
our knowledge-claims are ultimately traceable to the structure of our language. 
Language imposes its categories upon our thought and we just cannot jump out 
of our linguistic skin. 
In his later work Wittgenstein denies any attempt to provide an overall 
metaphysical picture at all. We find ourselves caught in a language-game, a 
game that provides us with what we understand as the world. The overall 
metaphysical picture of the relationship between language and reality Iies 
outside our grasp, for it lies outside language. As a consequence, Wittgenstein 
abandoned any notion of truth as correspondence with or picturing of reality, 
and instead understood meaning and truth as an internal function of language. 
The meaning of a word or sentence was not to be found in some external reality 
but simply in terms of its use within language. 
Previously, thought or ideas were deemed to be lurking somehow 
behind or within "words". It has come to seem progressively more inadequate 
and in need of replacement by a radically improved perspective. If the root idea 
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r 	 of the older view is that thought and language are, in principle, wholly 
independent, correspondingly the basic insight of the newer position is that 
there can be no fully articulated thought without symbolic embodiment. 
Language is no longer perceived to be a medium of exchange between 
ideas, but as the very "stuff' of which "ideas" are made. To separate thought 
from language is Iike separating mind from its embodiment in a human 
organism. 
For Iater Wittgenstein, therefore, not only is there no objective reality 
but there is no single meaning. Any sentence or proportion has as many 
meanings as there are contexts. Furthermore, anyone who desires to provide a 
final account is to be treated as if suffering from a philosophical disease. There 
are no answers in any ultimate sense, there are only responses within language. 
This radical shift of perspective tends to make the study of language 
nearly co-extensive with the study of all human behavior. Thus study of 
language has intimate relations with psychology, sociology, anthropology, 
logic, literary criticism and aesthetics. 
From the language-game account of philosophy as advanced by 
Wittgenstein, it can be safely assumed that he is not forwarding any 
metaphysical, ontocosmological or epistemological theories in philosophy but 
only employing a therapeutic method. He is helping us to break free of 
confusions that we are caught in when we try to philosophize. At the same time 
Wittgenstein is disabusing us of the notion that we can stand outside language 
176 
Chapter V 	 Wittgenstein's Impact on Epistemology 
r 	 and command an external view and that such an external view is necessary and 
possible for grasping essence of thought in language. In Tractatus, 
Wittgenstein advances an ontology characterised by features of realism. In his 
later phase, Wittgenstein embraces a theory of meaning which has the 
characteristic features of anti-realism. 
The language-game account of philosophy advanced by Wittgenstein 
anticipates certain postmodern themes. Thus Wittgenstein can be said to be 
presaging anti-foundationalism, anti-essentialism, anti-realism, post 
epistemological stand-point, anti-representationalism, rejection of 
metanarratives. Thus, Wittgenstein may be said to be presaging the postmodern 
turnaround of philosophy in the second half of twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
CRITICAL EVALUATION 
The early Wittgenstein (1889-1951), following Bertrand Russell, gave a 
clear and categorical version of logical atomism in his book Tractatus-Logico-
Philosophicus. His picture theory of propositions or of language is apparently a 
direct outcome of his atomistic analysis. Propositions, according to early 
Wittgenstein, are logical pictures of the situation. Language mirrors the logical 
forms of the universe. The function of analysis is to resolve all complex 
propositions into their ultimate units of unanalyzable names and their 
combination which represent the ultimate symbols of the world. The task of 
analysis is to make every statement an adequate picture of the reality it 
describes. There is an essential correspondence between the structure of the 
sentence and the structure of the fact. The world or reality is mirrored in the 
basic patterns of rational discourse. Given the syntax of a scientifically correct 
language, one can determine the ontological structure of objective reality 
(William and Hennery, 1962, P.  487). 
Thus for early Wittgenstein, in analyzing the meaning of any 
proposition, we must ultimately arrive at nothing but elementary propositions. 
The sense of any propositions can thus be stated completely by means of 
elementary propositions, so that if one had a set of all possible elementary 
propositions, one could say anything that is sayable. Non-elementary 
r 
propositions are just combinations of elementary propositions, they are 
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molecular propositions. The molecular propositions are truth-functional 
compounds of elementary propositions. The whole truth about the world is 
determined by the truth-value of the elementary propositions. If all true 
elementary propositions are listed, the world is completely described (Backar, 
G.P., Hacker, P.M.S.: Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Vasil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, pp. 451-57). 
According to Tractatus there are only three kinds of propositions: (i) 
Tautologous, (ii) Contradictory, and (iii) Descriptive. The tautologus 
propositions are true under all circumstances, contradictory propositions are 
false under all circumstances and only descriptive propositions can be either 
true or false. The limits of language impose corresponding limits on the reality 
that can be described. The limits of language are the limits of the reality. All 
that can be said are the propositions of the natural sciences. Philosophy is not 
one of those sciences and therefore its propositions are non-sensical. Whenever 
someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, the job of the philosopher 
is to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in 
his propositions. Philosophical propositions are not false but non-sensical. 
Most philosophical propositions arise from our failure to understand the logic 
of our language. Philosophy is not a body of true philosophical propositions but 
rather concerned with the clarification of various types of propositions (Baker 
and Hacker, 1980, pp. 466-67). 
The later Wittgenstein advanced a radical critique of his earlier 
- 	 standpoint outlined in Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus. In his posthumously 
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`- 	 published book `Philosophical Investigations', Wittgenstein brought out that 
his earlier understanding of language was inadequate because he deemed 
language to be monofunctional rather than multifunctional. He had assumed 
that description of facts was only the most fundamental function of language, 
he had also assumed that statements derive their meanings from stating facts. In 
`Philosophical Investigations', Wittgenstein brought out that besides the 
picturising of the facts, language has countless other functions. It is impossible 
to count numberless ways in which language can be used. For example, 
language can be used ethically, aesthetically, scientifically, symbolically, 
invocatively, informatively, descriptively, prescriptively, evocatively, 
exhortatively, parabolically, allegorically, axiologically, metaphorically, 
affirmatively, negatively etc. Wittgenstein points out that promising, asking, 
commanding, thinking, playacting and storytelling etc. are some of the other 
important functions of language (Pitcher, 1964, pp. 50-73). 
By highlighting such multiple games, Wittgenstein tries to undermine 
his earlier assumption that words have only descriptive role to play. 
Wittgenstein now underlined that words derive their meanings from their use 
and each word has a meaning in one context which can change if used in some 
other context. The later Wittgenstein rejected the assumption of a single pattern 
in language. Now, he found language as complex as life itself. Now he 
recommended that instead of engaging in atomistic analysis, a philosopher 
should engage in a careful description of the countless uses of language. 
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t- 	 Later Wittgenstein underlined that while using language we cannot help 
operating in and through countless language-games. It is these language-games 
which provide us our understanding of the world. The metaphysical picture of 
the relationship between language and reality lies outside language. Therefore, 
it is impossible to arrive at truth defined as correspondence with or picturising 
of reality. The meaning and truth operate intra-linguistically. They are not to be 
understood with reference to some external reality. They are to be understood 
within the context of multiple uses of language. Our ideas are not lurking 
within words. Such a perspective needs to be replaced by a radical paradigm-
shift. Early Wittgenstein assumes that ideas and language are wholly 
independent. For later Wittgenstein, ideas are always symbolically embodied 
and essentially inseparable. Words do not serve as a medium of exchange for 
ideas. Words are the very stuff of which ideas are made. It is as impossible to 
separate thought from language as it is to separate mind from its organic 
embodiment (Suter, 1989, pp. 14-6). 
The epistemological quest for objective knowledge, in view of the above 
considerations, is impossible of realization. A philosopher who is itching for a 
final, objective, transcendental, universal, and eternal metaphysical account of 
reality or final account of true knowledge is to be treated as suffering from 
conceptual illusions and linguistic confusions. He is to be treated as a patient 
and relieved of his confusions and misconceptions, through requisite and 
appropriate methodological field-illumination. Bringing out the multiple 
functions, purposes and uses of language is the most appropriate method of 
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'- 	 liberating the philosopher from his puzzlement. This conception of philosophy 
advanced by Wittgenstein can have its' own merits and demerits. However, we 
need to bring out the limitations of Wittgenstein's approach as well. 
There is something fundamentally wrong with Wittgenstein's 
methodological approach to philosophy. The method of `Iinguistic analysis' 
fashioned and applied by Wittgenstein with a view to resolving the vast body 
of philosophical problems, has been hailed to be one of the most original 
achievements in twentieth century philosophy. It brings most powerfully that 
philosophical problems originate out of grammatical similarity and logical 
polarity of various types of statements. Philosophy is a product of bewitchment 
of our intelligence by means of language. It is through linguistic analysis that 
we can pinpoint the sources of confusion as well as bewitchment and thereby 
accomplish the dissolution of philosophical problems, for they have no solution 
and mostly trap us in interminable disagreements. Such a Wittgensteinian 
approach can lead to illumination of many a philosophical perplexity by 
revealing to us the genesis of various philosophical problems. Various 
~-- 
philosophical problems can be cited to be pre-eminently amenable to 
Wittgensteinian method analysis, clarification and subsequent dissolution. 
However, to attribute the entire philosophical discourse across religious, 
cultural, historical and civilizational spectra to linguistic confusion and 
bewitchment seems to be a methodological or analytical overkill. Philosophical 
problems may become complicated or philosophical disagreements may get 
r 	 interminable in view of linguistic fixation, rigidity, confusion or bewitchment. 
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"- 	 However, all philosophical problems are not suggested by linguistic confusion 
or bewitchment. Philosophical problems arise out of man's reflection over his 
ontic and situational conditions. The questions pertaining to origin, meaning, 
purpose and destiny of man are not suggested by language. The questions with 
regard to human freedom and determinism or good and evil too are not 
lingogenetic. The questions related to truth, knowledge, justification, reality, 
God etc. too can be shower to be originating beyond or apart from the pulls and 
pushes of linguistic confusion and bewitchment. Such questions, it can be 
readily admitted, can be linguistically mismanaged or misdirected. Language 
can be the director of philosophical problems but it is not be the producer of 
philosophical problems. 
Wittgenstein while bringing out the linguistic genesis of philosophical 
problems fails to appreciate their sociological or situational context. 
Philosophical problems do not originate merely from linguistic sources, they 
are sociologically or situationally inspired as well. The emergence and 
development of human behavior of various dimensions and orientations is a 
T- 
function of various crises that we encounter in our societies. The situationalists 
or contextualists assume that philosophical world-views and value-systems 
emerge in response to human need for attunement with the cosmos by 
integrating the multiple dimensions of our experience into a meaningful whole. 
Philosophical theories such as naturalism, idealism, theism etc., are 
fundamentally philosophical interpretations seeking some coherence across the 
r 	 spectrum of multiple phenomenal, historical and social features. These 
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philosophical responses are the function of social, historical and cultural 
settings in which they originate, develop and articulate. Philosophical problems 
or socially conditioned and situationally determined. Philosophy as a concrete 
cultural response is integrally related to religion, science, ethics, art and 
literature and cannot be understood in isolation. Philosophical problems are 
culturally rooted and oriented. For example, our philosophical beliefs and 
values leading to multidimensional disagreements, are, historically speaking, 
rooted in our prephilosophical rather primodial religious, mystical, theological, 
literary and artistic responses. Problems pertaining to the existence of God and 
soul, the problem of good and evil, the problem of freedom and determinism 
etc., were in vogue in religious, theological and mystical discourse, for 
thousands of years before they were taken up for philosophical consideration 
by rational and critical thinkers. Such problems emerged specifically in the 
Semetic religious milieu espousing belief in complete providential 
determination of the cosmos by an All Powerful and All-Good God. Indian 
philosophers did not debate such philosophical problems as Freedom of Will 
and Determinism, Good and Evil etc. because of Indian belief in universal law 
of karma entailing `as you sow so shall you reap' and belief in numerous and 
even endless rebirths till the moral account of any person is squared out by 
dissolution of all sins leading to liberation from cycle of birth and rebirth. This 
only reinforces the contention of culturalists or contextualists that philosophical 
problems are culturally conditioned and situationally determined. 
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Even the modern approaches to philosophy whether Linguistic, 
Existentialist, Cultural, Marxist, Pragmatic etc. are directly and clearly 
traceable to the emergence of scientific research and consequent technological 
developments across the globe. While medieval or premodern philosophical 
problems were directly fostered and reinforced by theological imperatives, 
modem epistemological theories and contemporary approaches to Philosophy 
can be unambiguously traced to scientific and technological culture. 
Contemporary approaches to philosophy including that of Wittgenstein, have 
inaugurated a methodological turnaround instead of appropriating or debating 
substantive problems of philosophy. 
Wittgenstein is almost completely indifferent to the cultural 
determination of philosophical theories. He deosn't seem to be aware of the 
imperceptible determination of philosophical problems by our respective 
cultural and societal imperatives. He is not bothered about tracing 
philosophical problems to their social and cultural context. 
Wittgenstein does work out a functional analysis of language. However, 
such an analysis is not sufficient to appreciate metaphysical theories. 
Wittgenstein correctly points out that metaphysical statements have no 
descriptive or cognitive function. However, he does not appreciate the 
existential character of metaphysical statements. Metaphysical judgements do 
not merely embody linguistic `confusions, they also give expression to man's 
existential problems. Metaphysical statements are not conspired into 
articulation or formulation merely by linguistic bewitchment, they are also 
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inspired by our ineliminable perplexity with regard to origin and destiny of the 
universe and our status in such a universe. We cannot be satisfied by a purely 
phenomenological analysis of the world. Neither can a tabulation of 
confirmable hypotheses and formal deductions relieve us of our existential 
crisis. Man does not merely care for a descriptive analysis of the features of the 
cosmos, he craves for some metaphysical explanation of the universe, as well. 
Definitions and interpretations do not console him; he wants to explore the 
purpose of his existence, the ideals and values he has to live by and die for and 
the nature of his eschatological destiny. Man does not live by scientific 
explanations and causes. He does not live by inductive generalisations and 
deductive conclusions. He does not live by empirical or rational knowledge. He 
lives by aspirations and missions. These existential concerns of man are at the 
heart of philosophy. Therefore, philosophical discourse cannot be explained 
away by recourse to linguistic analysis. Philosophical propositions or theories 
arise out of our existential questions and concerns. Philosophical theories are 
motivated by our existential yearning to figure out our place and role in the 
cosmos. 
Wittgenstein cannot capture the existential genesis of philosophical 
propositions and theories. Philosophical propositions are essentially evaluative 
of human conditions and therefore existential and thus beyond the logic of truth 
and falsity. Philosophy arises out of our existential antinomies. It wells up from 
the depths of the antinomical structure of human existence. Philosophical 
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problems are rooted in the mystery of being. Wittgenstein fails to grasp the 
existential genesis of philosophy. 
Wittgenstein also fails to grasp the crucial function of philosophical 
theories. Such philosophical theories as idealism, pantheism, materialism, 
monism, pluralism, dualism etc. are not superfactual truth-claims but 
conceptual unifications or world-views. They operate as integrating guidelines 
or principles in our ongoing criss or predicaments. 
Metaphysical statements can not be assimilated to scientific and 
descriptive statements. Such an assimilation is a confusion born out of 
linguistic and grammatical similarities between various types of propositions, 
making us oblivious to the irresolvable logical dissimilarities thereof. However, 
Wittgenstein does not capture the value or significance of philosophical 
positions operating as world-views, thus interpreting features of the cosmos 
into a coherent whole. Philosophical theories operating as world-views are 
innocent of superfactual pretensions. Philosophical theories as world-views do 
not claim to be descriptively or cognitively true. As worldviews, they have 
directive, orientative and ontogenetic function. Wittgenstein had a rare genius 
of understanding what philosophy is not but he falters in appreciating what 
philosophy positively is. 
Bringing out the linguistic bewitchment of philosophers does not tell us 
the full story. We will have to understand philosophy to be an organization of 
our experiential data into a meaningful whole. For example, the proposition 
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k 	 "God is the creator of the universe" can be said to be an assimilation of "A 
potter is the creator of the pots". However, `God' can operate multi functionally 
or multi-contextually. The word `God' symbolizes a fully-fledged world-view 
and value-system. Any given theological perspective can have an abiding 
existential function. We can locate our existential manifold of beauty and 
order, evil and suffering, hope and fear, purpose and value, despair and 
helplessness etc., into `God frame of reference'. Theology as a superscience 
can be subjected to Wittgensteinian critique but theology as an existential 
interpretation of the cosmos or as a world-view is not amenable to the critique 
advanced by Wittgenstein. Wittgensteinian critique of philosophy is not 
applicable to philosophy as a consistent, comprehensive and fruitful conceptual 
unification. Philosophy as conceptual unification or as a world-view is beyond 
true/false logical dichotomy. 
Wittgenstein, yet again, ignores the value-geneticity or axiogeneticity of 
philosophical discourse. Any philosophical system or metaphysical theory 
presages a value-system. Metaphysics or ethics are dialectically correlated. 
They are interdependent and, so to say, rise and fall together. Both have a 
cross justificatory or cross-legitimatory function. An ethical theory can not 
operate in a vacuum and a metaphysical theory can not sustain its prestine 
glory in some transcendental realm. An ethical theory has to justify itself with 
reference to a conceptual unification or a metaphysical world-view. 
Conversely, we need a metaphysical world-view with a nuclear ethical core in 
order to operate meaningfully within any space-time civilizational continuum 
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or societal frame of reference. Thus, both metaphysics and ethics operate in a 
mutual causal relationship. 
Every metaphysical theory, conceptual unification, theological world-
view or ideological system can have a corresponding set of values. If the 
metaphysical theory or world-view is, in the face of historical change or 
evolution, replaced by another metaphysical theory or world-view, there is a 
corresponding replacement of a value-system as well. Similarly, an emergence 
of a new value-system, again due to historical vicissitudes or societal 
transformations, correspondingly necessitates an alternative metaphysical 
weltanschauung. Such values as love, kindness, mercy, sympathy, compassion, 
mutuality, commitment, detachment, responsibility, goodwill, authenticity etc. 
tend to stabilize and reinforce a theistic rather monotheistic world-view. On the 
other hand, such values as hard work, discipline, tolerance, free-enquiry, social 
egalitarianism, political independence, economic well-fare, democracy, 
liberalism, secularism etc. inspire or reinforce a naturalistic world-view. 
Monotheism and naturalism, correspondingly, promote or reinforce the 
respective values that drive us in the first place, to formulate such conceptual 
frames or schemes. 
Thus metaphysical systems or world-views, are profoundly and 
subterraneously axiogenetic or value-genetic, although their sociogenetic, 
psychogenetic and lignogenetic dimensions can hardly be overemphasized. A 
set of values can play a crucial or fundamental role in the origin and destiny 
and rise andfall of a philosophical theory. Once we are awakened to the value- 
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geneticity or value-centricity of metaphysical theories, we are illuminated as to 
the nature of a philosophical disagreement and its irresolvability. The value-
dimensionality of metaphysics spotlights one of its' basic sources. Such an 
awareness intimates to us as to what orientates a metaphysician to opt for a 
particular metaphysical theory. Such an awareness may also help us in 
transcending the very quest for resolution of metaphysical disagreements. Thus 
we may be liberated from our craze for debating the merits and demerits of a 
given metaphysical system. We may simply stop taking sides in philosophy. 
We may come to the conclusion that in view of the ineliminable competing 
value-choices, metaphysical disagreement is a perennial feature of a 
philosopher's intellectual struggle and should possibly be accepted in the spirit 
of `what can not be cured must be endured'. 
An exploration of the correlation between philosophy and values can 
enrich our understanding of philosophy. Philosophy against the backdrop of 
values can definitely yield its locus standi, raison deter and modus operandi. 
Philosophical theories and values are reciprocally reinforcing. By missing this 
reciprocation, Wittgenstein has missed the interrelationship between 
philosophy and life. 
The Wittgensteinian chastisement of philosophy to be bewitchment of 
our intelligence by means of language, can be greatly misleading. Such an 
evaluation can, at best, dismantle the superscientific pretentions of philosophy 
but hardly reveal its real import. Philosophy is not merely a product of 
linguistic bewitchment. Wittgensteinian linguistic analysis fails to probe the 
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deeper locus standi of philosophy. The existentialist and culturalist evaluations 
of philosophy see more profoundly the modus operandi of philosophy. 
A profounder analysis can reveal that philosophy can not be reduced to 
any monodimensional formula. Even a multidimensional analysis of 
philosophy can not exhaust it's range, richness and complexity. However, we 
need to understand the linguistic bewitchment and confusion which generate 
philosophical paradoxes. We will have to appreciate the basic cultural 
intuitions and orientations wherefrom a philosophical world-view springs up. 
We will have to understand the existential dilemmas and predicaments which 
powerfully induce a philosopher to underline certain philosophical responses. 
We will have to grasp the axiological motivations which inspire us to expound 
or appropriate this or that philosophical interpretation. We will have to uncover 
the political, economic and psychological roots of philosophical worldviews. 
Such a comprehensive methodological investigation of philosophy can 
hopefully pinpoint the causes and reasons of philosophical disagreement. 
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